

Office Memorandum

• UNITE

S GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AM*FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY *VPS*SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV (100-3-99)

DATE: March 9, 1954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

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 Miss Gandy _____

The Central Research Unit recently reviewed all the material issued by the United States Information Agency (USIA) to determine if any of these publications could be used by the Bureau in connection with the captioned programs. Among this material were three pamphlets entitled "Democracy Vs. Communism," which was reprinted by USIA from an article in the October, 1951, issue of the magazine Pageant, "Who is the Imperialist," which was prepared by USIA, and "The Phantom American Negro," which was reprinted by USIA from the July, 1951, issue of Reader's Digest. Copies of these publications are attached.

USIA furnished copies of the pamphlet "Who is the Imperialist," and since extra copies of "Democracy Vs. Communism" and "The Phantom American Negro" were not available, USIA furnished the photo-offset plates and copies were reproduced by the Bureau's Mechanical Section.

A letter transmitting these pamphlets, in quantities recommended by the Internal Security Section, to the offices in which the captioned programs are in effect is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter be approved and returned to the Central Research Unit, where it will be dated and arrangements completed for forwarding this material to the field.

Attachments

JFC:mpm


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1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue, Rm. 1243

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10-3-99-1785
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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INDEXED - 5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHO IS THE IMPERIALIST?



100-3-99-1285

IMPERIALISM — Some definitions:

“...A depraved choice of national life, imposed by self-seeking interests which appeal to the lusts of quantitative acquisitiveness and of forceful domination....”

Hobson's *Imperialism*

“Imperialism is leading to annexation, to increased national oppression....”

Lenin's *Imperialism*

“... A predatory foreign policy.”

Ushakov's *Standard Dictionary
of the Russian Language*

“The policy, practice, or advocacy of seeking, or acquiescing in, the extension of the control, dominion, or empire of a nation....”

Webster's *New International
Dictionary of the English Language*
Second Edition

Who *is* the Imperialist?

"Imperialism" is a word often heard these days. At work, at meals, wherever people get together and talk about the sad state of the world, imperialism is blamed again and again.

If imperialism is causing so much of the world's trouble, then free men everywhere should know the facts.

What are the facts? What nation recklessly seeks to extend its domination and control over a tense and nervous world?

Who *is* the Imperialist?

This booklet sets forth the record of Soviet territorial expansion since 1939.

Only a small part of this new Soviet empire is recognized by the free world. Soviet claim to most of it rests on force.

Who *is* the Imperialist?

The facts are a matter of record.

Let the record speak for itself.

Soviet Territorial Expansion Since 1939

1. Rumanian Provinces




These are the words of the Imperialist:
"Within four days . . . Soviet troops shall occupy the territory of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. . . . The Soviet Union insists. . . ."

So read the Soviet ultimatum dispatched to the Rumanian government in late June, 1940.

What could Rumania do? She had to accede to Soviet demands. The Red Army occupied Bessarabia and northern Bukovina; the two provinces were incorporated into the Soviet Union, on August 2, 1940.

What the U.S.S.R. Demanded and Got from Rumania:





These areas, larger than all of Denmark, included Rumania's second and third largest cities, Chisinau (Kishinev) and Cernauti (Chernovtsy).

Soviet Territorial Expansion Since 1939

2. Baltic States

Late in 1939, the Soviet Union got secret advance approval from Nazi Germany to seize the Baltic States. They were absorbed into the U.S.S.R. after an "election" supervised by the Red Army.



6,030,000 freedom-loving people were forced to become subjects of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union Made a Deal with Nazi Germany and Added the Baltic States to the U.S.S.R.



47,400
SQ. KILOMETERS




65,800
SQ. KILOMETERS

These countries, in total area, were twice as large as Scotland. Kaunas, Tallinn, Riga, once proud independent capitals, became provincial centers of Soviet power.

Soviet Territorial Expansion Since 1939

3. Northern East Prussia




During World War II, the Red Army occupied northern East Prussia and annexed the area to Soviet Russia.

1,000,000 people fled westward. Their homes and farms were taken over by families sent from the Soviet Union.

The U.S.S.R. Demanded and Got This Area of East Prussia and Gave its Cities Russian Names:


14,000
SQ. KILOMETERS



Koenigsberg (population 275,000) is now called Kaliningrad.

Tilsit (population 57,000) has been renamed Sovetsk.

Insterburg (population 39,000) became Chernyakhovsk.



Soviet Territorial Expansion Since 1939

4. Eastern Czechoslovakia




In June, 1945, Czechoslovakia's easternmost province, Carpathian Ruthenia, was added to the Soviet Union.

The annexation of this territory marked the first in a series of postwar Soviet assaults against the sovereignty and independence of the Czechoslovak nation.

Communists seized control of the weakened country on February 25, 1948. Czechoslovakia became a Soviet satellite.

What the U.S.S.R. Demanded and Got from Her Neighbor Czechoslovakia:



12,700
SQ. KILOMETERS

Many of the 731,000 people in the area abandoned their homes and farms, fled to start life anew in other parts of Czechoslovakia.

This area, nearly equal in size to Alsace-Lorraine, was incorporated into the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Soviet Territorial Expansion Since 1939


5. Eastern Poland



As a result of the agreement between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in August, 1939, Poland was invaded. Within a month, Hitler and Stalin divided the country between them. In 1941, the Germans forced the Russians out of their newly acquired Polish territory. But the Red Army reoccupied the area in 1944. Following the establishment of a Soviet-sponsored provisional Polish government, the Soviet Union annexed 181,000 square kilometers of Polish territory, establishing the Russo-Polish frontier, with minor modifications, at the Curzon Line.

A Nazi-Soviet Deal Led to This Grab from the Poles:

181,000
SQ. KILOMETERS



11,800,000 persons—a population exceeding that of the Netherlands — came under Moscow's control.




This piece of Poland is about equal in size to the combined areas of Austria and Hungary. Within its borders lie the important cities of Lwow (L'vov) and Wilno (Vil'nyus).

Soviet Territorial Expansion Since 1939

6. Finnish Provinces

The Soviet Union attacked Finland in November, 1939. In the armistice concluding the war, the Finns were forced to cede over one-tenth of their territory to the Soviet Union. This land included the Karelian Isthmus with Finland's second largest city, Viipuri (Vyborg); the shores of Lake Ladoga; a section of the Salla (Kuolayarvi) region; and a strip of Kalastajasarento (the Rybachiy Peninsula). Resuming the fighting in 1941, the Finns recovered these losses. But in a second armistice on September 19, 1944, Finland was compelled to yield to Russia, in addition to those parts previously ceded, the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) with its access to the Arctic Ocean. The Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947, added a lease of the Porkkala area as a Russian naval base for fifty years.




What Finland Ceded to the U.S.S.R.:

Most of 450,000 Finns in this area chose to resettle elsewhere in Finland.




45,600
SQ. KILOMETERS



PORKKALA NAVAL BASE: The U.S.S.R. got a fifty-year lease of this key fortress.

Soviet Territorial Expansion Since 1939

In the Far East




In Asia, as in Europe, the Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of extending the area of its control by swallowing up countries and parts of countries along its borders.


Soviet Territorial Expansion Since 1939

7. Tannu Tuva

In October, 1944, the republic of Tannu Tuva was incorporated into the U.S.S.R. as a special Autonomous Region.



8. Port Arthur



—and Manchurian Railways

A treaty with China, August 14, 1945, gave the Soviets joint control of the South Manchurian and Chinese Eastern railways, and of Port Arthur, important naval base.

Soviet Territorial Expansion Since 1939

9. Japanese Possessions




Following Japan's defeat in World War II, the Kurile Islands and the southern half of the island of Sakhalin were annexed and incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Red Army had occupied these territories after the Soviet Union's six-day war against the Japanese.

Areas of Japan Annexed by the U.S.S.R. Following Japan's Defeat:



46,100
SQ. KILOMETERS



433,000 people became subject to Soviet dictatorship. Many had to abandon homes.

These acquisitions, involving an area larger than Switzerland, substantially expanded Russia's Pacific coastline and brought important strategic areas under Soviet control.

The preceding pages reveal but one aspect of predatory Soviet policy: territorial expansion. But this does not complete the Communist record.

The fact is that the U.S.S.R. has subjugated many more millions of people and many more square kilometers of territory without changing a single boundary. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, eastern Germany, China, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and the remaining parts of Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia still lie outside the Russian borders. But no longer are they free and sovereign states. Soviet imperialism destroyed them from within and reduced them to the level of Russian colonies.

In country after country, the same methods were used: demonstrate, agitate, infiltrate, intimidate, subvert, control.

Over and over again, against free men everywhere, the Kremlin and its armed agents wield the blunt instruments of imperialism: threat, riot, beating, bloodshed, murder.

ALBANIA, like the other Balkan countries, was taken over by the "liberating" Red Army. The Soviet Union installed a puppet regime headed by a native quisling carefully schooled in Soviet methods. Today Albania's army is trained, supplied, and controlled by the Soviet Union.

In BULGARIA the Communist-run Fatherland Front seized total power and suppressed all opposition. An unprecedented law has been passed which allows Soviet citizens to hold Bulgarian government offices on a par with native citizens.

In the remaining part of CZECHOSLOVAKIA a "government of national unity" opened the way for Soviet-trained agents to occupy key cabinet posts. As soon as the Communists

had an iron grip on police, communications, armed forces, and other important sources of power, they overturned the freely elected government.

In HUNGARY, on Soviet orders, the clergy is subjected to steady persecution, and thousands of people are arbitrarily deported from their homes. As in the other satellites, Russian is a compulsory language in the schools.

In what is left of POLAND, the army, under complete Soviet control, is commanded by the Russian Marshal Nikolai A. Rokossovsky. Like the other satellites, Poland has no foreign policy of its own.

RUMANIA's rich oil resources are controlled by a joint corporation in which the U.S.S.R. owns over half the stock. Rumania is the seat of the international Communist propaganda organization, the Cominform.

The so-called "Democratic" Republic in east GERMANY is closely supervised by the Soviet Control Commission.

In CHINA, the U.S.S.R. dismantled the industries of Manchuria and, according to conservative estimates, removed at least \$800,000,000 worth of property to the Soviet Union. China's leaders are Soviet-trained.

In OUTER MONGOLIA, in a 1945 "plebiscite," the people "voted" 483,291 to 0 to become "independent." This meant complete separation from China and direct subjugation to Soviet interests.

In NORTH KOREA the Soviet Union established a puppet government and armed the North Korean army which (in June, 1950) attacked the Republic of Korea.

Here is the Soviet Record as of 1951:

TERRITORIES ANNEXED	AREA (km ²)	POPULATION (before annexation)
1. Rumanian Provinces	50,200	3,700,000
2. Estonia	47,400	1,122,000
3. Latvia	65,800	1,951,000
4. Lithuania	55,700	2,957,000
5. Northern East Prussia	14,000	1,187,000
6. Eastern Czechoslovakia	12,700	731,000
7. Eastern Poland	181,000	11,800,000
8. Finnish Provinces	45,600	450,000
9. Tannu Tuva	165,800	65,000
10. Japanese Possessions	46,100	433,000
TOTAL	684,300	24,396,000

SATELLITES CONTROLLED

11. Albania	28,700	1,186,000
12. Bulgaria	110,900	7,160,000
13. Czechoslovakia*	127,700	12,463,000
14. Eastern Germany	111,100	18,807,000
15. Hungary	93,000	9,224,000
16. Poland*	311,800	24,500,000
17. Rumania*	237,200	16,007,000
18. China	9,700,300	450,000,000
19. Outer Mongolia	1,621,100	2,000,000
20. North Korea	125,600	9,100,000
TOTAL	12,467,400	550,447,000

TOTAL SOVIET-DOMINATED: **13,151,700** **574,843,000**


*Parts not annexed

SEE MAP INSIDE

(Countries identified by numbers as listed above)



U.S.S.R.



SOVIET TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION SINCE 1939



ANNEXED



CONTROLLED

IN THE FREE WORLD

While the Soviet Union has been swallowing country after country by annexation and subversion, the free world has been working for political freedom.

India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ceylon, the Philippines, Burma, and Israel have become independent and have entered the family of free nations.

The new nations have established democratic institutions and elected representative governments. They have adopted domestic and foreign policies which are of their own choosing and making.

Other peoples who are continuing to prepare for independence look for leadership to the seven new republics and to the countries which have worked to further the independence of the new nations and to foster the cause of freedom in the world.

These are the newly independent countries:

	AREA (km ²)	POPULATION
India	3,131,300	347,300,000
Pakistan	874,200	73,300,000
Indonesia	1,511,200	79,300,000
Ceylon	65,600	7,300,000
Philippines	296,300	19,200,000
Burma	677,900	18,000,000
Israel	20,200	1,000,000
TOTAL	6,576,700	545,400,000

Continued on back page

IN THE FREE WORLD

INDIA, after several stages of increased self-rule under the British, in 1947 became a republic with dominion status in the British Commonwealth of Nations.

PAKISTAN, originally a part of the British-controlled Indian Empire, also became a self-governing dominion in 1947 and is now the world's largest Moslem state.

INDONESIA acquired full sovereignty from the Netherlands in 1949.

CEYLON, the youngest dominion in the British Commonwealth of Nations, became self-governing in 1948.

In fulfillment of its promise, the United States granted independence to the PHILIPPINES in 1946.

The Union of BURMA, formerly a Crown Colony of Great Britain, became a fully independent republic in 1948.

ISRAEL again became a Jewish homeland when the British-held League of Nations mandate expired in 1948.

THE FREE WORLD GRANTED
INDEPENDENCE TO:

6,576,700 KM² and 545,400,000 PEOPLE

THE SOVIET UNION SUBJUGATED:

13,151,700 KM² and 574,843,000 PEOPLE

WHO IS THE IMPERIALIST?

DEMOCRACY VS. COMMUNISM

From

PAGEANT

— OCTOBER 1951 —

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100-3-99-1785

YOUR RIGHTS AS A HUMAN BEING

"We believe that all men are created equal and that they have the right to equal justice under the law.

We believe that all men have the right to freedom of thought and expression and the right to worship as they please.

We believe that all men are entitled to equal opportunities for jobs, for homes, for good health and for education.

We believe that all men should have a voice in their government and that Government should protect, not usurp, the rights of the people.

These are the basic civil rights which are the source and support of our democracy." (President Truman, Sept. 28, 1948)

YOUR HOME AND PROPERTY

"In the middle west, most of our farm lands are owned by the families who operate them. But if a group of farmers wanted to pool their resources and run a collective farm, there is no law against it. They could go right ahead. . . . The point I want to make is that the farmers of the prairies have made their own free choice and the economic and social system that resulted was the system of family farms, along with cooperatives."

(Mrs. Edith Sampson, US Representative to the UN Gen. Assembly, Oct. 1, 1950)

THE EDUCATION OF YOUR KIDS

"The education of the masses in all the nations is the only sure basis for the general well-being of all peoples and our only hope for permanent peace."

(Earl J. McGrath, US Commissioner of Education, Oct. 26, 1950)

GOD AND YOUR CHURCH

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."

(Amendment 1, US Constitution)

"There must be absolute religious liberty, for tyranny and intolerance are as abhorrent in matters intellectual and spiritual, as in matters political and material."

(Theodore Roosevelt)

"Only in the collective can the individual find the means giving him the opportunity to develop his inclinations in all directions; in consequence, personal freedom is possible only in the collective." *(Karl Marx, "German Ideology")*

"Civil rights are protected by law, except where they are exercised contrary to their social economic purpose. . . ." *(Art. 1, Civil Code, RSFSR)*

"The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories . . . and the bulk of the dwelling houses in the cities and industrial localities are state property, that is, belong to the whole people." *(Art. 6, Constitution of the USSR)*

"Reinforcing by legislation the abrogation of private property in land, declaring the entire stock of land . . . to be national property to belong to the people as a whole [is] the basis of the socialist social order, the most important guarantee of the rights and freedoms granted to the toilers by the socialist revolution."

(Vishinsky, "The Law of the Soviet State")

". . . The school must become a weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat." *(Lenin, "Works")*

"Education is a weapon whose effect depends on who holds it in his hands, and at whom it is aimed." *(Stalin)*

"The Party cannot be neutral toward religion, and it does conduct anti-religious propaganda against all and every religious prejudice because it stands for science, while religious prejudices run counter to science." *(Stalin in "Leninism")*

YOUR JOB

"Nothing shall . . . require an individual employee to render labor or service without his consent, nor . . . to make the quitting of his labor by an individual employee an illegal act; nor . . . to compel the performance by an individual employee of . . . labor without his consent."

(*US Code, Labor Management Relations*)

"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining." (*Amendment, National Labor Relations Act*)

YOUR COUNTRY AT PEACE OR AT WAR

"We have no aggressive purpose. We will not use our strength for aggression. We are a tolerant and restrained people, deeply aware of our moral responsibilities and deeply aware of the horrors of war. . . . We will continue to take every honorable step we can to avoid general war."

(*President Truman, Dec. 15, 1950*)

"Our essential purpose is, as it has always been in our history, to preserve our free institutions so that freedom and justice may survive and continue to flourish. We wish to do this peacefully, because peace is the climate in which our free institutions flourish best. But we have shown in our history that we hold these values so dear that if we must, we will fight for them." (*Sec. of State Dean Acheson, Nov. 29, 1950*)

YOUR DAILY NEWSPAPER

"There are more than 1,700 daily newspapers in the United States and almost 10,000 weeklies. . . . Each of these papers is free to report world news and to comment on this news as it likes. Out of this total of 140 million citizens, 1,700 daily newspapers, and 10,000 weeklies, there are bound to be some extremists. There are two ways in which these extremists can be handled. One way is to put them in jail; the other is to argue with them in the open and bring them under the weight of wiser opinion. We prefer the latter."

(*Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt, Oct. 24, 1947*)

"Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of the press. . . ."

(*Amendment I, US Constitution*)

"Voluntary withdrawal of a worker or clerk from government, cooperative and social enterprises and offices, as well as voluntary transfer from one enterprise or office to another is forbidden."

(Soviet Law of 26 June 1940)

"For truancy (more than 20 minutes late) without a valid reason, the workers and employees of state, cooperative and public enterprises and institutions . . . are to be punished by corrective-labor work at the place of work for a period up to six months and withholding of salary up to 25 per cent."

(Soviet Criminal Code)

"We are living not only in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."

(Lenin, "Collected Works")

"As long as capitalism and Socialism remain, we cannot live in peace. In the end one or the other will triumph—a funeral requiem will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism."

(Lenin, "Collected Works")

"We have no freedom of the press for the bourgeoisie. We have no freedom of the press for the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries. . . . But what is there surprising in that? We have never pledged ourselves to grant freedom of the press to all classes, and to make all classes happy. . . ."

(Stalin, "Leninism")

"Every line in our newspapers and magazines, every word of the Bolshevik press, must be subordinated to the task of training the working class in the spirit of Communism and the struggle with survivals of capitalism in the conscience of men."

(Page 1 editorial in Pravda)

CONTINUED

VOTING AND POLITICAL PARTIES

"All citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, township, parish, school district, municipality or other territorial subdivision, shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such elections." (*U.S. Code*)

"The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any other state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. . . ." (*Amendment 15, U.S. Constitution*)

YOUR RADIO AND TV

"Freedom of speech on the radio must be broad enough to provide full and equal opportunity for the presentation to the public of all sides of public issues. Indeed, as one licensed to operate in a public domain, the licensee has assumed the obligation of presenting all sides of important public questions, fairly, objectively, and without bias. The public interest—not the private—is paramount. . . ."

(*Order of the Federal Communications Commission, Jan. 16, 1941*)

THE MOVIES

". . . many motion pictures . . . are produced very frankly to entertain and do no more than entertain; to make people happy; to bring them a pleasant hour or two of complete relaxation—a vital necessity in a complex, wearying, worrisome world. If the motion picture served no other end but that, it would still rank, in my opinion, among the enriching forces of life."

(*Eric Johnston, Nov. 1947*)

YOUR FAVORITE MUSIC

"Music has been a great help in maintaining . . . civilization, and music is international . . . as nations sing and play each other's music, so they gradually grow to understand each other better; hence they will, little by little, ease some international stresses. When you have sung in a quartet or choir with a man, you are less likely to try to get the better of him outside the concert hall. . . ."

(*President Truman, Oct. 1946*)

YOUR FAVORITE BOOKS

"Freedom of expression is unique among the liberties . . . for it protects and promotes the other freedoms that create a free society of happy men. . . ."

(*William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State, March 25, 1948*)

"Several parties and, accordingly, freedom for parties as well, can exist only in a society where there are antagonistic classes with hostile and irreconcilable interests. . . . In the USSR, however, there are no longer such classes. . . . In the USSR there is ground for one party only—the Communist Party; and in the USSR only one party can exist—the Communist Party."

(*Stalin, Report on the Draft Constitution of the USSR, 1936*)

"Possessing an audience of millions and penetrating to the most far-flung and 'deaf' corners of our immense country, the Soviet radio must carry to the widest masses the teachings of Marx-Lenin-Stalin. . . ." ("USSR Speaking," No. 2, 1935)

"In order . . . to become a genuine loudspeaker for the Party addressing the millions of workers, political information [on the radio] must be outstanding in its loyalty to the Party's interests and activity. We reject all indifferent, 'objective' information." ("USSR Speaking," No. 2, 1935)

"[The film is] a great and invaluable force . . . aiding the working class and its Party to educate the toilers in the spirit of socialism, to organize the masses . . . and to raise their cultural and political battle-fitness."

(*Stalin in "Lenin, Stalin, and the Party on the Film"*)

"The characteristics of this music [V. Muradelli's 'The Great Friendship'] are the negation of the basic principles of classic music; the cult of atonality, the dissonance and discord supposedly expressive of 'progress' and 'novelty' . . . interest is confused, neuropathological combinations . . . turn music into cacophony, into a chaotic conglomeration of sounds. . . ."

(*General meeting of Moscow composers in Feb. 1948*)

"We do not intend to abandon the war theme. We must write of war, so that the generation of young people that comes after us can love arms and be ready for struggle and victories." ("Moscow Literary Gazette," 1946)

The Phantom American Negro

By George S. Schuyler

*Associate editor of the Pittsburgh Courier,
a Negro newspaper of national circulation.*

From
THE READER'S DIGEST
July 1951

100-3-99-1785

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Reader's Digest

JULY 1951

The "downtrodden Negro" of Party Line fame
is better off than the Russian citizen

THE PHANTOM AMERICAN NEGRO

WHEREVER our citizens travel abroad, they are quizzed about the "oppressed and persecuted" American Negroes. "How can you tell others about democracy when you terrorize and lynch Negroes? Why do you deny them their civil rights?"

"How does it feel," a Norwegian asked me last December in an Oslo hotel, "to be able to stay in a nice place like this and eat in such a fine dining room?" He would not believe that I had been a guest in fine hotels in the United States.

A Uruguayan cabinet officer dis-
coursed dolefully on the tragedy of
the "poor Negroes" of North Amer-
ica until I observed that they owned
several times more automobiles than
the total number of cars his country
boasted, and that in no city in our
South were the Negroes as impover-

GEORGE S. SCHUYLER is associate editor of the Pittsburgh *Courier*, a Negro newspaper of national circulation.

*Condensed from
The Freeman*

George S. Schuyler

ished as the mestizos I had seen in Montevideo.

Who is responsible for this false picture of the Ameri-

can Negro? The Communists, of course, have done their part in spreading a fantastically biased picture of American race relations. There has been no effective American counterpropaganda. Indeed, Americans themselves have helped to publicize misinformation. The books that literate foreigners have read — *Kingsblood Royal*, *Freedom Road*, *Strange Fruit*, *Native Son* — all stress hatred between whites and blacks. The news services send abroad mostly the sensational and discreditable items, salted with occasional mention of Marian Anderson, Jackie Robinson or Ralph Bunche. On the screen, foreigners see *Home of the Brave*, *Pinky* and *No Way Out*. Small wonder that they believe in this phantom Negro!

Paradoxically, the average white American is as misinformed as the

average European, for he has been exposed to the same propaganda in books, magazines, newspapers and movies.

Actually, the progressive improvement of race relations and the economic rise of the Negro in the United States is a flattering example of democracy in action. The most "exploited" Negroes in Mississippi are better off than the citizens of Russia or her satellites.

In 1865 about 95 percent of American Negroes were illiterate. Today there is little illiteracy among them. The educational systems that have eliminated their illiteracy were voted and maintained by white-controlled counties and states. By 1900 there were a million and a half colored pupils in public elementary schools. Today the enrollment exceeds two and a quarter million. In 1900 there were 92 public high schools for Negroes in the South. Today there are 2500. Some 10,000 Negroes are graduated from college each year, and there are 70,000 students in attendance — proportionately more than the total number of college students in Great Britain. This climb from chattel slavery is not accomplished in an atmosphere of persecution.

In 1900 it was prophesied that disease would exterminate the American Negroes. Today their life expectancy is 60 years, only eight years less than that of American whites.

In 1900 Negroes owned 17 percent of the nonfarm homes in which

they dwelt. By 1947 they owned 34 percent. Altogether American Negroes now own over one million homes. There are 184,000 Negro farm owners, with farms averaging 70 acres. And in the past few years Negroes have themselves financed and erected 25,000 new housing units — quite an achievement for a "terrorized" populace.

A standard Soviet charge is that American capitalists grind down the Negro. The Julius Rosenwald Fund expended more than \$22,000,000 largely for Negro education and helped erect 5000 schools in the South. The General Education Board, set up by John D. Rockefeller in 1902, has expended 20 percent of its money to advance the education of Negroes, and recently John D. Rockefeller, Jr., gave \$5,000,000 to aid privately owned Negro colleges.

For the past 50 years the economic gulf between Negroes and Whites has been narrowing. Negroes own 14 banks, 200 credit unions, 60,000 retail businesses, 26 savings and loan associations, and 25 large insurance companies with assets of more than \$100,000,000, with a billion dollars' worth of insurance in force in 27 states and the District of Columbia.

Negroes own and publish 150 newspapers and several major magazines with a combined circulation of three million. Not a single one has been suppressed, South or North, although they are unsparing in their criticism of racial proscription.

More than 1,250,000 U. S. Negroes are members of labor unions.

and many predominantly white unions have Negro officers, even in the South.

Segregation in the armed services has been rapidly broken down since 1944. Today training schools for all services are fully integrated racially, and there are some 3000 Negro commissioned officers.

The process of integrating the Negro into the national social structure has been faster in some states than in others, and the record of the inhumanities attending the

process has been deplorable in many areas; but in spite of all this there has been amazing and unprecedented adjustment within the memory of living men.

Here, then, is the *real* Negro in American society, not the phantom Negro of the anti-American propagandists, native and foreign. Admittedly we still have a long way to go, but instead of being apologetic about this record, Americans should be proud that their free system has been capable of such elasticity.

100-3-99-1785

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-3-99)

FROM : SAC, New York [redacted]

SUBJECT: CPUSA-TOPL W.
IS-C

DATE: 2/25/54

b7D

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Lovell
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Gandy
Mr. Hill
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Watercrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Rebulet 4/7/53, requesting the Field to advise the Bureau by the first of each month the names of the subjects being considered for interview under the Toplev Program.

I. The names of Toplev subjects being investigated preparatory to requesting Bureau authority to interview are as follows:

b6
b7C
b7D

EXP. PROC.

II. The names of subjects on whom authority has been received from the Bureau, but have not yet been contacted by this office are as follows:

RECORDED - 69


1-2-11-7786

2-6-1954

REGISTERED MAIL


EWB:AM

Letter to Director
NY 100-3-99



b6
b7C
b7D

III. The names of subjects whom this office contemplates considering for interview in the future are as follows:



(919)

This office is of the opinion that an additional 200 CP people, those in functionary positions or those in underground operations of the CP can be considered for interview under the Toplev Program in this office. Because of the need of additional informant coverage in this area, agents assigned to this Program are enthusiastically engaged in carrying out the Toplev assignment. During the month of February, several CP members, who were interviewed directly by the agents on the Toplev Program, took time out to engage in a brief conversation, which

Letter to Director
NY 100-3-99

should be considered contrary to CP instructions, which are that all CP members must shun engaging in conversation with FBI agents, or when approached, remain silent and immediately walk away from the interviewing agents. Every effort will be made to develop additional Toplev informants if at all possible.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AMPS*FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER *118*(SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA; TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C (100-3-99) *TOP SECRET*

CG 5824-S (61-7665)

DATE: March 16,
1954 *(Y)*Classified by *100-3-99*
Declassify on: *8710/83* *TOP SECRET*

LENA SCHERER, was.; SECURITY MATTER - C (100-107137)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

Security Informant CG 5824-S, who was developed under the Toplev Program, maintains close touch with high-ranking Communists in New York City, among whom are Marcel and Lena Scherer. The informant, who corresponds from Chicago with the Scherers and maintains personal contact with them during his visits to New York, obtains considerable current information from the Scherers which is unavailable from any other source. Lena Scherer, in particular, keeps our informant advised of all information which comes to her attention, as well as furnishing national and New York State inter-Party documents. In the latest progress letter on CG 5824-S, dated March 8, 1954, Chicago stated that informant had recently received three letters from the Scherers, one of which referred to a Thesis of Criticism of the Communist Party national leadership and its policies. (S)

Due to our informant's close association with the Scherers through liaison a memorandum dated June 22, 1953, was furnished to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), requesting that this Bureau be advised prior to INS's taking any positive steps of a prosecutive nature regarding Lena Scherer as such steps would jeopardize an important investigation being conducted. Lena Scherer was born in Poland, entered the United States in 1912, and was naturalized in 1928. She has been very prominent in Communist Party affairs and is on the Attorney General's Denaturalization and Deportation Program. The attached memorandum dated March 9, 1954, was received from INS requesting to be advised whether we have any objection to a contact by INS at this time with Lena Scherer (Chernenko) as a possible witness in the case against William Schneiderman. In view of Lena Scherer's known Communist sympathies, it is doubtful whether she would cooperate with INS, but, nevertheless, it is believed her association with CG 5824-S is so important to the Bureau's operations it is felt we should make known to INS the fact that we are still interested in Scherer and the contemplated contact may jeopardize an important investigation. (S)

ACTION

For approval there is attached an appropriate letter to INS in line with the above.

Attachment *RECORDED COPY FILED* *SP3 Pjt/Dm*
DECLASSIFIED BY *SP3 Pjt/Dm* *10/8/96 #396,331 Pjt/Dm*
JDD:DME

60 MAR 18 1954

EX-104 RECORDED-21

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. C. E. Murphy

Director, FBI

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOKIEN (NOO-3-93)

SECURITY INFORMATION PROGRAM (63-2642-3)

CLASSIFIED AND
ESTIMATED

28422 m. 6. mo 21. Q.

1. 3.

FEB 24 1961

RECLASSIFICATION

FEB 24 1961

RECLASSIFICATION

FEB 24 1961

RECLASSIFICATION

FEB 24 1961

There are transmitted herewith copies of two leaflets entitled "Proof of Guilt" and "For a Lasting Peace" for use in connection with the captioned programs of the Bureau.

You will note that the leaflet "For a Lasting Peace" is designed to appear at first glance as pro-Communist literature. For your information, this leaflet was originally prepared by the United States Information Agency (USA) office in Rome, Italy, prior to the 1953 Italian elections. A bulk shipment was then forwarded anonymously to the headquarters of the Communist Party in Rome and a considerable quantity of these leaflets was distributed by Italian Communists before the anti-Communist nature of the pamphlet was discovered. While it is not contemplated that any such procedure could be applied in the United States, it is being called to your attention as an illustration of an ingenious and effective method of placing this type of material in the hands of Communists.

The availability of this material should be brought to the attention of all agents in your office who are assigned to internal security and related investigations.

A small supply of these pamphlets is being maintained in the General Security Unit of the Bureau in the event additional copies are required at any time.

Attachments (10)

2 - Baltimore	(with attachment)	- 10
2 - Boston	"	10
2 - Buffalo	"	10
2 - Chicago	715300	"
2 - Cincinnati	"	10
2 - Cleveland	"	10
2 - Denver	"	10
2 - Detroit	715305	"
2 - Indianapolis	"	10
2 - Los Angeles	715308	"
2 - Milwaukee	"	10
2 - Minneapolis	"	10

2 - Newark	(with attachment)	- 20
2 - New Haven	"	10
2 - New York	"	75
2 - Pittsburgh	"	10
2 - Philadelphia	"	25
2 - Portland	"	10
2 - St. Louis	"	10
2 - San Francisco	"	10
2 - Seattle	715302	"
2 - Springfield	"	10
2 - Washington	"	10

JFC:mpm

MAILED 27

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT
 (AH)
 FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY/PK

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
 TOPLIV (100-3-99)
 SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

DATE: March 12, 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Harbo	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Geatty	_____
Mohr	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Sizoo	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

The Central Research Unit recently reviewed all the material issued by the United States Information Agency (USIA) to determine if any of these publications could be used by the Bureau in connection with the captioned programs. Among this material were two pamphlets entitled "Proof of Guilt" and "For A Lasting Peace," copies of which are attached.

Extra copies of these leaflets were not available from USIA so copies were reproduced by the Bureau's Mechanical Section for dissemination to the field in quantities recommended by the Internal Security Section.

A letter transmitting these pamphlets in quantities recommended by the Internal Security Section to the offices in which the captioned programs are in effect is attached.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter be approved and that it be returned to the Central Research Unit, where it will be dated and arrangements completed for forwarding this material to the field.

JFC:mpm/
 Attachments

1 - Mr. J. D. Donahue, Rm. 1243 #99-289

CLASSIFIED AND
 EXP. DATE: 28 APR 1954
 FOR: 7-24-81
 DECLASSIFICATION: 7-24-81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

RECORDED-21
 INDEXED-21

MAR 13 1954

1788

RECORDED-21 INDEXED-21

THE FACTS

The commander of the North Korean 4th Division issues instructions for launching the attack. The invasion, which began June 25th, shocked the free world.

This order, dated 18 June 1950 and translated in Russian for Soviet observers, directs North Korean 4th Division reconnaissance "as the attack begins."

C нервной системе:

32. Речи национальных языков подвергнуты за последние годы значительным изменениям, в первую очередь грамматике; некоторые слова и даже целые выражения устаревают, другие же приобретают новые значения.

1945年1月25日，蘇聯軍隊進駐北平，蔣介石在美軍機場乘飛機逃往南京。

100-3-99-1788

KOREA

JUNE 25, 1950.

PROOF OF GUILT

A horizontal strip of a thermometer scale showing the number 38 followed by a degree symbol and the word Celsius.

10

A black outline of a downward-pointing arrow.

10-3-99-1788

WHO IS THE AGGRESSOR?

The dawn that streaked Korean skies on June 25, 1950, was host to a disheartening sight. The chill air was filled with the rumble of North Korean tanks, the bark of North Korean guns, as soldiers of North Korea poured south over the 38th Parallel. The world was shocked to read the news of war. They hoped that the great war that had ended 5 years before had permanently crushed the forces of tyranny. On that June 25th free people asked themselves: Has tyranny risen again? Who is the aggressor?

Both the Soviet Union and its satellite, North Korea, glibly placed the blame of aggression on the Republic of Korea to the south. Twice the United Nations Commission on Korea refuted these claims after thorough investigation. Only two days before the attack, the Commission completed a tour of the area immediately south of the 38th Parallel and found that "the South Korean army is organized entirely for defense, and is in no condition to carry out an attack." In September 1950, the United Nations Commission on Korea stated bluntly that the North Korean regime was guilty of "an act of aggression, initiated without warning and without provocation, in execution of a carefully prepared plan."

Today, after one year of fighting, conclusive evidence of this "carefully prepared plan" is in the hands of the United Nations. Here, for all the world to see, is positive proof that the North Korean army, with the full knowledge of the Soviet Union, carried out a full-scale invasion on the peaceful Republic of Korea. North Korea was the aggressor.

On October 4, 1950, after Seoul was recaptured by the United Nations forces, intelligence officers carried out a routine search for enemy documents. In a Seoul building once occupied by Soviet observers attached to the North Korean army, UN troops found a group of North Korean documents translated into the Russian language. Among them was an order from the General Staff of the North Korean Army to the Chief of Staff of the North Korean 4th Division. The order contained detailed instructions for reconnaissance of the "enemy" before and during the attack. The document was dated June 18, 1950, a week before the outbreak of the war!

The document substantiated a North Korean operational order found July 20, 1950, by a United Nations infantryman on the body of a North Korean officer who had fallen near Taejon. This document was the usual type of operational order issued prior to a large-scale operation. It contained instructions for the units of the North Korean 4th Infantry Division.

After these two incriminating papers had lost their usefulness from a military intelligence standpoint, they were submitted by Lt. General Matthew Ridgway, Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea, to Ambassador Warren Austin, United States representative to the United Nations Security Council. Mr. Austin delivered the documents to the Secretary General of the United Nations.

The evidence placed responsibility for the war on North Korea—a puppet in the Communist plot to conquer Asia. Today the world knows who is the aggressor. The documents discovered on the battlefield are tangible proof of guilt.

PROOF OF GUILT

The first North Korean document, entitled Reconnaissance Order No. 1, was dated June 18, 1950, a week before the North Korean invasion. It was in the Russian language for the benefit of Soviet Red Army observers and used Japanese place names, keyed to Soviet military maps. The order contained instructions to the 4th Division of the North Korean army (called "Korean People's Army") for determining the Republic of Korea's defense positions as the North Korean army advanced to attack:

"When the division is set up in an attack position . . . it is necessary to:

"Determine accurately the arrangement of the trenches . . . the defense firearms supply and the system of firing.

"Determine the location of the main body of the enemy personnel . . ."

After the attack had begun, the North Korean 4th Division was further ordered:

"With the advance toward the approaches to SEOUL by all means secure the collection of information about enemy forces concentrated in the city and steps intended for the city defense.

"Not more than a third of the personnel of the reconnaissance subdivisions are to be placed along the attack line at observation points, and two-thirds must be readied to accomplish the reconnaissance in the heart of the enemy's defenses.

"Each regiment must have one group of three to five men who would collect captured documents on the battlefield."

The second document, Operations Order No. 1, issued by Operations Section, 4th Infantry Division was signed by Lee Kwon Mu, Commander of the North Korean 4th Division and Ho Bong Hak, Chief of Staff. Marked TOP SECRET and dated "1400 hours 22 June, 1950," three days before the start of hostilities, the document contained details of the military offensive.

"1. The 1st Infantry Regiment of the enemy's 7th Infantry Division is standing on the defensive against our attack.

"2. The most important objective of our Division in the frontal attack is to penetrate the enemy's defensive line on the KWAN-DONG-AJANG-DONG line, and after taking MAJI-RI, hill 535.6, P'Yongmaul, and NAEHOEAM, advance to UIJONGBU-SEOUL area..."

"3. On our right wing the 1st Infantry Division will stand to the attack . . .

"4. The main attack will be directed toward the wide road on the left flank . . .

"5. The 18th Infantry Regiment, together with one battalion of artillery, one .45mm gun company, one self-propelled artillery battalion, one engineer company, one tank company, and two anti-tank sections will break through the enemy's defensive line . . ."

The plan called for completion of the remaining attack preparations by June 23 at the latest.

THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE ON JUNE 25.


THE AGGRESSOR, BEYOND ALL DOUBT, IS NORTH KOREA.

25 YEARS OF SOVIET EFFORTS TOWARD LASTING PEACE

Year	Pledge	Result	Year	Pledge	Result
1925	Turkish-Soviet Non-aggression Pact	The U.S.S.R. denounced this Pact in 1945.	1937	Chinese-Soviet Non-aggression Pact	In 1945 the Soviets plundered the industries of Manchuria.
1926	Afghan-Soviet Non-aggression Pact	In 1940 the U.S.S.R. forced Afghanistan to cede frontier territories.	1939	Estonian-Soviet Alliance	The U.S.S.R. annexed Estonia in 1940.
1926	Lithuanian-Soviet Non-aggression Pact	The U.S.S.R. annexed Lithuania in 1940.	1939	Latvian-Soviet Alliance	The U.S.S.R. annexed Latvia in 1940.
1927	Iranian-Soviet Neutrality Pact	The U.S.S.R. refused to withdraw her troops from Iran after World War II.	1939	Lithuanian-Soviet Alliance	The U.S.S.R. annexed Lithuania in 1940.
1928	The U.S.S.R. signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact repudiating war as a means of settling international disputes	In 1929 the U.S.S.R. invaded Manchuria in order to regain possession of the Chinese Eastern Railway.	1941	Yugoslav-Soviet Non-aggression Pact	The U.S.S.R. broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia one month after signing the Pact.
1929	The U.S.S.R. solemnly renounced war, signing a protocol to that effect with Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Rumania	The U.S.S.R. attacked Eastern Poland in 1939, and in 1940 seized Estonia and Latvia.	1942	Anglo-Soviet Alliance	The Alliance is still in effect, formally. But the U.S.S.R. has violated it repeatedly with such acts as the blockade of Berlin in 1948-49.
1932	Finnish-Soviet Non-aggression Pact	The U.S.S.R. invaded Finland in 1939.	1942	Alliance between the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Government in London	The U.S.S.R. broke the Alliance in 1943 by supporting the puppet Lublin Government.
1932	Estonian-Soviet Non-aggression Pact	The U.S.S.R. annexed Estonia in 1940.	1942	Anglo-Iranian-Soviet Alliance	The U.S.S.R. violated this Alliance by refusing to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran after World War II.
1932	Latvian-Soviet Non-aggression Pact	The U.S.S.R. annexed Latvia in 1940.	1943	The U.S.S.R. announced the dissolution of the Comintern	In 1947 the U.S.S.R. promoted the establishment of the Cominform.
1932	Polish-Soviet Non-aggression Pact	The U.S.S.R. seized Eastern Poland in 1939.	1943	Czech-Soviet Alliance	In 1948 a coup d'état supported by the Soviet Union reduced Czechoslovakia to a puppet of the U.S.S.R.
1933	The U.S.S.R. signed a Convention repudiating aggression with Finland, Yugoslavia, and Turkey	The U.S.S.R. invaded Finland in 1939, broke off diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in 1941, and denounced her Non-aggression Pact with Turkey in 1945.	1944	Franco-Soviet Alliance	Although this Alliance is still in force officially, the U.S.S.R. has violated the spirit of the pact by supporting subversive organizations which seek to overthrow the French Government by violence.
1935	Franco-Czech-Soviet Alliance	The U.S.S.R. would not aid Czechoslovakia against Hitler in 1939.	1945	Chinese-Soviet Alliance	At the same time they made this Alliance with the National Government of China, the Soviets were arming the Chinese Communists.
1936	Alliance between the U.S.S.R. and Outer Mongolia	The Soviets used this Alliance as a means to infiltrate Outer Mongolia. By 1945, Outer Mongolia had completely lost its autonomy.	1945	Yugoslav-Soviet Alliance	The U.S.S.R. denounced this Alliance in 1949.
1936	The U.S.S.R. became a member of the Committee for Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War	In the same year the U.S.S.R. sent weapons and war matériel to the Spanish Communists.	1945	Polish-Soviet Alliance	In 1947 the Communists seized power in Poland, transforming that country into a Soviet puppet.
			1948	Finnish-Soviet Alliance	Bitter attacks against Finland appear periodically in the Soviet press.
			1948-1950	The U.S.S.R. repeatedly proclaimed her peaceful intentions in the U.N., through such spokesmen as Vishinsky, Gromyko, and Malik	The U.S.S.R. blockaded the Western sections of Berlin and supported, even through diplomatic channels, aggression by Greek, Chinese, Indo-Chinese, and North Korean Communists.

The Soviet Union has violated or denounced 10 non-aggression or neutrality pacts in 16 years. The Soviet Union has violated 14 military alliances in 13 years. When the Soviet Union talks about peace, remember these facts!

This is the way the Soviet Union works for a lasting peace



100-3-99-1788



1788

SAC, Los Angeles [redacted]

March 29, 1954

Director, FBI (100-100)

FBI

OTOP 4-84

b7D

Rebut dated March 4, 1954, entitled "Communist Party, USA Report 10-9" [redacted] in which you set forth the results of an interview with [redacted] on March 1, 1954. The subject indicated a willingness to talk to the Agents and stated that he was originally recruited into the Communist Party in Los Angeles in 1937 and was active until 1949 when he technically covered his activity with the Party in order to comply with the Taft-Hartley Act. Since 1949 [redacted] said that he continued to meet with Party members at which he attended no formal meetings and in 1951 he moved to [redacted], California, where he has been residing ever since. His only contact since that time with Party people has been about every six months when he visits Los Angeles and meets with two friends, both old-time Party members.

You were advised in Rebut dated February 18, 1954, that authority was granted to interview [redacted] but his inactivity within the past few years did not place him in the category of persons to be interviewed under the Security Information Program, but there is no objection to an interview with him under Section 37-C of the Manual of Instructions and a Toploy Agent could be present during the contact. As a result of your interview the Bureau feels [redacted] is still not a Security Information Program subject, i.e. a known subject, as he is presently not active in politics on a high level nor is he engaged in any activity in [redacted], California, on a club or legal level.

Authority is granted to continue contacts with him to ascertain whether he can be developed as an informant, and you should be certain to understand his cooperation must remain confidential and he cannot consider himself a Bureau employee.

2 cc: New York

Cleveland
Detroit
Chicago
San Francisco
Philadelphia

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Geatty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

384



NOT RECORDED
194 MAR 22 1954

ORIGINAL FILE IN

Use caution in your contacts with [redacted] to be b7D certain he is not a plant.

In view of the fact that the extent to which he can and will cooperate is not known at this time, authority is not being granted to compensate him in any specific amount.

If during his development it is necessary to spend any money for expenses or otherwise, you should utilize the authority available to all SACs to pay up to \$100 to any one person for information of value.

After you have expended a total of \$100 if you feel the informant has progressed to the point where additional money for services rendered or expenses incurred is required, appropriate recommendation should then be made to the Bureau, setting forth all the facts.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-14-2011

3/17/54

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
Attn: Asst. Director A. H. BELMONT

SAC, New York [redacted]

CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

[redacted] was

SM - C

Remylet, 2/24/54.

Inasmuch as the agent to whom this case is assigned has been working full time on the LEPRO case, it has not been possible to complete the interview. It is believed, however, that the interview can be completed, and the Bureau advised, by 4/17/54.

RM

1 - Bufile [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

ABM:PJM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100-3-99-
NOT RECORDED
152 MAR 22 1954

354
58 MAR 24 1954

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SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

March 15, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted]
SECURITY MATTER - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT of 1950

Reurlet dated March 9, 1954.

Authority is granted to contact [redacted] whenever feasible away from residence and place of employment.

In conducting this interview you should be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

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Tolson _____
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Belmont _____
Clegg _____
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Rosen _____
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Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____



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Director, FBI (100-3-99)
ATTN: Asst. Dir. A. H. BLMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

3/9/54

CP USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

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[redacted]
SM - C
ISA OF 1950

[redacted] and
[redacted] of New York
County CP, has been selected as an individual to interview under
the Toplev Program.

Personal Background

The subject was born [redacted]
the son of [redacted] who were both
reported born in [redacted]. Subject's father was known
to be a [redacted] by occupation.

Education

[redacted]
It is noted that the records of the Veterans Administra-
tion reflect that the subject included in a program of

courses in the [redacted]

b7D

Marital Status

[redacted] was married to [redacted]
in [redacted]

RM

1/ - Bufile [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

100-3-17-1
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59 MAR 17 1954

HPL:MBR

Letter to Director, FBI b7D

The records of the New York State Supreme Court, New York County, New York, indicate that on [redacted]
Mrs. [redacted]

was granted an interlocutory decree, the judgment to be final in three months, annulling her marriage to [redacted]

[redacted] The grounds on which annulment was decreed were "fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation", in that defendant at the time of the marriage, [redacted] did agree to cohabit for the purpose of having children and subsequent to the marriage defendant refused to permit the plaintiff to have children. It is noted that the action was not defended.

b7D

According to the records of the [redacted] Board of Elections one [redacted], who may be subject's present wife, registered from [redacted] New York, which was subject's residence from 1951 to the present time.

A check of the marriage records of the [redacted] failed to disclose a record of a subsequent marriage for the subject.

Employment

From [redacted] subject was employed by the [redacted] [redacted], New York, as an [redacted]

b7D

From [redacted] subject was employed by [redacted] as a [redacted]

From [redacted] to the present time the subject has been employed by [redacted]

It is noted that the [redacted] been designated by the [redacted] however, it is reported that subject in his position would have no access to classified material inasmuch as the work

b7D

Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted]
[redacted] of his unit was being devoted entirely to normal [redacted]

Investigation has reflected that subject is presently residing at [redacted] New York, with his wife who is believed to be [redacted]

Military Service

b7D

[redacted]
was inducted into the United States Army on [redacted]. He was honorably discharged on [redacted] as an [redacted], to accept commission as [redacted] United States Army, [redacted], on [redacted] and reported for duty on the same date at [redacted]. He was granted two months and six days terminal leave effective [redacted] from the Headquarters, [redacted] Fort Dix, New Jersey, to revert to Inactive Status and accept appointment in the Officers Reserve Corps.

The subject served one year, eleven months and five days in foreign service in the China-Burma-Indie Theater. The Army records also reflect that subject was appointed [redacted] in the Officer Reserve Corps on [redacted]. He was ordered to report for active duty on [redacted] Fort Dix, New Jersey.

b7D

Subject was relieved from Active Duty on [redacted] Fort Dix, New Jersey, and was given a six months deferment by reason of seasonal occupation.

He was transferred to the Inactive Reserve on [redacted] under authority of the Air Force Board of Appeals dated [redacted] and was discharged from his Commission as [redacted] United States Air Force, on [redacted]. His military occupation was shown as [redacted]

Status of Health

The subject's file at the United States Veterans Administration, New York City, reflected that on [redacted]

Letter to Director, FBI

b7D

[redacted] he submitted a claim for numerous disabilities. The most significant was [redacted]. The file indicated that the subject then was [redacted]

CP Activities

In 1946 [redacted] first came to the attention of the NYO as a [redacted] the NY State CP [redacted] dated August 27, 1946. During the period 1948 to 1949 subject was reported as [redacted] of NY County CP.

b7D

It is noted that [redacted] was registered with the American Labor Party in NYC during the years 1949, and 1950. In 1951 he was reported registered with the ALP in Queens, New York.

In April or May, 1953 a confidential source of this office advised that an individual residing at [redacted] New York, which is known to be the residence of the subject, was in contact with [redacted] of the CP.

It is noted that subject's former wife, [redacted] was a member of the [redacted] the CP during the period 1948 to 1949.

b7D

Because of subject's position in [redacted] of NY County CP and the fact that there is no indication that he has dropped his CP affiliations, it is believed that he may still be active within the CP organization either in Queens County or NY County.

Because of his position as [redacted] the CP it is believed that he would have received Marxist training and would probably be in touch with other CP leaders.

Letter to Director, FBI

b7D

Authority to Contact

Bureau authority is requested for this office to contact [redacted], during the week of March 22, 1954, circumstances permitting. Such a contact would be made when subject is on the street alone, a discreet distance away from his residence or employment.

b7D

The interview would be conducted in accordance with existing Bureau rules applying to interviews with security subjects.

SAC, Detroit [redacted]

March 12, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

Reurlet dated March 4, 1954.

Authority is granted to contact the subject whenever feasible away from residence and place of employment.

In conducting this interview you should be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

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Winterrowd _____
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Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

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58 MAR 24 1954



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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-14-2011

Director, FBI [redacted] (100-3-99)

March 4, 1954

SAC, Detroit [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA-^{TOPLEV}
INTERNAL SECURITY-C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]
SECURITY MATTER-C
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT OF 1950

b7D

Attention: Assistant Director A. H. BELMONT

I. BACKGROUND

A. General

The Subject was born on [redacted].
The Subject's birthdate has also been shown as [redacted].
[redacted] The Subject's parents are [redacted] who reside at [redacted] Michigan.

The Subject is married to [redacted].
[redacted] The records reflect her maiden name as [redacted].
[redacted] She married the Subject on [redacted] Michigan.
She was naturalized on [redacted].

b7D

The Subject enlisted in the U. S. Army in May, 1926 at [redacted]
Texas and was discharged on [redacted].

With respect to education, a Detroit Police Department report indicates that the Subject completed the eighth grade in the public school at [redacted] Michigan.

B. Residences

The Subject presently resides at [redacted] Detroit, Michigan, having moved there in [redacted]. In 1941 the Subject resided at [redacted] and previously had resided at [redacted], all in Detroit.

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REGISTERED MAIL

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NOT RECORDED
10 MAR 17 1954
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Letter to the Director

Re: [REDACTED] Was.

SAC
ISA, 1950

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C. Employment

Mrs. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Michigan, advised that the Subject has been employed
to date except for leaves of absence taken to hold

[REDACTED]
His Social Security Number is [REDACTED] and while em-
ployed here he has held the positions of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. He is presently employed as a [REDACTED]

Mr. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] advised that as a [REDACTED] the Subject would
not have access to classified security information.

The Subject was employed by the [REDACTED]
Detroit, from [REDACTED] Michigan,
from [REDACTED] while employed at the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] he was a member of [REDACTED] and also took an active part as
a member of the [REDACTED], later known as the [REDACTED] The
Subject from 1938 through [REDACTED] Michigan.

D. Criminal Record

b7D

Records of the Detroit Police Department under Police
Number [REDACTED] indicate the following:

Letter to the Director

Re: [REDACTED] Case.

SM-C
ISA, 1950

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The records of the Identification Division, FBI, indicate the Subject's FBI Number is [REDACTED] and that he was arrested by the [REDACTED] Police Department. The record reflected the following information regarding this arrest: [REDACTED]

- II. COMMUNIST PARTY HISTORY

From 1933 through 1940 the Subject was a member of the CP and actively participated in CP affairs. From 1945 through 1952 the Subject was a member of [REDACTED] and participated in CP and [REDACTED]. In 1947 the Subject held a position as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In 1949 the Subject was [REDACTED]

In 1950 the Subject was [REDACTED]

In 1951 the Subject was [REDACTED] the State Conference of the Michigan CP. In 1951 the Subject was [REDACTED] CP.

[REDACTED] In 1952 the Subject was the [REDACTED]

In 1953 the Subject was [REDACTED]

b7D

III. WEAKNESSES AND PRESSURE POINTS

On January 15, 1953 [REDACTED] advised as follows: During a discussion with the Informant he commented that [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] Communist Party of Michigan, had changed considerably in recent weeks regarding his outlook toward the Communist Party.

The Informant said that [REDACTED] has been known for years as a zealous comrade and a Marxist theoretician. The Informant recalled that [REDACTED] would frequently criticize he and other Party members for their failure to study or even read Party publications. The Informant would use the alibi that much of his free time was taken working around his home and property. [REDACTED] who had always lived in an apartment house had little sympathy for property owners.

Letter to the Director

Re: [redacted] Name.

SAC
ISA, 1950

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However, since purchasing his own home last year [redacted] has taken a less active part in the section affairs and has even missed meetings on occasion. It was quite obvious to the Informant that his reading has suffered and his general interest appears to be waning. Two weeks ago [redacted] called on [redacted] at his new residence. The Informant spent approximately one hour with him and [redacted] enthusiastically displayed recent improvements he himself had made and particularly delighted in showing off a recreation room he had constructed in the basement. Only one passing reference was made to Party activity and [redacted] confidentially advised the Informant that his whole economic concept has changed since he bought his home. He did not further elaborate on this change but the Informant believed it noteworthy.

IV. APPROACH

[redacted] will be contacted at an opportune moment away from his residence and employment either by both Topley Agents or one Agent with the other standing by at which time in a friendly manner Agents will attempt to put him at ease and secure his cooperation. Bureau instructions concerning interviews with Topley Subjects will be followed during the interview at which time every effort will be made to induce the Subject to furnish assistance to the Government.

SAC, Los Angeles [redacted]

March 12, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

100-3-99-✓

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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[redacted] wa.

SECURITY MATTER - C

Reurlet dated March 4, 1954.

Authority is granted to contact [redacted] whenever feasible away from residence and place of employment.

In conducting this interview you should be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

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Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

6 MAR 25 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN [redacted]

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

March 4, 1954

SAC, Los Angeles

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA,
TOLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SECURITY MATTER - C

Captioned subject is being considered for interview
under the Tolev Program.

PERSONAL HISTORY

Subject was born in [redacted]. He has completed high school and has taken extension courses at the [redacted] but is not known to have any university degree. He also has taken a course at the [redacted] on the subject of [redacted]

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Subject was married on [redacted]. [redacted] was a member of the [redacted] the Los Angeles County Communist Party (LACP) in 1944 and 1945 and has had additional affiliation and activity in the Communist Party and front organizations.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

At the present time subject is employed as an [redacted]. He previously owned the [redacted] and since 1928, he has been engaged in the [redacted] either in the [redacted] of the business.

At the present time subject resides at [redacted], Los Angeles. He has been residing in this area since at least 1928.

VWH:pas
REGISTERED

100-3-99-

NOT RECORDED
19th MAR 17 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

[redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY HISTORY

Reliable informants have reported subject's membership in the Communist Party since at least 1944, at which time he was a member of the [redacted] the LACCP. During the period of the Communist Political Association (CPA) he was also active in that organization. In 1945 he was a member of the [redacted] the LACCP. Subject at one time was the [redacted] the [redacted] meeting of the [redacted] the LACCP.

In 1946 subject was in contact with [redacted]
in the LACCP.

In addition to subject's activities in the Communist Party, he has been active in a number of front organizations, including the [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] the
and
a subscriber to the "Daily People's World" (DPW).

In August, 1953, a reliable informant advised that [redacted] the LACCP Underground. This informant believed that [redacted] function was to provide [redacted] the
Underground of the LACCP.

In this connection, two Party members who have an Underground assignment recently called upon subject to furnish [redacted]. Subject acted completely ignorant of their purpose. This matter was subsequently checked by the Communist Party Underground, and as a result of their investigation, they concluded that [redacted] to these Party people because they, the unknown Communist Party members, had not gone through the proper channels to request [redacted]

b7D

PERSONALITY

In connection with subject's refusal to [redacted] to the unnamed Party people above who are active in the Underground, the possibility exists that [redacted] may have decided of his own volition not to cooperate. It is noted, however, that the Party felt that he operated correctly in refusing to [redacted]

[redacted]

In October, 1952, while at a meeting of the CRC, subject was in conversation with a reliable informant and he made a statement that he was an [redacted] and was doing all right and was "not ashamed of making money."

b7D

APPROACH

Bureau authority is requested to place subject under surveillance until such time as, security permitting, he can be approached under the Toplov Program.

SAC, Philadelphia [redacted]

March 12, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

100-3-99-U
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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[redacted] wa
SECURITY MATTER - C

Reurlet dated March 8, 1954.

Authority is granted to contact [redacted] whenever feasible away from residence and place of employment.

In conducting this interview you should be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

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Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

MAP 91-100A
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Director, FBI (100-3-99; [redacted])

3/8/54

SAC, Philadelphia [redacted]

ATTENTION: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A.H. BEIMONT

CP, USA, TOPLV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] vs.
SECURITY MATTER - C

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Background

[redacted] was born in [redacted] Pa., on [redacted] to [redacted]
both parents having been born in Pennsylvania.

He went to public elementary schools in [redacted] Pa.
It is not known if he graduated from high school.

[redacted] was employed by the [redacted]
Pa. in 1938 and 1939. On [redacted] he began work for the [redacted]
and has been so employed up to the present time
in the [redacted] of their plant in [redacted]. In addition
to his employment he has been an active union member. In 1941 he was an
[redacted] He was also the [redacted]
in the [redacted] area and was a member of the [redacted]

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In the fall of 1945 [redacted]
[redacted] who were out on strike. [redacted] was fired from his job by the
company after the union went back to work; however, he was later reinstated.

In 1946 he was [redacted]
[redacted] He was also [redacted]
in 1946; however, at the present time he [redacted]

[redacted] has lived at [redacted] Pa., from 1939
until the present.

Marital Status

[redacted] were married on [redacted]
[redacted] Pa. His wife was born in [redacted] of American-
born parents.

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NOT RECORDED
165MAR 17 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

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3/8/54

Director, FBI

[redacted] have been born to the [redacted] who
are [redacted] of age.

[redacted] was a member of the CP as of 1943. In 1946 she was

In 1947 she was

[redacted] CP, EPD. Also in 1947 she attended a CP

In 1948 [redacted]

Section. She has continued to be an active CP member up to the present time but has held no leadership position in the past three years.

Personality

[redacted] appears to be a very pleasant individual. Some of his associates at the [redacted] have stated that he is well liked and would very likely have a position of [redacted] if he was not a Communist.

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Hobbies

The [redacted] area is well isolated from the main population centers and is known for its excellent [redacted] areas.

CP History

[redacted] first came to the attention of this office as a [redacted] a CP sponsored war bond rally at [redacted] Pa., on 9/24/43. For the rest of 1943 [redacted] was in frequent touch with the [redacted] CP, EPD. In 10/43 [redacted] as a member of the [redacted] the [redacted] and CP membership dues in the [redacted] area.

In the latter part of 1943 [redacted] had a [redacted] position in the [redacted] area, which position he still held in 1944. The exact title is not known. In 2/45 he was elected [redacted] CPA, in the [redacted] area.

In 8/45 [redacted] the CP in [redacted] attended a convention of the CP, EPD. [redacted] was elected to the [redacted]

b7D

[redacted]
Director, FBI

3/8/54

Committee at this convention. It was brought out at this time that [redacted] had been a CP member for seven years.

In 2/46 [redacted]

[redacted] meeting.

In 5/46 [redacted]

In 1945 and 1946 the subject was very open with his CP sympathies and frequently admitted this and his membership to known Party members.

b7D

In 1946 he was [redacted]

[redacted] section.

In 1946 and 1947 members of the CP in [redacted] usually had meetings twice monthly. These meetings were alternated between the residence of the subject and the residence of another Party member.

In 7/48 [redacted] was a [redacted] from the [redacted] to the District Convention, CP, EPD, held in Philadelphia.

In 8/48 [redacted] attended the National Convention of the CP held at Madison Square Garden, New York City, N. Y. He was [redacted] the [redacted] at that time and is still the [redacted]

In 1/49 the [redacted] said that the proper leadership wasn't being displayed in the [redacted] and that [redacted] was the individual who could furnish that [redacted]

During the first seven or eight months of 1952 [redacted] was relatively inactive in the CP. He was censured for this inactivity by [redacted] was at this time related to a club level in the [redacted] Section. This unit, however, has again been designated as a section and [redacted] as the [redacted]

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In addition to the above CP activity, [redacted] has been active in the Progressive Party and is a subscriber to "The Worker" and the "Daily Worker."

Family

[redacted] of the subject, became a member of the CP in 1938 and has maintained active membership since that time. He has also been active in the IWO and in the PP.

[redacted] 3/8/54

Director, FBI

[redacted] was interviewed by Agents of this office in 1/54. He was not belligerent, but he refused to cooperate.

[redacted] was a CP member in 1938. He is not known to have been a member since that time but has maintained IWO membership and has been active in the PP.

[redacted] was a member of the [redacted]
[redacted] CP, EPD, from 1938 to 1944.

[redacted] of the subject, was a member of the [redacted] in 1943 and 1944.

[redacted] father of the subject (deceased), was a member of the [redacted] in 1946.

Factionalism

There are no known instances of factionalism on the part of the subject or his wife except as noted under the previous heading.

Finances

[redacted] makes approximately \$1,000 a year at the [redacted]. He resides in a house owned by [redacted] and is believed to be paying a small rent payment to her. Accordingly, it is apparent that he is not in a bad financial situation, and he appears to have enough money for his needs.

Women

There are no known instances in which the subject has been interested in any woman other than his wife.

b7D

Knowledge of the Underground

[redacted] is not known to have participated directly in CP underground activity; however, in the early summer of 1953 JOSEPH ROBERTS and IRVIN KATZ, CP leaders in the district, who were in hiding and who have subsequently been arrested as Smith Act subjects, [redacted]

Also, in his position as [redacted] and due to the apparent trust placed in him by the district officials, he is in a position

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[redacted] b7D

3/8/54

Director, FBI


to learn of the CP underground. Also, because of the isolated area in which he lives he is in a position to hide other underground members of the CP.

Reaction to the Harboring Statute

[redacted] has not been contacted in reference to the CP fugitives.

Associates

Subject has been closely associated with the following individuals who are or have been in the direct leadership of the CP, EPD:



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In addition to these individuals, subject has been associated with numerous other CP leaders of lesser importance.

Some of his known Party associates who are fellow employees are known to this office and have been cooperative. None, however, is in a position to be of assistance in persuading the subject to change his viewpoint concerning Communism.

Criminal Record

The subject has no known criminal record.

Approach

It is contemplated that [redacted] will be contacted by two top level Agents somewhere at a secure place between his place of employment and his residence. Subject has expressed the opinion that Communism will be a great benefit to the workingman and to humanity in general.

It is planned that he will be interviewed along the following lines:

b7D

3/8/54

[redacted]
Director, FBI

1. The Bureau's jurisdiction in matters pertaining to the internal security of the United States will be explained to him.
2. The benefits afforded organized labor in this country as compared to the condition of labor in the Soviet Union, including the role of trade unions in Russia and Russia's satellite countries will be discussed.

3. Since [redacted] has a family and is probably well settled in [redacted] with 15 years seniority at the [redacted] he will be reminded of this and mention will be made of the forthcoming Smith Act trials. He will be told that he may possibly receive some publicity in connection with those trials, which publicity could well be adverse what with the rising public sentiment being against Communism.

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Conversational leads that [redacted] may give will also be followed up and any topic that seems to be of interest to him will be fully developed.

The Bureau is requested to authorize the contact as set out above.

CAC, Detroit [redacted]

March 8, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted], was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

Reurlet dated March 2, 1954.

b7D

Authority is granted to contact [redacted]
whenever feasible away from residence and place of
employment.

In conducting this interview you should be
guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to inter-
views with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is
not possible to approach the subject within 60 days, the
Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact
has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the
interview.

JDD:DE

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Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____



ORIGINAL FILED IN [redacted]

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

March 2, 1954

SAC, Detroit (66-3360)

-CONFIDENTIAL

CP, ISA, TOPLEY
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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b7D

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

ATTENTION: Mr. A. H. BELMONT, Assistant Director

BACKGROUND

Records of Selective Service Board [redacted] Detroit,
Michigan, reflect that [redacted] wife of [redacted] was born
in Detroit, Michigan, on [redacted]. Her maiden name was [redacted]
[redacted] were married at [redacted] on [redacted]
[redacted] and have [redacted] in [redacted]
Michigan.

The [redacted] presently reside at [redacted] Detroit,
Michigan. Prior to residing in [redacted] according to
records of [redacted] resided at [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] attended [redacted] in 1932.
[redacted] was founded at [redacted]

[redacted] About the year 1930 and thereafter until the
[redacted] a radical element grew up among the student body
and faculty and was very active in the [redacted] and active
to a considerable extent in organizing tenant farmers and sharecroppers

JH:DEW
REGISTERED - AMCD

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NOT RECORDED
194 MAR 11 1954
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Letter to Director, FBI

RE: CP, USA, TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted], was,
SECURITY MATTER - C

b7D

A. Employment

[redacted] according to information submitted by Confidential Informant T-1, is presently employed as a [redacted]

[redacted] Detroit, Michigan. His average income is \$62.50 per week. From 1936 to 1938 [redacted] was employed for an unnamed [redacted]

[redacted] an alleged Communist affiliate and was seen in their headquarters at [redacted]
Detroit, back in 1934.

[redacted] was employed by [redacted]
Detroit from 1936 to April, 1942. His reason for leaving was given as [redacted]

[redacted] was employed by the [redacted] and
Detroit, from 1935 to 1938, "sales - went out of business."

Subject was employed by the [redacted]
[redacted] Winter of 1933 to 1934, as [redacted] His reason for leaving was "cut in production."

Subject was employed by [redacted]
[redacted] from 1930 to 1933. His position there was that of [redacted] and his reason for leaving was given as "to live in Detroit."

B. Residences

b7D

The Subject presently resides at [redacted] Detroit, Michigan. The following have been reported as past residences for the Subject:

[redacted]
date unknown;

[redacted] Detroit, date unknown;

Letter to Director, FBI

RE: CP, USA, TOPLIV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] was:
SECURITY MATTER - C

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] date unknown;

b7D

[redacted] date unknown;

[redacted] date unknown;

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] to present;

[redacted]

[redacted]

C. Citizenship

The Subject claims citizenship through his father, [redacted]
who filed his Declaration of Intention No. [redacted]

[redacted]

b7D

D. Marital Status

The records of the Marriage License Bureau, [redacted]
Missouri, on [redacted] contains marriage license application
[redacted] filed [redacted] by [redacted]
[redacted] These records indicate that they were married in
[redacted]

Letter to Director, FBI

RE: CP, UEA, TO: LEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

b7D

E. Credit and Criminal Record

The records of the Detroit Police Department and the Detroit Credit Bureau reflect no information concerning the Subject. The following identification record under FBI No. [redacted] was located in the Identification Division of the FBI and is as follows:

CONTRIBUTOR OF FINGERPRINTS	NAME AND NUMBER	ARRESTED OR RECEIVED	CHARGE DISPOSITION
--------------------------------	-----------------	-------------------------	--------------------

[redacted]

b7D

F. Description

Name

[redacted]
[redacted] Detroit, Michigan
[redacted]

Son

Residence
Employment

Detroit, Michigan

Sex

Male

Race

White

Height

5' 7"

Letter to Director, FBI

RE: CP, USA, TOPLEVEL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] was,
SECURITY MATTER - C

b6
b7C
b7D

Weight
Hair
Eyes
Complexion
Characteristics

[redacted]
Fair

Scars and marks
Social Security No.
Marital status
Wife
Children

[redacted]
Married

Parents
Close relatives

Education

COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVITY

Subject has been a member of the CP since 1934 and has attended Communist meetings with other known Communists at Detroit, Michigan. An early report from the Boston Office advised files there indicated that the Subject [redacted]

b7D

A statement attributed to the Subject's wife, [redacted] was reported by [redacted] on April 22, 1944. In conversation with WILLIAM FREED, [redacted]

Letter to Director, FBI

RE: CP, USA, TOPLAV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] was,
SECURITY MATTER - C

b7D

[redacted] replied in answer to a statement that FREED was in the market for a job, "Well, that sounds like you would mean the Army or Navy." FREED answered by saying the Army had placed him in 4-F. [redacted] then said, "You don't sound very disappointed," to which FREED answered, "You wouldn't want me to be a hypocrite, would you? After all, I would rather save my hide for the street fighting here at home if the wrong ones win out in the coming elections." [redacted] replied, "That's right, if DEWEY or the HOOVER crowd gets in, there will be plenty of street fighting to do because it will bring on a civil war. ROOSEVELT's got to have this fourth term."

[redacted] was asked what would happen to the Party if DEWEY should get in, to which she replied "We will go underground." WILLIAM FREED countered with the statement, "Yes, we will go underground. All lists and records will be destroyed and all contacts will be personal."

Subject in 1943 and 1944 was a member and

[redacted]
County CP.

Subject was a member of the Michigan State Committee, CP, and a [redacted] CP, [redacted] in 1947. He held CP membership card No. [redacted] in 1946, CP membership card No. [redacted] in 1947, and CP membership card No. [redacted] in 1948.

In April 1948 Subject was [redacted] State Convention of the CP. In 1949 Subject was a member of the [redacted] and he has served on committees and performed assignments in various CP organizations within [redacted]

b7D

Informants have reported his regular attendance at CP meetings and functions. A meeting of the [redacted] the CP was held at the Subject's home in 1949. Subject has been in frequent contact with officials of [redacted] and in 1948 was cleared by the National Board, CP, USA, [redacted] to comprise the official [redacted]. He has made heavy financial contributions to the Party, and has also promoted CP publications.

Letter to Director, FBI

RE: CP, USA, TOPLIV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

HCUA HEARINGS, [redacted]

b7D

Subject was named before the HCUA hearing held in [redacted]
[redacted] a State Conference of the Communist
Political Association on April 22, 1945, at the Jericho Temple, 2705 Joy
Road, Detroit, Michigan.

OBSERVATIONS

[redacted] THTMAG
DENNIS, Organizational Secretary, CP, District 7, who had been operating
underground from June 1951 to the time of his arrest as a Smith Act Subject,
and who was recently tried and convicted. Among this material was the follow-
ing quotation with respect to [redacted]

APPROACH

It is contemplated that the Subject will be contacted by a lone Agent away from his employment or residence, when a suitable time and location are presented. The other Toplev Agent will be standing by in close proximity to fully observe proceeding. It is planned that this approach will be made in a most friendly manner, realizing that the Subject may be apprehensive of a subpoena for the coming HCUA hearings, and it is also observed that he is quite fearful of his position [redacted]

[redacted] a job he has held for quite some time.

b7D

Bureau authority is requested to proceed with the approach as outlined above.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

(1) *Revert to [Signature]*

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
 DEVELOPMENT OF TOP-
 LEVEL SECURITY INFORMANTS (TOPLEV)
 INTERNAL SECURITY - C

DATE: March 15,
1954

Tolson _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Clegg _____
 Glavin _____
 Harbo _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Gandy _____
 Mohr _____
 Fitzgerald _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Sizoo _____
 Miss Gandy _____

*AG Gunner*SYNOPSIS

Under program of contacting high-ranking Communists as potential informants (Toplev) 601 individuals have been approached and 30 developed as informants or confidential sources. In addition, 15 individuals are being recontacted and there are 49 authorized interviews pending. There have been 556 negative interviews, and the program is being followed very closely by the Seat of Government and the Field. At the present time twenty Special Agents in six offices are working full time on this assignment. Five of these offices have a backlog of subjects for interview and one office, Philadelphia, is in the process of making its last contacts, at completion of which, program will terminate there on full-time basis. As work decreases in any office Agents are released from full-time duty on this project. Many valuable informants and sources developed as a result of program, and current data set forth on specific examples. Memorandum is for information and program will continue to be followed closely, and as soon as any office completes its assignment it will be removed from Toplev status and the Agents released for other duties.

ACTION

None. This is for information. Program is being closely followed and as each office completes its Toplev interviews, steps will be taken to release the Agents working full time on this project in order that they may handle other duties.

JMC

JDD:DME

58 MAR 21 1954

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INT SIC

DETAILS

In September, 1951, a program was inaugurated whereby specially selected Agents were given training at the Seat of Government preparatory to interviewing high-level Communists as potential informants. A total of 35 Agents from 14 Divisions were originally trained to conduct these interviews. The program has received very close supervision at the Seat of Government and in the field and as offices exhausted their Toplev material the Agents assigned full time to the program were released for other duties. Under the program, in all 14 Divisions a total of 601 individuals have been contacted and as a result we have obtained 30 informants and confidential sources. 556 interviews were negative, but 15 subjects in seven Divisions are being recontacted. A total of 49 authorized interviews are pending.

OFFICES WORKING PROGRAM ON PART-TIME BASIS

As this program developed, eight of the fourteen offices: Baltimore, Buffalo, Cleveland, Indianapolis, New Haven, Newark, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, gradually contacted all available Toplev prospects and as each office indicated there was insufficient work to occupy the Agents full time, the Bureau directed that these Agents be made available for other assignments and they were not to be considered on special assignment for this purpose any longer.

At the present time these eight offices are not operating the program full time, but the Agents in these Divisions trained for this work are available to contact individuals of Toplev caliber who should be interviewed as potential informants. As such requests for authority to interview are received from these Divisions they will be handled in the same manner as in the past.

There are set forth below statistics relative to the eight offices which are no longer working full time on this program:

	Interviews Conducted	Successful Interviews	Negative Interviews	Interviews Authorized	Subjects being & Pending	Recontacted
BALTIMORE	8	0	8	0	0	
BUFFALO	12	1	11	0	0	
CLEVELAND	34	3	31	0	0	
INDIANAPOLIS	15	3	12	0	0	
NEW HAVEN	6	0	6	0	0	
NEWARK	26	3	22	1	1	
PITTSBURGH	19	0	19	0	0	
SAN FRANCISCO	38	0	37	0	1	

It is noted that there are a few recontacts and outstanding authorizations being handled by these Divisions, and these cases are being closely followed.

With regard to the success of the above offices, it is noted that ten informants and confidential sources were developed by them, all of whom are being contacted and are furnishing information in varying degrees.

OFFICES WORKING TOPLEV
PROGRAM FULL TIME

There are six offices presently occupied full time on this program. These offices and the personnel on special assignment are as follows: New York - six Agents; Detroit - four Agents; three Agents each in Los Angeles and Philadelphia; and two Agents each in Chicago and Seattle, a total of twenty Agents.

In addition to the interviews authorized and pending, all of these offices are considering for interview in the immediate future numerous other Toplev subjects and, with the exception of Philadelphia, have a backlog of such individuals for future approach.

Philadelphia has five subjects who will be approached within the near future and when these contacts are completed, that office will terminate the program on a full-time basis. Philadelphia is being closely followed in this matter.

There are set forth below statistics relative to the work presently being performed by these Agents and the approximate number of subjects to be contacted in the future in each office. On the first of each month these offices must advise the Bureau not only concerning the pending work, but also the number of subjects in their backlog of cases for future interviews.

	<u>Inter- views Conducted</u>	<u>Successful Interviews</u>	<u>Negative Interviews</u>	<u>Inter- views & Pending</u>	<u>Subjects Authorized & Pending</u>	<u>Subjects Being re- contacted</u>	<u>Subjects to be Approached in Future</u>
CHICAGO	51	4	46	3	1	19	
DETROIT	18	2	13	5	3	29	
LOS ANGELES	90	5	83	3	2	100	
NEW YORK	197	7	186	29	4	219	
PHILADELPHIA	32	0	32	5	0	0	
SEATTLE	55	2	50	2	3	12	

VALUE OF PROGRAM AND FUTURE PLANS

The program has resulted in obtaining 30 informants or confidential sources who have furnished a tremendous amount of information previously unobtainable. In addition, the program has had a tremendous effect upon the Party as a disruptive tactic and has caused much confusion on all levels in the Party. As the program has progressed it has become more and more difficult to develop informants as the individuals being contacted are being told constantly by the Party to refuse to talk to FBI Agents under threat of expulsion from the Party.

Two of the informants developed, NY 694-S and CG 5824-S, have resumed high-level Communist Party association on behalf of the Bureau and both of them have been furnishing information unobtainable from any other source. The New York informant, NY 694-S, has been acting as a courier between the Communist Party, USA, and the national leaders of the

Canadian Communist Party, and through NY 694-S information has been obtained indicating close association between the two Parties and a special file has been opened as a result of information he has developed. This file is called, "SASH - Espionage, R" and is being followed very closely to determine the extent of the connections between the two Parties and the possibility of an escape route from the United States into Canada, which could be used by the Communist fugitives.

CG 5824-S has been told by the highest Communist Party leaders that he is considered part of the "reserve leadership" and he is to receive definite Party duties of a political nature. He has already furnished considerable information relative to the present plans of the Party on a national scale.

Another informant. [redacted]

[redacted] was developed under the Program and continues to provide much information on the personnel and policies of that Communist [redacted] b7D

[redacted] was also developed under this Program and has been providing considerable information during the present [redacted]

Two of the most recent informants who have been developed are [redacted] has been [redacted]

and is endeavoring to improve his position in the Party in the [redacted] area on behalf of the Bureau. Due to his personal situation there is an excellent possibility that he may be able to operate in the Communist Party underground.

[redacted] Communist Party and when he agreed to cooperate in November, 1953, stated that he had not been active lately but that the Party had been in touch with him, the latest occasion having been in October, 1953. Since he agreed to assist the Bureau he has been very active in attempting to become reactivated and he has succeeded in being reaccepted into the Party. He is improving his position daily and has an excellent possibility of furnishing high-level coverage on Communist activities in [redacted]

b7D

The above are a few examples of the informants and confidential sources developed under this Program which will be continued on a full-time basis in those offices which have sufficient Toplev material to occupy the Agents on such a basis.

It is anticipated that Philadelphia will terminate the Program very shortly and Seattle should complete all pending interviews in approximately 60 days.

Detroit and Chicago will have interviewed all Toplev subjects within a few months but Los Angeles and New York have sufficient work to continue this Program for some time.

All offices, however, are being closely followed in order to obtain the maximum benefit from the efforts of the Agents assigned to this work and as soon as any office runs out of Toplev material it will be directed to terminate the Program on a full-time basis.

arr

gf

12

SAC, New York Attention: Security
Matter Section

March 24, 1954

Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOP LEVEL (100-3-99)
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

Reurlet 2-19-54, and mylet 3-10-54.

4-22-94
83-1343
SPLASHES

There are transmitted herewith twenty-five copies
of the publication "American Labor Unions" for use in the
captioned programs.

Attachments (25)

JFC:bas

ON YELLOW: New York letter requested copies of enclosure and
Bulet advised same would be forwarded when available.

~~CLASSIFIED AND
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION~~


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-12-2010 BY SP

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1790

INDEXED - 60

MAR 26 1954
103



Wilson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

67 APR 5 1954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

SAC, San Francisco [redacted]

April 5, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted] was
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

A review of the Bufile in this case reveals that authority was granted by the Bureau in Bulet of August 5, 1953, to approach the subject under the Toplev Program, but in subsequent letters you have advised it has not been possible to develop a source having intimate knowledge of the subject's activities and thereby facilitating the approach.

In addition, you pointed out by letter of December 16, 1953, that an interview with the subject at that time could jeopardize the development of a confidential source being used in connection with the underground Communist Party activities and, therefore, steps were not being taken to interview the subject under the Toplev Program.

Since there is no indication when you will be able to interview the subject in accordance with the Toplev Program, his case should be removed from Toplev consideration.

The case should be reassigned and if in the future the circumstances are such that an interview with the subject is feasible and practicable under the Toplev Program, the Bureau should be advised, setting forth full particulars and your recommendation concerning the manner of approach. Based upon your recommendation, the Bureau will consider authorizing an approach to the subject at that time.


B

JDD:DE

100-3-99- ✓

NOT RECORDED

106 AP 1 6



ORIGINAL FILED IN

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

3/30/54

SAC, New York [redacted]

CP, USA

TOPLEV

IS - C

[redacted]
SM - C

b6
b7C
b7D

Rebulet 2/1/54 authorizing a contact with [redacted] under the TOPLEV Program.

This will advise that no contact with [redacted] has yet been made since agents assigned to the TOPLEV Program have been working on the LIFO Investigation since 3/1/54. It is anticipated that an interview with [redacted] will be arranged by 4/30/54 and the results of such interview will be forwarded to the Bureau.

AM

1 - BU [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

100-3-99
NOT RECORDED
195 MAR 31 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

CAR:SR

257
APR 8 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SAC, Newark [redacted]

March 29, 1954

100-3-99
Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurairtel dated March 23, 1954.

Authority is granted to recontact the subject whenever feasible away from residence and place of business.

In conducting this interview you should be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

b7D

JDD:DE NOTE ON YELLOW: Subject is [redacted] working out of [redacted] and has been a [redacted] Communist in the State of New Jersey for about ten years. Authority was granted in Bulet 7/3/53 to contact under Toplev Program, but Newark subsequently advised that no situations arose whereby he could be approached in a secure manner. In view of his Communist Party activity, which also includes attendance at [redacted] in 1933, it is believed additional efforts should be made to contact him at the present time. Since subject displayed no hostility during contact 3/22/54, and Newark's claims there is sufficient basis for reinterview, it is felt that another approach should be made.

[redacted]

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Trotter _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

354

YELLOW
DUPPLICATE
MAR 29 1954
MAILED

APR 8 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN

NK [REDACTED]
EGB:fed

NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

MARCH 23, 1954

b7D

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [REDACTED] CONFIDENTIAL AIR TEL

ATTENTION ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A.H. BELMONT.

CP, USA - TOPLIN, IS-C. [REDACTED] IS-C. SUBJECT
INTERVIEWED NEAR HIS RESIDENCE, 3/22/54, 9:55 TO 11:25 AM. ENGAGED IN
LIVELY AND-SANIERED DISCUSSION. DISPLAYED NO HOSTILITY. SUFFICIENT
BASIS FOR REINTERVIEW. AUTHORITY REQUESTED TO RECONTACT UNDER
PREVIOUS SECURE CONDITIONS. LETTER FOLLOWS.

END

HOSTETTER

REGISTERED MAIL

CC: NK [REDACTED]

NOT RECORDED
171 MAR 31 1954

b7D

INITIALS [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-19-2011

Director, FBI (100-3-99; [redacted])

3/29/54

SAC, Philadelphia [redacted]

CP, USA, TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ATTENTION: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A.H. BEDFORD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] W.S.
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

Gd
Rebulet dated 2/23/54.

Surveillance are being conducted to effect a Toplev contact
with [redacted]. To date, no opportunity for a secure contact
has been afforded.

It is anticipated that this contact will be made in the
near future.

RAG:mmt
Registered Mail

58 APR 6 1954
69

100-3-99-
NOT RECORDED
153 APR 2 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-19-2011

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
ATTENTION: ASST. DIR. A.H. BELMONT

3/26/54

SAC, New York [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

GP, USA - TOPLIV
IS-C

b7D

[redacted] was
SM-C

Rebulet 1/29/54, authorizing interview with subject.

Spot surveillances to interview subject have been conducted in the vicinity of her residence and employment on 2/17/54, 2/24/54, 3/19/54, 3/22/54 and 3/23/54. These efforts to interview the subject under secure conditions have been negative.

Further efforts will be made to interview the subject, and it is expected that the interview will be conducted by 4/29/54. The Bureau will be promptly advised of the results of this contact.

RM

1 [redacted]

APR 1 1954

HPL:RM

APR 6 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
ATTENTION: ASST. DIR, A.H. BELMONT

3/26/54

SAC, New York [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

QP, USA / - TOPLEV
IS-C

[redacted] was
SM-C

Rebulet 1/27/54, granting authority to contact subject
under the TOPLEV program.

Spot checks conducted 2/15/54 and 2/19/54, met with
negative results. Since 3/1/54, the Agent to whom this case
is assigned has been working on the LEFRO Case on a full-time
basis. However, it is believed that it will be possible to
approach the subject and advise the Bureau of the results of
the interview by 4/27/54.

b6
b7C
b7D

RM

1 Bureau [redacted]
1 [redacted] (TOPLEV)

1100-2-17-1
NOT RECD
101 MAR 31 1954

100-2-17-1

AEN:RM

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

0-9a

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

TELETYPE

MARCH 25, 1954

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, DETROIT

100-3-49 ✓

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA. TOPLEV. IS, C.

[REDACTED] WAS., IS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS., SM, C. REURTEL MARCH

TWENTYFOUR, LAST. AUTHORITY GRANTED CONTACT

[REDACTED] WHEN HE IS ALONE AND AWAY FROM
EMPLOYMENT OR RESIDENCE IF SUCH CONTACT WILL
NOT PREJUDICE [REDACTED]

b7D

CONTACT SHOULD BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
INSTRUCTIONS OF TOPLEV PROGRAM. ADVISE BUREAU
RESULTS INTERVIEW.

JDD:DE

HOOVER

BUFILES: 100-3-99 ✓

[REDACTED]

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

ORIGINAL FILED IN

F-318

5 APR 9 1954

SENT VIA

M Per

PAGE TWO

CONSULATE FIFTY TWO AND FIFTY THREE. FACTIONALISM BETWEEN SUBJECT AND

[REDACTED] SUBJECT IS

WIFE REPORTED [REDACTED] - SUBJECT BORN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CURRENTLY EMPLOYED AS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SMITH ACT DEFENDANTS

END PAREN. SUBJECT IS SISTER OF [REDACTED] CP [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] FROM DETROIT AREA ALONG WITH WIFE. [REDACTED] UNMARRIED,

HAS POOR MORAL REPUTATION, REPORTED TO HAVE CARRIED ON NUMEROUS AFFAIRS,
PREVIOUS CONTACT WITH SUBJECT [REDACTED] INDICATING AFFAIR REPORTED BY

[REDACTED] SUBJECT ACTIVE IN [REDACTED]

IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH CP FUNCTIONARIES, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] REPORTED TRIP THIS WEEK END MAY AFFORD OPPORTUNITY TO
CONTACT [REDACTED] TOPLEV APPROACH. WILL TAKE PLACE FOLLOWING CLANDES-
TINE MEETING AWAY FROM EITHER SUBJECT'S EMPLOYMENT OR RESIDENCE. WILL
BE HANDLED IN DISCREET MANNER WITH [REDACTED] BEING INTERVIEWED AFTER
LEAVING [REDACTED] WITH NO HINT OF PRESSURE OR THREAT. AUTHORITY REQUESTED
BY FRIDAY NOON, MARCH TWENTY SIX WHEN SURVEILLANCE WILL COMMENCE.

MC INTIRE

END AND ACK PLS

2"WHAT IS LINE 8 FIRST PAGE BLS

I MEAN 9

WHAT IS LINE 9 ON PAGE ONE PLS

EIGHT. [REDACTED] CP IN FIFTY ONE. FORMER

6-29- PM OK FBI WA JG

TU DIS

SAC, Chicago [redacted]

March 25, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

100-3-99-[redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPIEV

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted]
SECURITY MATTER - C

b7D

Reurlet dated March 15, 1954.

Authority is granted to contact [redacted] whenever feasible away from residence and place of employment.

In conducting this interview you should be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

JDD:DE

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

354

YELLOW	DUPPLICATE
MAR 26 1954	
MAILED	

58 APR 8 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

March 15, 1954

SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

ATTN: Assistant Director
A. H. BELMONT

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted]
SECURITY MATTER - C

The following data concerning [redacted] is submitted to the Bureau for consideration of a request to interview [redacted] under instant program.

Background

[redacted] was born on [redacted]. He presently resides at [redacted] Chicago, and is employed as a [redacted] Chicago. He has worked for this since [redacted]. He is single and resides alone. His early life was spent in [redacted] and on [redacted]

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[redacted]. At the time of [redacted] he listed his politics as Socialist and his religion as Lutheran.

He is a brother to [redacted] (Bufile [redacted] in the Chicago Division and [redacted] the Civil Rights Congress, Chicago. He is known to have two other [redacted] and [redacted] believed to be residing in [redacted] and not known to have any Communist background.

Communist Party History

[redacted] apparently followed the Socialist cause early in life since his letters, [redacted] mentioned his activities in the Young Peoples Socialist League, a youth organization for the Socialist Party.

100-3-99

NOT RECORDED

MAR 30 1954

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ORIGINAL FILE IN

DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: CP, USA
TOPLEVEL
IS - C

[redacted]
SM - C

During 1924 and 1926, while employed by the [redacted], he was under surveillance by Railway Special Agents while he distributed CP literature and agitated on behalf of the CP.

In 1930, he was reported to be [redacted] a CP front organization.

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In 1932, he [redacted]
[redacted]
For reasons unknown, this trip was not made.

In 1941, in Chicago, he was [redacted] the American Labor Party on behalf of the CP. In the same year he became the [redacted] which met in the CP Headquarters in Chicago.

In 1943, he served as [redacted] and became a member of the Communist block in the Joint Political Action Conference of the AF of L, CIO, and the [redacted]

b7D

In 1944, he acted as [redacted] of the CP.

In 1945, he was [redacted] the Communist Political Association.

In 1946, [redacted] the National Railway Convention of the CP held in Chicago during February, 1946.

In 1949, he was given the CP responsibility of [redacted] in Chicago.

DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: CP, USA
FOPLEV
EX-C

[redacted]
EX-C

However, subsequent to this assignment, little information was reported concerning [redacted] activity. However, during a recent contact with [redacted] PSI, it was ascertained that [redacted] paid his dues to [redacted] who is described as [redacted]

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Evaluation

[redacted] most of his life and has spent many years attempting to [redacted] in Chicago on behalf of the CP. His efforts have obviously failed inasmuch as it is known that the [redacted] the Party in Chicago has not been enlarged and that [redacted] has been rebuffed in his attempts; particularly, since he has been reportedly ousted from the [redacted] to which he had belonged. Further, he has been described by [redacted] as just working out his [redacted] pension. However, his background and present position as [redacted] gives his prominence in the Communist movement a new significance.

It is to be noted that by Bureau letter dated May 12, 1953, captioned, [redacted] COMMILLI MILLER - C", the Bureau denied the Chicago division permission to conduct an interview with the subject inasmuch as it was deemed that it would not be productive. However, it is felt that since [redacted] has been identified as [redacted] subsequent to this denial, and falls under the purview of the FOPELV Program, it is believed he would be of considerable value if developed as a security informant.

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Plan of Approach

Pursuant and investigation have developed that [redacted] works the day shift at the [redacted] and commutes from his residence to his place of employment via public

DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: C., USA
SULEV
LC-C

[redacted]

LC-C

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transportation. It is planned to contact [redacted] as he disembarks from transportation after work near his home. Initial efforts of the interview will be to afford [redacted] a chance to become acquainted with the agents and gain confidence in them. In the event [redacted] is susceptible to interview, it is planned to engage him in a conversation pertaining to his work in the trade union movement and his particular activity in behalf of the CP.

Bureau authority is requested for contact of [redacted] in the above-outlined manner.

SAC, Seattle (66-2135)

March 25, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

SECURITY MATTER - C

Reurlet March 16, 1954, setting forth
the results of your contact with [redacted] on March 3,
1954.

It is noted that the subject has still not shown any desire to cooperate even though he has had ample opportunity to do so.

Authority is not granted at this time to recontact [redacted] and if at the end of a 90-day period, as suggested in referenced letter, you feel another contact may be made with him, you should request authorization, setting forth your reasons why such an approach should be made.

JDD:DE NOTE ON YELLOW: [redacted] has been contacted on five occasions and each time he is friendly and courteous and tries to minimize his connection with the Communist Party. He is not inclined, however, to cooperate or furnish any information and it does not appear authority should be given at this time to Seattle to approach him in 90 days as it is not known what the situation will be 90 days from now. [redacted] has been associated with the Communist Party since at least 1939 and is

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Geatty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
MAR 26 1954
MAILED

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (66-2135) [redacted]

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

CONFIDENTIAL
AIR MAIL - REGISTERED

ATTENTION: ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR A. H. BELMONT

b7D

[redacted] wa.

MAR 16 1954

SECURITY MATTER - C

Reference is made to Bulet dated 2/15/54, in which authority was granted to re-contact this subject away from his residence and place of employment.

SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

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On 3/3/54, SA'S JOSEPH P. MAC FARLAND and [redacted] were in [redacted], Washington, and shortly after noon on that date instituted a spot check surveillance in the vicinity of the [redacted]

[redacted] in the [redacted] of [redacted]. Shortly after 2:30 P.M. agents located subject's Studebaker automobile which was parked in a different parking lot than heretofore used by subject. Agents maintained surveillance of this automobile until 3:30 P.M., at which time agents noted [redacted] leaving his place of employment and walking in a general direction towards his car.

INTERVIEW WITH [redacted]

b7D

At 3:35 P.M. agents met [redacted] near the parking lot where his car was parked and he in turn gave a most hearty and cordial greeting to agents stating, "Where have you been? I haven't seen you for some time." Agents then asked [redacted] how his health and well being were and he said, "Not so good." He said, "As you can probably see I recently [redacted] furthermore, I am still bothered [redacted] and undoubtedly will have to set up in the hospital for a while in the very near future." He went on for a few minutes at some length concerning his other physical ailments at the time, which he said were rather minor but troublesome. He told agents that he recently had another minor operation and that he hoped in the near future he would be in A number one shape

JRB:jlB

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again. He also said that he had been working hard and that the cold weather had loused up his automobile and he had put up his money to fix the battery and steering post and other odds and ends in his car.

After joking with [redacted] for a minute or so he was asked by agents if he had been the recipient of any overtures by the Party members in [redacted]. Said that he had not as yet and he pointed out to agents again as he has in the past that he, himself, did not think it vital to make any overture to the Party members and it would be much better for him to wait and have the Party members make the overtures to him. Agents at this time agreed with [redacted] and said that he was wise to stick to this decision. [redacted] indicated to agents that he was in a hurry to leave inasmuch as he had some commitments in the downtown area and said that if agents had nothing more to discuss at the time that he would like to leave. He did state, however, that "Any time you are around town be sure to drop in and see me, inasmuch as I enjoy talking to you." Agents and [redacted] parted apparently on most jovial terms and interview was terminated.

b7D

TIME OF INTERVIEW

The above-described interview with [redacted] was had between the times of 3:35 and 3:50 P.M., March 3, 1954 in the vicinity of [redacted]
[redacted] in a parking lot in [redacted], Washington.

EVALUATION

It is apparent to agents that [redacted] is making no effort himself to associate with members of the Communist Party in [redacted] and also making no effort to reactivate himself in any way. Agents do feel, however, that if Party members come to him he will afford them an open ear for their many propositions what ever they may be and quite possibly will make said facts known to agents at some later date. As pointed out previously to the Bureau this individual is very intelligent and apparently does not want to be rushed into making any effort to secure information of value relative to Communist Party activities and furnish same to the FBI. Agents do feel that [redacted] should be re-contacted, however.

b7D

Bureau authority is requested to re-contact [redacted] after a lapse of ninety days.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-19-2011

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
ATTN: Assistant Director A. H. BELMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

3/24/54

b7D

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

CP, USA
TOPLEV
IS-C

[redacted] was.
SM-C

Remylet, 1/11/54 and bullet, 1/19/54.

Spot surveillances have been maintained intermittently in the vicinity of subject's residence and place of employment since 2/12/54 but subject has not been observed. It is known that he has been at home at least part of the time as a pretext call was made to his residence on the morning of 3/19/54 and he personally answered the phone and acknowledged his identity. Although surveillance on that day was thereafter maintained on his residence no one answering the subject's description was observed to leave the building. b7D

A description of subject's car is in the possession of this office and contact is being maintained with security informants who know the subject personally. It is therefore believed that an interview can be conducted in the near future and the Bureau advised of the results by 4/24/54.

REGISTERED MAIL

1 - [redacted] (TOPLEV)

JAC:CDB

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196 MAR 31 1954
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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-19-2011

900 Standard Building
Cleveland 13, Ohio

66-4754

March 24, 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI

Attention: A. H. BELMONT
Assistant Director

Re: CP-USA, TOPLEV
IS - C
(Bufile 100-3-99)

[redacted]
(Bufile [redacted])

b7D

Dear Sir:

Remylet January 20, 1954, setting forth the results of the fifth interview with [redacted] on January 18, 1954.

Efforts to arrange for further interviews during February were unsuccessful due to [redacted] being out of town and otherwise occupied. However, definite arrangements have been made to conduct the sixth interview with him on March 30, 1954, at which time the Bureau will be promptly informed of the results.

Very truly yours,

N. H. McCABE
SAC

EBB:mmk
REGISTERED MAIL

CC: [redacted]

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DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

March 23, 1954

SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY -C

b7D

[redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY -C

Reccoglet 1-25-54 and Bulet 1-25-54 authorizing a contact
with [redacted]

To date a contact has not been made with the subject due to
the assignment of SA CHARLES W. COLGLAZIER to extensive
contact with [redacted] in re: Bufile [redacted] and other
investigation in that regard. It is anticipated that this
contact will be made within the next thirty days.

CWC:ech
[redacted]

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100-3-99
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53 APR 8 [redacted]

INITIALS ON ORIGIN,

CONTINUATION OF PAGE ONE

900 Standard Building
Cleveland, Ohio

March 23, 1954

DIRECTOR, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL AMSD~~

ATTENTION: A. H. BELMONT, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY -C
(Bufile 100-3-99)

~~TOPLEVEL~~
INTERNAL SECURITY-C

(Bufile [redacted])

Dear Sir:

Rebulet February 12, 1954 which advised that above captioned individual is now considered as a confidential source. Please be advised that records of the Cleveland Office have been changed to reflect the designation

[redacted] b7D

This source contacted the Cleveland Office on February 2 and February 24, 1954 to report that

[redacted] Source said he [redacted]
1954 but had been unable to obtain any information of value.

[redacted] recontacted the Cleveland Office on February 26, 1954 to advise that he had attended a meeting at the Temple, Shaker Heights, Ohio. This meeting was held on February 24, 1954 and ROY COHN, legal counsel for the McCarthy Committee was the main speaker and spoke on the topic, "McCarthyism". Source said that COHN explained the methods utilized by this committee and gave a lucid explanation of the fight against Communism.

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179 MAR 31 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

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DIRECTOR, FBI

[redacted] was telephonically contacted on March 19, 1954 at which time he stated that he had no information of value to furnish the Cleveland Office. The source advised that he was temporarily unavailable for interview and advised that he would recontact the Cleveland Office within a few days to arrange for a meeting with an agent of the Cleveland Office.

b7D

It is contemplated that during the next meeting with [redacted] he will be requested to make an immediate decision as to whether he will wholeheartedly cooperate with the Bureau because it is not possible to continue contacting him in the event he is unable to be of assistance to the Bureau. It will be emphasized that his relationship with the Bureau will terminate in the event he is unwilling to cooperate fully and thus furnish valuable information to the FBI.

The Bureau will be promptly informed of any development in this matter.

Very truly yours,

N. H. McCabe
Special Agent in Charge.

CC: JOHNSON, 6126 IB

SAC, SEATTLE (66-2135) [redacted]

March 26, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA (10) ✓

TOPLEV

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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[redacted] SECURITY MATTER - C

Reurlet dated March 16, 1954, containing the results of an interview with [redacted] in which he indicated that he would cooperate with the Bureau and he said he would prepare a report concerning his past activities in the Communist Party and make it available in the near future.

Authority is not granted at the present time to classify him as an informant and utilize his symbol number, but if he does furnish the information as he agreed and gives other evidence of cooperation at that time a symbol number may be designated and the Bureau advised.

Authority is granted to compensate [redacted] in the amount of \$75 during the next contact if he does furnish information as agreed. Authority is also granted to recontact him on or about April 1, 1954, away from residence and place of employment.

In conducting this interview you should be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Tolev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject on or about April 1, 1954, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Sizoo _____
Miss Gandy _____

JDD:DE NOTE ON YELLOW: Subject has been involved in Communist activity since 1947 and though he has not held any high positions he has been closely associated with persons connected with the leadership in the CP in [redacted]. Information from informants indicates that he has been active up to the present time and he has indicated he will cooperate.

YELLOW

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ORIGINAL FILE

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99)
FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (66-2135)
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ATTENTION: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
A. H. BELMONT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR 16 1954

b7D

[REDACTED]
SECURITY MATTER - C

Reference is made to Bulet dated 2/17/54, in which authority was granted to contact [REDACTED] whenever feasible away from his residence and place of employment.

SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

On March 2, 1954, SA'S JOSEPH P. MAC FARLAND and [REDACTED] were in [REDACTED], Washington. Said agents at approximately 4:00 P.M. instituted a spot check surveillance in the vicinity of [REDACTED] which is in the near proximity of subject's residence at [REDACTED]. Agents maintained this surveillance until well after the hours of darkness and failed to note any activity whatsoever about subject's home. Agents did note, however, that directly behind subject's home an old automobile was parked in the garage, but agents were unable to ascertain the license plate number of this vehicle due to the manner in which it was parked. Agents presumed, however, that this was subject's car inasmuch as it was parked in the garage adjacent to his house.

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Shortly after 7:00 A.M. on March 3, 1954, agents again instituted a spot check surveillance in the vicinity of subject's residence. Between 7:30 A.M. and 10:30 A.M. agents noted no activity whatsoever about the premises of subject's home. Agents were of the opinion at this time that quite possibly subject had gone out of the city in an endeavor to secure employment. In order to ascertain whether or not this might be the case agents decided to knock on the front door of subject's home inasmuch as it was impossible to make telephonic contact, as agents had ascertained that subject's telephone had just recently been disconnected by the telephone company. Accordingly, at 10:45 A.M. agents made contact with subject's residence and the subject, himself, immediately came out from the back part of the house and greeted agents. Agents courteously identified themselves to [REDACTED] at this time and told him that they desired to discuss a matter with him in confidence. [REDACTED] immediately stated that he understood and excused himself for a minute or two to obtain his shoes and a warm coat and said that he would immediately meet with agents in front of his home. A few minutes thereafter [REDACTED] came

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out of the home and met agents on the sidewalk, at which time they told him that they had an automobile parked in the near vicinity and it would be a most comfortable place where [redacted] could sojourn for a short talk with agents!

INTERVIEW WITH [redacted]

On arriving at the parked Bureau car near the intersection of [redacted] agents again made known their official identities to [redacted] and he examined both agent's credential cards. [redacted] then remarked, "What have I done? I am no criminal. Why do you men want to talk to me?" Agents then told [redacted] that they had been desirous of conversing with him for some period of time inasmuch as he undoubtedly could aid and assist his government due to the fact that he had some information that was currently considered of value to the government. [redacted] said, "I don't know what you mean. I don't know any criminals. I don't associate with any and all during my life I have prided myself on the fact that I have led a very clean and above-board life." [redacted] then, without any prompting whatsoever, made mention to agents that a year or so ago he was a [redacted]
[redacted]

b7D

[redacted] Agents remarked to [redacted] that he had acted in the manner in which any prudent individual would do in the event he were confronted with such a situation. [redacted] then said, "I can't understand why you men want to see me as this is the only incident in my life in which I might have created the impression of cooperating with criminals."

Agents assured [redacted] that they were not coming to him to incriminate him in any crime whatever, but merely sought his cooperation on a matter that they desired to discuss with him.

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Agents then explained the jurisdiction of the FBI in both the criminal field and in that of internal security. It was brought to [redacted] attention that the FBI investigates violations of many federal statutes and secures factual information concerning said violations and presents the facts that are made known through the investigation to the United States Attorney or other appropriate government officials. [redacted] said that he understood this and it was also explained to [redacted] that the FBI investigates any individual or organization which might adhere to the interests of another nation which would be detrimental to the welfare and security of the United States and its

citizens. It was explained to [] that prior to World War II the FBI investigated many individuals and organizations that might be in sympathy with the Japanese or German governments through the fact that they could be used to the detriment of this country. It was explained to [] that the FBI investigates individuals and organizations at the current time who might be connected with organizations which would render aid and assistance to the U.S.S.R.

Agents noted that after making this remark [] apparently became quite alert and made a joking gesture to the effect that, "I believe I see the light now and think I know what you want to discuss with me." [] continued by stating that he could not engage in any activity that would reflect upon his family and that he could not do anything to in any way hurt or harm any of his friends of associates. While he did not specifically use the word stool-pigeon it was obvious that at this time [] had some reluctance about furnishing information concerning individuals with whom he associated in various activities and occupations. Agents went on to explain to [] at this time the program, plans and policies of the Communist Party and brought to his attention the thought that he, himself, could not consider himself an informer if he related facts concerning circumstances of which he had knowledge, no matter what the particular situation was. He was reminded that if he were the secretary of some organization that it would be his duty to take notes or occurrences at the meeting and to report the facts at the next meeting of the particular organization. He was asked the question at this time whether he would consider himself to be doing anything that would cause him to lose face with himself by engaging in this activity and he replied in the negative. Agents also brought to [] attention that if he were a newspaperman that it would be his duty in order to prepare stories and copy for the paper which he represented, to attend meetings and interview people to make observations and report the facts in the form of a news item or story to appear in the publication on which he was serving. He was asked the question at this time as to whether he would consider himself to be engaging in any activity that would cause him mental concern and he replied in the negative. It was brought out to Mr. [] at this time that no honorable, intelligent, law-abiding Christian fears the truth and that if he were engaged in an activity to report on the doings of an organization as long as he was truthful and factual, totally unbiased and held no animosity toward the individuals in the organization or the organization itself that he would have nothing to fear from the truth. He was asked whether he was fearful of the "truth" and he replied in the negative.

It was brought to the attention of Mr. [] at this time that because of the secret activities of the Communist Party that the government has to depend upon loyal, intelligent, unbiased, well informed individuals to keep it advised as to the nature of the activities and the identify of the individuals participating in Communist affairs so that the ends of government can be properly served. It was brought to [] attention that without this

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type of information the government would be at a loss to make a proper evaluation as to the dangerousness and the willfulness and the loyalty of individuals connected with the organization, which evaluation would be most necessary in times of international or domestic upheavels. It was explained that the government's only interest in the Communist Party as far as any activities in which he might participate on behalf of the government would be to secure factual, unbiased, truthful information about the doings and activities [redacted] of the Communist Party and of the membership thereof. It was suggested to [redacted] at this time that he as a law-abiding, good Christian who professed belief in Christianity and who looked forward to the time when in this world there would be a Christian government that he had a duty and an obligation to perform in order to maintain and sustain the freedom of religion, the freedom of enterprise and the many blessings which he and all the citizens of this country enjoy. [redacted] was asked the question at this time as to whether he could be totally unbiased and report truthfully and accurately information coming to his attention with respect to Communist activities and he replied in the affirmative.

b7D

[redacted] was assured that the government must be certain in its own mind that he was the type of individual that the government believed him to be, that is, a loyal, patriotic, honest, intelligent, unbiased person, and that he could confirm this belief upon the part of his government by performing a duty and obligation which he owed to the government in taking part in sustaining the government by making available to the government his knowledge and service in connection with keeping the government advised of Communist activities and the identity of Communists in the [redacted] area. [redacted] stated that he understood what was wanted and that he believed that he could undertake such a task.

After having reached thus far with [redacted] as pointed out above [redacted] made the remark to the agents, "I guess you men know all about my activities and association with the Party in this area." Agents assured him that they were cognizant of his activities for the past few years. [redacted] then remarked that, "Well, I'll tell you why I first became involved in the Party. It was due to the fact that I have always had an interest in the working class and I desired to see from the inside just what this organization was proposing and doing for the working people." He said that he associated with the various individuals in the [redacted] area who are also connected with the Party and he remarked that he could not recall any instance where any of these individuals made any overtures to the effect that they were advocating the violent overthrow of this government.

b7D

It was explained to [redacted] that the Communist Party in this country is nothing more than a long arm of the Soviet foreign office and that, in fact, all Communist Party directives in the United States were originated in the Soviet Union and carried out in this country to fit the situation at the

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time. It was also explained to [] that the Communist Party in this country and in other nations had been used as a training ground for sabotage and espionage. [] on hearing this appeared to be somewhat dubious relative to the truthfulness of this matter and agents explained to him different situations in this country and others relative to the sabotage and espionage matters. Agents went into a somewhat thorough discussion with [] concerning the ultimate aims and objectives of Communism and pointed out to him very clearly that the Party in this country was in practically every instance, both on a national scale and on a local scale, two-fold in its objectives, that is, the Party would advocate things that appeared advantageous to the worker, while on the other hand the ultimate objective, although hidden, would be detrimental to the welfare of the United States. It was explained to [] that this situation did not always prevail on objectives propounded by the Party but from time to time it did and any intelligent being within the Party could fathom out the deceit and actually understand the ultimate motive of such a program. [] apparently agreed with agents in this matter and said that he knew that the Communist Party abroad was a ruthless outfit and he most certainly did not in any way favor its growing in this nation. He then went on to explain to agents that the reason he drifted away from the Party a year or so ago was due to the fact that several Russian officials in the Soviet Union were executed without being afforded a fair and impartial trial. Agents then pointed out to [] that the Communist leaders in the United States had been duly arrested and indicted and afforded a fair and impartial trial for violating the Smith Act.

b7D

[] readily agreed with agents in this respect and made a remark himself to the effect that the eleven leaders who were tried a few years ago in New York were most certainly afforded a fair and impartial trial.

Agents then went into a rather detailed discussion with [] regarding his current status with the Party people in the [] area. [] advised agents that he at no time had been expelled or suspended from the Party and that he had just drifted away. He remarked, however, that he still receives at the current time invitations to various affairs being sponsored by the Communist Party in []. He said that just recently he received an invitation to a meeting which was held during the latter part of February. [] seemed to understand the point of the discussion at this time and volunteered information to the effect that he did not believe he would have any difficulty in reactivating himself in the Party inasmuch as he was certain that no individual was angry towards him and he felt that they would again accept him within the ranks of the Party if he made any move whatsoever to indicate that he was interested.

b7D

Agents pointed out to [] that he should not become overly interested too suddenly and for the best results should take things very slow at the start and not appear to be too overly anxious to become reactivated.

He said that he understood this and felt that in the event he accepted an invitation to some meeting in the near future that people would have no suspicion whatsoever concerning his attendance at said affair. [redacted] was also told that he in all probability would have to pay some dues and subscribe to some Communist Party publications such as the "Daily People's World", and purchase numerous and sundry items of Communist Party literature in order to get back in good standing again. [redacted] said that he realized this and would make an effort to reactivate himself in the near future. Agents after further discussion with [redacted] made it very plain and emphatic to him that if he voluntarily would reactivate himself in the Party with the idea of aiding his government that he should at no time indicate or assume that he was in any way employed by the U.S. Government. He was also told that any such arrangement would have to be most confidential and that the only way such arrangement could be jeopardized would be by him making mention of the fact that he was cooperating with the government. He was told that he must be most careful not to divulge to anyone the fact that he would be cooperating with the government inasmuch as to do so would defeat the purpose. [redacted] said that he understood this and would desire to cooperate with the FBI and would make an effort to do so in the near future. [redacted] said that he has seen enough of Communism to know that it is not the best for the American people. He also made remarks to the effect that it would be most difficult to associate with some of the individuals connected with the Party in [redacted]. He said several of the people he knew in the Party he would not consider to be dangerous to the security of the nation but he did remark, "I guess you really never know how one will act in the event of an emergency." [redacted] then went into some dissertation to agents, stating that most certainly he did not want to be called to testify in court to merely point out individuals who were members of the Communist Party.

b7D

He explained this by stating in the event he learned anything about any individual who upon order of Communist Party officials commit sabotage or espionage against this nation he would be more than glad to testify to such facts.

Agents pointed out to Mr. [redacted] that in the trials in the country concerning Smith Act violators people within the Party for services to the U.S. Government had volunteered to testify and had made mention to the court and jury only actual facts that they had learned while in the Communist Party. It was explained to Mr. [redacted] that no individual had been forced to testify against their will. [redacted] then asked agents what they desired him to do. Agents told [redacted] that it would be appreciated if he would endeavor to reactivate himself within the ranks of the Communist Party in [redacted], however, he was cautioned at this time to make his re-entry into the Party a slow one and a sure one. [redacted] said that he understood this and would merely accept one of the invitations that he would undoubtedly receive in the near future and go to the affair and act in the same manner as he did when he was in the Party a short time ago.

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Agents then told [] that in the event he was successful in reactivating himself the FBI was interested only in facts and did not want any fiction, opinions or matters of doubt. It was told to Mr. [] that the FBI was interested in any Communist Party meeting and concerning same they are interested in the date said meeting was held, the place where it was held, the individuals in attendance at the meeting and the topics discussed at said meeting, as well as who said what at said meeting. It was again pointed out to Mr. [] that the FBI was only interested in honest facts concerning the above. [] then told agents that he understood what was desired and somewhat in a boastful manner stated that he prided himself upon having a good memory.

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[] at the current time is unemployed and seems to have considerable time on his hands and quite possibly would have ample time to attend many Communist Party and Communist Party front functions in the [] area. Agents feel that the individual is fairly intelligent and apparently sincere in his desire to cooperate with the FBI. It should be pointed out, however, that [] at the outset of the interview was a rather difficult individual to handle and after explaining to him the dangerousness of the Communist Party movement and the many ramifications thereof [] seemed to come around to the agents' way of thinking. Agents feel that [] with proper guidance will be an individual who can in all probability go a long way in the Communist Party in the eastern area of the state of Washington. Agents feel that he is sincere and probably can be of good service to the Seattle Division.

Shortly prior to the termination of the interview with [] he made a remark to the effect that he most certainly did not want to find anything that would show up to identify him with the function that he was to perform. Agents told [] that he would most certainly have to make a written report of the meetings or affairs he attended, but that he would not be required to sign his name. [] seemed pleased to learn this and agents then told him to sign the name [] to any report he might furnish concerning Communist Party activities. [] seemed to be in complete agreement with this idea. Agents also told [] that they would be desirous of obtaining from him a written report concerning his past activities in the Communist Party and he said that he would prepare same and make it available to agents in the near future. A matter of finances also was discussed with [] bearing in mind that he, in order to properly reactivate himself, would probably have to pay some back dues and take some action relative to subscribing to publications and subscribing to literature. Agents told [] that on or about the first of April, 1954 he would be compensated in the amount of \$50 in order to take care of his time and expenses. [] said that this amount would be most satisfactory with him. Agents then went on to explain to [] that in the event he did reactivate himself and found it possible to attend functions that he would be compensated relative to the amount of time spent and the amount of information of value furnished the FBI. Agents

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told [] that they could not guarantee any actual amount of compensation per month at the outset, but he was assured that in the event he did his part truthfully and sincerely that his time would be well taken care of. [] said that sort of an arrangement was agreeable to him and that he would make an honest effort to aid and assist his country in the above-described manner.

TIME OF INTERVIEW

The above-described interview was had with [] in a Bureau automobile parked near the corner of [] Washington, between the times of 10:45 A.M. and 11:50 A.M. on March 3, 1954.

EVALUATION

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Agents feel that this individual is sincere in his agreement to aid and assist the FBI relative to matters of the Communist Party in the Spokane area. Agents also were of the opinion that [] is intelligent enough to make certain that he does not try to go too fast at the outset and upset the "apple cart" before it is properly set in motion. [] probably will develop into an informant of value and should be one who could cover the situation in this area very thoroughly.

Bureau authority is requested to recontact this individual on or about the first of April, 1954, in order to obtain from him at that time a report concerning his past activities in the Communist Party and to determine from him what progress he has made, if any, in reactivating himself within the Communist Party. Bureau authority is also requested at that time to compensate [] in the amount of \$75 in order to take care of his time and necessary current expenses.

Further communications directed to the Bureau concerning this individual will not carry his name caption, but he will be classified as Confidential Informant []

SAC, LOS ANGELES [redacted]

March 25, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

100-3-99 - ✓

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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[redacted]
SECURITY MATTER - C

Reurlet dated March 12, 1954.

Authority is granted to recontact [redacted] after April 1, 1954, if the subject does not get in touch with your office.

Your recontact should be made away from residence and place of employment, and in conducting any interview with [redacted] you should be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject within 90 days after April 1, 1954, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

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NOTE ON YELLOW: The subject was recruited into the Communist Party in 1937 and, according to Los Angeles, he has been continuously active since that time in the Party and has [redacted]

[redacted] He has been affiliated with several front organizations and has attended schools sponsored by the Party. On 2/12/54 the subject was contacted and willingly agreed to an interview. He admitted knowing several Communists and stated he did not think the Communist Party was a danger to this country. He agreed to a recontact which was made on 3/11/54 and though he did not furnish any information he was still agreeable to the interview and if it is felt efforts along this line should be continued by Los Angeles.

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ORIGINAL FILED IN

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

March 12, 1954

SAC, LOS ANGELES [redacted]

Op., USA, TOPLV
IS-C

Attention: Assistant Director
A.M. BALMONT

SM-C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Rebulet dated March 2, 1954.

SECOND INTERVIEW WITH SUBJECT

It will be recalled that in my previous letter, the subject indicated he would be willing to have a discussion with Agents on another occasion. On March 11, 1954 subject was recontacted in the vicinity of his place of employment by SA's [redacted] and VINCENT W. HUGHES. When Agents approached him, before they had any time to make an effort to be friendly and offer a handshake to the subject, he made the comment, "Is this the same deal as the last time, - no subpoena?" Agents replied that of course there was no subpoena; they were there to talk to the subject in a friendly fashion, at which time subject then stated, "Well then, I'll leave." Agents immediately went into a hurried discussion in an effort to delay subject's departure and pointed out that there were a few points which they had not covered in their previous interview which they desired to bring to his attention. While the subject did not agree to the interview, he did not actually depart and Agents continued their discussion, although the atmosphere was certainly not conducive to a relaxed consideration of the problem.

Agents advised him that what puzzled them so was that subject, by his own statements, admitted that he had no intention of ever revolting against the country and that his allegiance would be to the United States in time of war, and, in the face of these statements, subject joined and was active in an organization which did advocate revolution and whose allegiance is to international Communism. Agents explained that this inconsistency puzzled them greatly and they felt that if subject would be willing to sit down and hold a discussion, they could point out to him the mistake that he was making. Subject raised a question that Agents had no right to question his loyalty and that he was offended by this attitude. When the Agents replied that their problem was to attempt to determine who might be a potential subversive and that to them the best criterion they had to go by was a man's support and participation in an organization which was subversive.

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[redacted]

Agents advised that if a man paid dues and attended meetings of the Communist Party, they must assume that he believes in the basic tenets of Marxism; that they could not look into the man's head to see which tenets he disregarded and which ones he accepted. Agents asked subject the question that if a man went to church every Sunday, would not he consider it reasonable to think that that man believed in God, since this is the basic tenet of religion?

[redacted] replied that he didn't think that it was necessarily true, - that a man might go to church for business reasons or because he enjoyed the company or the singing, or for any number of other reasons. Agents stated that while they agreed there were probably such exceptions, that most of us would assume that the average churchgoer does believe in God.

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Subject then stated that he felt that he was at a considerable disadvantage in holding such a discussion with Agents; that he assumed that Agents were lawyers and were trained and experienced at carrying on this type of discussion, whereas he was a man with little education and no training along this line, and he didn't feel that he could defend his position. Agents stated that they felt the error the subject was making was assuming that such a discussion was some sort of a debate where one side or the other would have to win. They stated this was not the case at all, - that this conversation was to evolve around a search for what we might all agree upon as the truth and that we were all interested in reaching the same objective. Agents stated that if there was going to be a discussion concerning the history of the automobile industry, that they would certainly like [redacted] to participate in such a discussion and would feel that without question, among the three of them, he would have more to contribute to the conversation than anyone else, in view of his twenty years of association with the industry. There would be no resentment towards his presence, but more likely, an appreciation that a man of his knowledge and background would be on hand. The discussion then turned to the demerits of Capitalism as defined by

[redacted] He seemed to be unhappy about the fact that he felt General Motors could turn out a better car because the Engineering Department produced a fine product but the company would not put it into production because the switch-over would slow down the assembly line. [redacted] General Motors produces fifty-three cars an hour at present and that they could probably produce this better car if they would cut down production to about forty cars an hour. This then lead into a discussion of profits and prices and again the subject took the position that big companies could afford to, and had an obligation to see that the working people got the finest product which could be produced at the cheapest rate. Agents stated that they felt there were a number of sides to this question and that if they could sit down in a leisurely fashion with the subject, they could possibly resolve these various issues, but with subject desiring to terminate the interview, it was difficult to carry on such a discussion and again the conversation turned to an effort to have [redacted] meet with Agents for dinner or on some other similar occasion, which he refused to do.

During part of the discussion, Agents had occasion to read part of the revolutionary statements contained in LENIN's pamphlet entitled State and Revolution. [redacted] of course, did not deny that LENIN stated revolution was necessary, but he made the comment, "Yea, and who's going to start this revolution?" Agents pointed out that it is impressed in the writings of MARX and LENIN that while historical materialism has pointed the way, that civilization goes through various stages such as slavery, feudalism, capitalism, Socialism, and Communism; that the purpose of the Communist is to hasten these changes by their actions. Thus, they were to instigate revolution in order to bring about the better world which they were going to produce. [redacted] did not take issue any further on this matter.

Agents asked him if he had read the literature which they had furnished him and he stated he had read part of it. Since Agents needle him in a friendly way on this subject, he indicated he would read the balance of it. In addition, they gave him several other pamphlets.

They then brought up the subject of [redacted]. [redacted] has a long Party record and was approached by Bureau Agents last Summer, at which time she received them in a friendly fashion, but denied any past affiliation with the Communist Party. Agents asked [redacted] if he would go over this literature with [redacted] and have a discussion between them and think about some of the things which Agents had mentioned and then agree to a subsequent contact with Agents. [redacted] at first, indicated he did not desire to see Agents further. He told Agents he didn't want them around his house because of his mother's condition and that he didn't want to see them around [redacted] home. He then stated that in about a month, he would call the Agents on the telephone. After about an hour and twenty minutes, this interview was terminated.

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EVALUATION

While subject had originally intended not to have a discussion with Agents, he did carry on such a discussion, which indicates to the Agents that he is a reasonable and likeable person. On several occasions during the interview, he laughed freely and he gives a very forthright answer to most questions. Agents do not feel that there was any obvious progress which they had made in dissuading him from Communism, but the mere fact that he talked to them is regarded as a good sign. The fact that he agreed to discuss these questions with [redacted] is also indicated as a very good sign. In the event Agents do not hear from this subject by April 1, 1954, they will attempt to recontact him, with Bureau permission. UACB.

SAC, Detroit (66-3360) [redacted]

March 25, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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[redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Memorandum dated March 11, 1954.

It is noted that you have suggested three possible approaches to the subject in order to determine whether she could be developed as an informant. To utilize a third party, such as [redacted] would naturally reveal to [redacted] our interest in the subject and it is not believed advisable at this time to use this method of contact. A possible approach through [redacted] is not practical or feasible in view of his erratic nature and unreliability.

Authority is granted, however, to either directly approach the subject or contact her through her husband. Either contact should be made away from subject's residence and any place of employment in accordance with existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

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Miss Gandy _____

JDD:DE NOTE ON YELLOW: SEE PAGE TWO.



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NOTE ON YELLOW:

Of the three approaches suggested by Detroit, the first one through a former informant would indicate to the former informant our interest in the subject and it is felt other avenues of approach should be explored first. [redacted] is unreliable and should not be utilized. There is no objection to a direct approach to the subject and such may be made but if Detroit feels an indirect approach is more feasible through subject's husband, such can also be attempted.

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Subject's husband has been identified as a member of the Communist Party, but he has not held many positions of importance. If he were inclined to cooperate or induce the subject to cooperate, we could obtain valuable informant coverage.

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

March 11, 1954

SAC, Detroit

(66-3360)

REGISTERED MAIL
CONFIDENTIAL

CP, USA - TOPLIV
IS - C

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IS - C

Attention: Assistant Director A. H. BELMONT

I. Background

Captioned individual was born [REDACTED]. Her mother is deceased and no information is available regarding her father. On [REDACTED] Subject married [REDACTED] and on [REDACTED] was granted a divorce from [REDACTED] for cruelty and non-support.

She is currently married to [REDACTED] who was born [REDACTED]. Subject filed a bill for divorce, but this divorce was not granted inasmuch as [REDACTED] was in the United States Army at the time. She is currently residing with her husband.

Subject has [REDACTED]

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On August 31, 1950 [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] was on the verge of being [REDACTED] and a doctor had diagnosed his case as a very serious [REDACTED] DE-356-S reported on November 27, 1951 [REDACTED], who had recently been drafted into the Army, became involved in a physical altercation with [REDACTED], as a result of which he was being detained by military authorities in the [REDACTED]. Subject was of the opinion this was a "frame-up", and a [REDACTED] was formed by Subject and several other active CP members in Detroit.

100-3-99-

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Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

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[redacted] stated on October 10, 1950 that [redacted] has been somewhat of a problem, requiring doctor's aid in view of his physical condition and that on his return from college in [redacted] his attitude was apparently anti-Party in that he refused to keep company with Party youth and appeared no longer interested in Communist activities.

[redacted] reported on November 19, 1953 that according to COLEMAN YOUNG (one of the current leaders in District 7), [redacted] "talked too much", was a "bad actor" and had violated Party decisions in school and also in military service.

[redacted] has in the past supplied a little information to the Detroit Division but is generally considered to be unreliable.

As to Subject's husband [redacted], he is currently employed by the [redacted] but is inactive in CP affairs and has been inactive for several years.

DE-356-S stated on October 2, 1951 that a person believed to be [redacted] had "got religion".

Subject has lived at various addresses in Detroit from 1932 to 1942. From [redacted] she resided at [redacted] and she then moved to [redacted] at which address she currently resides with her husband.

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Subject is currently unemployed (housewife). Her last employment was around November, 1952, for about [redacted] when she was paid by the [redacted]. Prior to that time she had worked for brief periods as a [redacted] for considerable periods received welfare benefits.

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA - TOBLEY
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[redacted]
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II. Communist Party Activity

Subject has been in the Communist Party since approximately 1935. The first position Subject held in the CP was in [redacted]

near the end of 1942 she was invited to be a member of CP, [redacted] a case in which the CP was interested at that time. As of 1943 Subject was on the [redacted] for [redacted] 1943 Subject was [redacted] the CP. During 1944 Subject was a member of the [redacted] CPA. In 1945 when the CPA was dissolved Subject became CP Club and served on the [redacted] of the CP Convention in 1945 which dissolved the CPA.

During May, 1946, Subject attended a meeting of the [redacted] of the CP in Michigan. During the latter part of 1947 or early 1948 Subject attended a national CP school in Chicago. In 1949 Subject was a member of the [redacted]

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During 1950 Subject was a member of the CP Section [redacted]

On August 3, 1951 Subject was described as a [redacted]
On [redacted] United States Senator BLAIR MOODY.

On June 4, 1953 [redacted] described Subject as being a member of the [redacted] CP.

Since 1935 Subject has, of course, engaged in numerous other Communist and Communist front activities, such as picket lines, mass meetings, etc.

Subject is generally considered by the Communist Party to be a reliable individual.

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

[redacted]
IS - C

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III. Possible Pressure Points

a. Factionalism or Evidence of Dissatisfaction With CP

[redacted] stated on July 11, 1945 that Subject was perturbed with the CP inasmuch as she had not been paid for some time. Subject made the statement, "They don't care if they pay us or not as they know we will work anyway."

DE-140-S* stated on July 23, 1945 that CARL WINTER, CP State Chairman, [redacted]

[redacted] the official approval of WINTER. Informant stated that apparently this meeting consisted of members who were [redacted]

[redacted] fearful that meetings such as the type Subject held would cause a serious split in the Party.

DE-140-S* stated on April 23, 1948 that HELEN WINTER, Administrative Secretary, CP, was of the opinion that although [redacted] has always been sweet to her face, she feels that [redacted] has a strong antagonism against her behind her back. Informant also stated that ESTHER JACKSON was of the opinion that Subject should not be sent to a CP school inasmuch as JACKSON felt Subject had an uncontrollable personal ambition and would further her own interests at the expense of anybody or any organization.

DE-140-S* reported on April 23, 1948 that Subject was angry with the CP leadership inasmuch as she felt that her work in the community was not being properly recognized.

[redacted] stated on September 25, 1951 that Subject had attempted to avoid responsibilities of her position as [redacted] area believing that the security of the Party would be in danger because she is under constant surveillance. Informant stated that Subject had succeeded in shoving most of her responsibilities on [redacted]

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Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

[redacted]
IS - C

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On July 16, 1952 [redacted] advised that Subject was having serious trouble and advised that "she must take actions for the security of her children" and was apparently reluctant to meet with the [redacted]

[redacted] advised on May 14, 1951 that Subject had commented recently that white chauvinism had penetrated the Communist Party to a great extent and that Subject had made the statement that when the Communist Party refuses to fight for Negro rights, there will be no Communist Party in Michigan.

[redacted] advised on March 11, 1953 that at a meeting of the [redacted] stated he had heard some church members state that the Communist does not believe in Christianity. Subject answered by stating that the CP believes in Christianity but not like the capitalists. She stated the capitalists believe in segregation and all white leaders in the prominent churches.

[redacted] advised on May 21, 1953 that Subject had recently joined the [redacted] Detroit, and was [redacted]

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b. Finances

DF-110-S* reported on October 26, 1949 that Subject had complained to [redacted] that she was in desperate need of money and needed \$50 for a period of two weeks.

This Informant reported on November 28, 1949 that Subject had requested [redacted] to grant financial help so that [redacted] could continue his schooling in Illinois. This request by Subject was not granted by [redacted] leaders in view of the fact that they felt many others were equally as deserving as [redacted]

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA - TOPLIV
IS - C

[redacted]
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DE-140-S* stated on December 5, 1949 that Subject had decided to [redacted] school and that [redacted] had decided that they would put an immediate stop to any such plans.

[redacted] stated on February 15, 1950 that Subject had complained that she was just about at the end of her rope financially.

IV. Prior Interview

In connection with the attempt to locate the COMFUGS, Subject was contacted on July 11, 1951 at her residence by SA's MORTIMER C. WATSON and [redacted]. Agents made inquiry as to the present whereabouts of the eight fugitives, to which Subject replied that she only knows what she reads in the newspapers. She was reluctant to say whether she knew any of the fugitives. When told that the Bureau has reason to believe that one or more of them had been in contact with her in the past or might be in the future, she indicated that she could not understand why. She was thereafter apprised of the Harboring Statute after which she remarked she had cognizance of the same, having heard about it over the radio. She stated during the contact that she considers herself to be a loyal citizen of this country and indicated that she would cooperate with law enforcement agencies if she learned any information concerning the present whereabouts of the fugitives.

V. Personality

On January 16, 1948 [redacted] (both leading CP members, [redacted]) stated concerning Subject that she would speak at ten meetings if it would help her prestige but that if brain work was involved one must keep after Subject to get it done.

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DE-140-S* reported in 1945 that HELEN ALLISON stated there was no Negro comrade in [redacted] that has the administrative ability of Subject.

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

[redacted]
IS - C

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[redacted] advised on March 8, 1954 that he has known Subject since about 1945 and has been well acquainted with her since about that time. [redacted] stated Subject was always a strong supporter of the CP as she believed the CP was helping the Negroes. [redacted] stated that Subject's prime consideration in being a CP member was to help the Negro race.

[redacted] also stated that Subject has a strong church feeling as evidenced by her recent joining of a neighborhood church and at times has even asked for CP financial support for some church cause. [redacted] stated he did not know if Subject was actually assigned by the CP to work in a church but felt that Subject has personal religious feeling in any case. [redacted] stated that Subject's husband, [redacted] during the late 1940's "got religion" and ceased activity in the CP to the point that even though meetings were frequently held in his home he did not attend.

[redacted] stated that Subject is very fearful of the FBI and that he doubts very much if a direct approach to Subject would be successful.

[redacted] pointed out that financial consideration would be of extreme importance to Subject and felt that with the proper approach to Subject and an offer of money, the Bureau would stand a reasonable chance of developing Subject to a point where she would furnish information.

VI. Approach

As outlined above, there are three possible avenues of approach to Subject in addition to a direct approach by Agents.

The first would be through [redacted] who advised he might be able to talk with Subject and arrange a meeting between Subject and Agents.

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Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

[redacted]
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The second would be also a third party approach through Subject's husband. [redacted] has advised that while Subject is the real boss of the family, [redacted] does have some influence over Subject, and [redacted] expressed the opinion that with the proper offer of money possibly this method would have some chance of success. It is pointed out, however, that no Bureau Agent has as yet interviewed [redacted]

The third approach would be through [redacted] who is living in Detroit but [redacted] expressed the opinion that [redacted] would have very little influence over [redacted] but that nevertheless the possibility existed that such an approach could be made.

It is expected that additional investigation will be conducted prior to an approach to Subject and that of the approaches outlined above the one which assures the greatest chance of success will be utilized. Approach of Subject under whatever method chosen will be made in a place where maximum security can be assured.

Bureau authority is requested to interview Subject under the regulations of the TOPLEV Program.

100-3-99 ✓
SAC, Denver [redacted]

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March 26, 1954
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Director, FBI

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV (100-3-99)
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

Reurlet 3/19/54

There are transmitted herewith fifty additional copies of the leaflet "For a Lasting Peace" as requested in relet.

Enclosures (50)

JFC:oeccall

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DIRECTOR, FBI
Attn: Central Research Unit

3-19-54

SAC, DENVER

[redacted]
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CP, USA
TOPLEV (100-3-99)
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

It is requested that an additional fifty copies
of the leaflet entitled "For A Lasting Peace" be furnished
the Denver office.

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136 MARCH 21 1954

SAC, New York [redacted]

March 25, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

100-3-77-

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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[redacted]
SECURITY MATTER - C

Reurlet dated March 17, 1954.

Authority is granted to contact [redacted] whenever feasible away from residence and place of employment.

In conducting this interview you should be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

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Miss Gandy _____



ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
Att: Assistant Director A.H. BELMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

3/17/54
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS-C

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[redacted]
SM-C

[redacted] a Communist sponsored union, has been selected as an individual to interview under the TOPLEV program.

Personal Background

Subject was born [redacted] at Brooklyn, NY, the son of [redacted]

[redacted] in 1936 and a [redacted]
NYC, in 1937. From September, 1936 to August, 1939, [redacted]
[redacted] and was [redacted]
cropped from his position in [redacted]
[redacted] investigation, when it was determined that he was
a CP member. Subject served in the US Army during World War II
having been inducted [redacted] was appointed as [redacted]

[redacted] He was a [redacted]
of the [redacted] and was reported as responsible
for [redacted]
matters. He was separated from US Army at [redacted]
on [redacted] It was reported that subject carried one [redacted]

[redacted] place unknown. It is noted that [redacted]
[redacted] who is also known as [redacted] has been reported
as a member of the CP from 1947 to 1951 and, in 1949, was a
member of the [redacted]
NYC. After leaving the US Army in 1946, [redacted] became employed
at the [redacted] and was employed by
the [redacted] as an [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

RM

1 - [redacted]

NOT PERTINENT
152 MAR 31 1954

HPL:KMC

Letter to Director

[redacted]
In 1951, he became employed by the [redacted] at [redacted]
[redacted] with the salary of \$4,500.0 per year. In 1953
and to the present date, he has been carried as [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] is reported to be residing in [redacted] NY,
which residence is part of a large housing project. Subject
resides with his wife and [redacted] who
was reported born [redacted]

CP Back ground

[redacted] is reported to have joined
the CP in about 1938 while he was a [redacted]
at [redacted]. In 1939, he was dropped from his position at
[redacted] because of his CP affiliations during the investigation
of the NYC [redacted]

In 1939, informants advised that the subject
was active in the NY [redacted] which has been reported
as a Communist [redacted]

In 1941, [redacted]
the IWO in NYC.

b6
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On [redacted] was a guest
at the meeting of the [redacted] the IWO.

In 1946 after [redacted] returned from service
in the US Army, he became [redacted]
in NYC.

It is noted that the [redacted]
[redacted] has been designated as a Communist front
organization.

In September, 1947, informant advised that
[redacted] was present at the [redacted] CP Headquarters
interviewing CP members to determine their fitness to attend

Letter to Director

the [redacted] which was to take place
from [redacted]

In 1949, [redacted] was reported
as a member of a CP Club in NYC.

From 1946 to 1951, [redacted] was a
full time paid [redacted]
and was carried on [redacted]

b6
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b7D

It is noted that this job entailed [redacted]

In August, 1950, [redacted]
[redacted] the Labor Youth League in NYC.

In 1952, informants advised that [redacted]
was active on a [redacted] the CRC, NYC.

During the fall and winter of 1953,
[redacted] continued to be listed as [redacted]
at the [redacted] Since January,
1951, he has been employed by the [redacted]
NYC, as [redacted]

It is noted that this union is reported
as CP dominated.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] at CP front meetings in the NYC area.

Plan of Approach

Bureau authority is requested for this
office to interview [redacted] during the week of 3/29/54
circumstances permitting. A contact would be made with

Letter to Director

[redacted]
[redacted] when he is alone on the street and a discreet distance away from his residence or employment. Existing Bureau instructions applying to interviews with security subjects will be followed and the Bureau policy concerning labor unions would be explained to [redacted] early in the interview.

b6
b7C
b7D

SAC, Detroit (66-3360) [redacted]

March 19, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted] was
SECURITY MATTER - C

100-3-99-1

Reurlet dated March 11, 1954.

Authority is granted to contact [redacted]
whenever feasible away from residence and place of
employment.

In conducting this interview you should
be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating
to interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it
is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days,
the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the
contact has not been made and when you anticipate
conducting the interview.

JDD:DE



Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN [redacted]

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99)

March 11, 1954

SAC, Detroit (66-3360)

CONFIDENTIAL

CP, USA TOPLW
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

b7D

Attention: Mr. A.H. BELMONT

BACKGROUND

A. Birth

Subject was born [redacted] Michigan.

B. Education

Subject's education consisted of eight years of elementary school,
four years of high school and one term of [redacted]
Michigan.

C. Marital Status

Subject married [redacted] in Detroit, Michigan on [redacted]

D. Military Service

In the fall of 1930, Subject was enrolled in the Reserve Officer's
Training Corps at [redacted] for a period of several months.

E. Criminal Record

b7D

<u>Contributor</u>	<u>Name and Number</u>	<u>Arrested or Recd.</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
				Dism. on motion of D.A.

[redacted]

rel. N.C.

JW:ELC

REGISTERED - AMSD

100-3-99
NOT RECORDED
MAR 24 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

Letter to the Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA TOPLIV
IS-C

[redacted] was.
SI-C

<u>Contributor</u>	<u>Name and Number</u>	<u>Arrested or Recd.</u>	<u>Charge</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
[redacted]				b7D

The above record was taken from the Identification Record of the Subject under FBI [redacted]

F. Employment

Subject continues his employment with the [redacted]
[redacted] Detroit, Michigan. It is noted that Subject [redacted]
[redacted] this company. Subject also has the following previous employments:

[redacted] January, 1942.

[redacted] (prior to January, 1942.)

[redacted] Michigan. (prior to January, 1942)

[redacted] Michigan. June 1, 1938.

[redacted] Michigan (Badge [redacted]).
March, 1937. b7D

G. Residence

Subject continues to reside at [redacted] Detroit, Michigan.
His previous residences were:

[redacted]

Letter to the Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA TOPLBY
IS-C

[redacted] was.
SL-2

H. Description

Name

[redacted]

Residence

Race

Sex

Birth

Height

Weight

Hair

Eyes

Complexion

Build

Occupation

Present Employment

Male

[redacted] Michigan

5'9"

180 lbs.



Medium

Citizenship

[redacted] U.S. citizen

Marital Status

Married

Relatives

Wife

[redacted] Michigan

Brother

COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVITIES

Subject was a member of [redacted] in 1938, holding membership book [redacted] State Convention, [redacted] CPA in May, 1944 at which time he was alleged to have had eleven years experience in the CP USA. He was a member of the [redacted] in May, 1944 and [redacted] in March, 1945, both in [redacted] CPA. Subject was affiliated with the [redacted] in July, 1946; he was active in the [redacted] in February, 1946; [redacted] Civil Rights Congress from April, 1949 to June, 1950; the [redacted] from October, 1951 to January, 1952; Labor Youth League in April, 1951; [redacted] Michigan in 1951 and 1952; [redacted] in March, 1952 and May, 1952; he has been active in the [redacted] in the [redacted] since December, 1952 and has attended numerous Party meetings during [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

b7D

Letter to the Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA TOPLIV
IS-G

b7D

[redacted] was.
IS-G

the entire above period and as late as February, 1954.

APPROACH

Subject will be approached by a lone agent while the other Agent will stay in close proximity of the area affording the utmost security. Contact will be friendly and every effort will be made to develop a friendly conversation. The fact that Subject is operating a very successful business may afford the interviewing agent an opportunity to stress that point in an effort to impress the Subject with the idea of possibly cooperating with the Bureau. Subject must certainly have cognizance of the fact that the House Committee on Un-American Activities hearings will be conducted in Detroit within the next 30 or 60 days and not wanting publicity to effect his business may be one of the possible causes of cooperation on his part.

Bureau authority is requested to contact Subject as set out previously.

SAC, Cleveland [redacted]

March 19, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

106-31187

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

M2
Reurlet dated March 10, 1954, setting forth your progress in developing this informant, and Bulet of August 14, 1953, directing that you furnish to the Bureau a progress letter by the first of each month.

Since the informant is fully aware of the situation concerning his reactivation in Party affairs and is alert to any possibility through which he may become reactivated, authority is granted to submit progress letters every 60 days rather than on a monthly basis.

You should be certain to continue to closely follow his development and include in summary fashion every 60 days all pertinent information obtained by the informant and, particularly, plans for his future development.

Any matters of immediate interest should, of course, be furnished to the Bureau by airtel or teletype, dependent upon the individual circumstances in each case.

JDD:DE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____



ORIGINAL FILED IN

[Redacted]
900 Standard Building
Cleveland 13, Ohio

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

b7D

March 10, 1954

DIRECTOR, FBI

Attention: A. E. BELMONT
Assistant Director

RE: CP, USA; TOPLIV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
(Bufile 100-3-99)

[Redacted] (Bufile [Redacted])

b7D

Dear Sir:

Remylet December 16, 1953 reflecting results of interviews with [Redacted] on November 14, 1953 and December 10, 1953 and mylet of February 11, 1954, captioned [Redacted] requesting authority to contact [Redacted] on a monthly basis. Monthly contact was approved by bulet February 23, 1954.

In an effort to provide the basis for closer liason with [Redacted] who resides in the vicinity of Youngstown, Ohio, he was introduced to SA FRANK G. DOUDS, resident agent at Youngstown, who is familiar with the day to day activities of the Communist Party activity at Youngstown and would therefore be in a position to take advantage of any specific Communist Party situation arising which might provide an opportunity for [Redacted] to make an effort to reactivate himself in the Communist Party, USA.

Due to the heavy work and school schedule of [Redacted] SA DOUDS has had difficulty in endeavoring to make suitable arrangements looking towards the reactivation of [Redacted]. SA DOUDS last contacted [Redacted] on February 8, 1954, relative to obtaining further valuable information regarding the Communist Party underground and information on [Redacted]

EBB:JWD:emd

REGISTERED MAIL

100-3-99
NOT RECORDED
87 MAR 25 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DIRECTOR, FBI

a number of individual security matter cases. On that date, [redacted] indicated he would be friendly and receptive to any Communist Party member he might meet "accidentally" and he expressed the opinion that an "accidental" meeting would be the only logical way he could possibly re-enter the Communist Party.

b7D

Contact with [redacted] will be maintained and further efforts will be made looking towards his reactivation. In accordance with authority contained in Bureau letter dated February 23, 1954, [redacted] will be contacted on a monthly basis and the results will be furnished to the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

N. H. McCabe
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

SAC, New York

Director, FBI

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

(100-3-99)

March 22, 1954

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 25X(1)
DATE 08-15-2012

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

WAS.

(classified per OGA letter dated
7-31-12)

b1
b3

(S)

For your confidential information, on September 3, 1953, the Bureau was informed that [redacted]

[redacted] interview him, but it is not known whether he was interviewed or whether any action at all was taken by him or the [redacted]. The Bureau, however, had nothing to do with the above-mentioned incident. Since September, 1953, there have been no indications that [redacted] is considering defecting from Communism and, in fact, he has continued [redacted]

b7D

You are requested to review subject's file and, particularly, any information of recent date, and submit a recommendation to the Bureau as to whether you feel an interview with the subject under the Toplev Program is feasible or practicable.

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

Enclosure 393
58 MAR 23 1954
58 MAR JDD:DE NOTE ON YELLOW: PAGE 2.

YELLOW
DUPLICATE
MAR 23 1954
MAILED

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

NOTE ON YELLOW: Subject has a long association with
the CP and was recently [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] and has had no apparent job. [redacted]
however, [redacted] Communist organizations and he has

b7D

[redacted]
in a manner favorable to Communism. There have been
rumors that he is [redacted] and on September 3,
1953. [redacted]

b1
b3

(S)

[redacted]
[redacted] It was felt we should have nothing to do with
[redacted] proposition at that time, [redacted]
[redacted] it is believed consideration should be
given to an interview with him.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

Director, FBI (100-3-99) (65-28359)

3/19/54

SAC, Philadelphia (65-1945)

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLBV

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ATTENTION: Assistant Director A. H. BELMONT

PINCUS JOSEPH KIMMEL, wa.,
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

CONFIDENTIAL

Rebulet dated 2/1/54.

On 2/16/54, a surveillance was instituted near the automobile driven by subject at a secure distance from his home by SAs WILLIAM E. HUGHES and ROBERT M. GRANT.

At 10:01 A.M., KIMMEL approached his car and was contacted by SA HUGHES, with SA GRANT observing the contact.

When approached, KIMMEL refused to stop to talk to the Agent and got in his car and drove away. His only comment to the Agent was, "I'm not interested." He repeated this three times while getting into his car.

In view of the above, no further contact with KIMMEL is anticipated unless information is developed to indicate a further contact might prove productive.

RMC:llw

SEARCHED
INDEXED
MAY 25 1964

FBI, DETROIT

3/19/54

AM EST

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [REDACTED]

AIR TEL

AMSD

CP, USA - TOPLEY, INTERNAL SECURITY - C; [REDACTED] SM-C.

REBULET MAR. EIGHT LAST. SUBJECT INTERVIEWED THREE TEN TO FOUR FORTY PM
MAR. EIGHTEEN LAST BY LONG AGENT WITH ASSISTING TOPLEV AGENT STANDING BY.
b7D

INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE IN [REDACTED] WHERE SUBJECT HAD DRIVEN TO HAVE A
LATE LUNCHEON. SUBJECT APPROACHED AS HE CAME TO HIS CAR AND INTERVIEW
THEN CONTINUED IN HIS CAR. [REDACTED] VERY FRIENDLY AND AFFABLE. EXHIBITED
NO ANTAGONISM TOWARD AGENT OR BUREAU. SHOWED LITTLE SURPRISE AND AGREED TO
CONVERSATION RIGHT THERE AND THEN. SUBJECT ADMITTED RIDING CREST FINANCIALLY
AND STATED HE LEFT THE PARTY SOME TIME AGO. HE STATED HE OBSERVED NOTHING
IRREGULAR COMMITTED BY ANY MEMBER OR BY THE ORGANIZATION WHILE HE WAS A MEMBER
AND ONLY AFTER THE FIRST NEW YORK SMITH ACT TRIAL WHICH ADJUDGED THE DEFENDANT
GUILTY OF A VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED LAW, DID HE PULL AWAY FROM THE PARTY. HE
PRAISED OUR COUNTRY AND ITS ABILITY TO CONTROL ANY SUBVERSION, ADDING FURTHER
PRAISE FOR THE BUREAU AND FEELS ASSURED THAT NO HARM COULD COME TO OUR
DEMOCRACY AND WAY OF LIFE. HE FEELS THE COUNTRY IS UNNECESSARILY ALARMED
OVER COMMUNISM. HE STATED HE COULD NOT COOPERATE AND "FINGER" ANY ONE IN THE
[REDACTED]

END PAGE ONE

JH:JEP
66-3360

REGISTERED MAIL

70 MAR 29 1954

354

68 MAR 25 1954

AIRTEL

X00 3-11-
NOT RECORDED
152 MAR 23 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

PAGE TWO

ORGANIZATION AS IT WOULD BE AGAINST HIS PRINCIPAL, AND EVEN THOUGH KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL AS FAR AS ANY ONE ELSE OTHER THAN THE BUREAU AND HIMSELF WAS CONCERNED, NEVERTHELESS HE HAS A CONSCIOUSNESS AND HE WOULD HAVE TO LIVE WITH IT. SUBJECT DID NOT OBJECT TO FURTHER CONTACTS, STATING IT WAS UP TO THE AGENT. AFTER THE AGENT PRESSED FOR ANOTHER INTERVIEW VERY SOON TO PROVE THAT THE ORGANIZATION IS CONSPIRATORIAL AND ILLEGAL AND HAS BEEN FROM ITS EARLY BEGINNING, SUBJECT STATED HE MIGHT EVEN PHONE THE AGENT AT THE OFFICE SOMETIME AFTER HAVING GIVEN THIS ENTIRE CONVERSATION CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT. RECONTACT IS BEING PLANNED. LETTER AMSD FOLLOWS.

MC INTIRE

END

LETTING SERVICE

6-50 3 1414.24

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
(100-282722)

March 19, 1954

SAC, Detroit (66-3360)
(100-15358)

CP, USA *TOPLEV*
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] wa.
SECURITY MATTER - C

b6
b7C

Attention: Assistant Director, A. H. BELMONT ✓

Remylet, February 11, 1954 and Bureau letter, February 16, 1954.

Captioned individual was telephonically contacted by SA [redacted]
[redacted] on March 1, 1954, pursuant to the tentative agreement described in
my letter.

After identifying himself, SA [redacted] reminded the Subject that the purpose of the call was to make arrangements to continue the discussion with Subject. It was immediately apparent that the Subject's attitude was considerably more hostile than at either of the original contact or the subsequent telephonic contact. Subject stated she had definitely decided there was nothing she had to discuss and would definitely not make arrangements to meet with Agent.

SA [redacted] expressed surprised at the obvious change in attitude on Subject's part and stated that there was certainly a great many things about which both Agent and Subject were in agreement, and that a discussion could easily prove beneficial to the Subject. Subject stated she had nothing to discuss and could see no reason to speak further with the Agent. *CG*

It is apparent that Subject was following what may be in some instances current CP instructions, which are to talk to Agents at least long enough to see what they want and give the impression of being friendly but to end the initial contact as soon as possible and firmly refuse any further contact.

In view of the above, no further contacts are contemplated with the Subject at this time.

TLB:RGM
REGISTERED

100-3-99-X
NOT RECORDED
165 MAR 25 1954

60 MAR 5 1954

100-3-99-X
NOT RECORDED
165 MAR 25 1954

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-20-2011

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99)

3/18/54

SAC, LOS ANGELES

CP, USA, TOPLWV
IS-C;

b7D

CONFIDENTIAL

This is the monthly progress letter required by Bureau per Bulet dated 9/28/52.

Since my last progress letter on this informant he has again been in regular contact with [redacted] regarding the question of his re-entry into the Communist Party. [redacted] continues to insist that he will be picked up at any time, but to date such a pickup has not been made.

b7D

Subject has been to two meetings of the [redacted]
[redacted]
since my last letter.

He was contacted by [redacted] an old-time Communist in this area, on [redacted] and asked for assistance in obtaining a job for [redacted]. During the ecourse of this conversation [redacted] and the informant discussed their respective statuses in the Communist Party and [redacted] stated that he apparently was in the same situation as informant and had not been to a Party meeting for a number of months.

REG.
VWH:VMD

100-3-99-V
NOT RECORDED
196 MAR 26 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
ATTN: Asst. Director A. H. BELMONT
FROM : SAC, New York [redacted]
SUBJECT: CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

DATE. 3/17/54

b7D

[redacted] was
IS - C

b7D

[redacted] SM - C

Re NY let, 2/15/54, advising that this office was holding up the reinterview with [redacted] for a period of thirty days. It should be noted that [redacted] passed away in February, 1954.

Reference is made to Chicago Airtel to Bureau, 3/8/54, copies this office, entitled "CP, USA - FUNDS; IS-C" which sets forth information obtained by Chicago informant 5824-S during his visit to NY in February, 1954. This informant suggests that the reinterview of [redacted] to be postponed for two

[redacted] months. Informant has suggested that perhaps the dependents of [redacted] namely, Mrs. [redacted] and the daughter and son-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. [redacted], may receive bad treatment and disrespect from the present CP leadership, and if this materializes, then a recontact with [redacted] in about two months hence may prove beneficial. The possibility exists that [redacted] may be receptive to a reinterview because of any bad treatment by the CP.

This is to advise that the reinterview with [redacted] will not take place until approximately the end of May, 1954.

Chicago is requested to furnish this office with any additional suggestions or information obtained by CG 5824, which may assist in the reinterview with [redacted]

RM

2 - Chicago (100-2398) (RM)
1 - [redacted] (P&C)
1 - [redacted]

b7D

NOT RECORDED
164 MAR 24 1954

EWB:NER/PJM

ESI - 1634/16
"500, D 155"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
Att: Assistant Director A.H. BELMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

MAR 17 1954

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

CP, USA - TOPLEV.
IS-C

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
SM-C

Rebulet 2/4/54 granting authority to reinterview [redacted]

On the morning of 2/26/54, a physical surveillance was instituted in the vicinity of subject's residence, [redacted] by SAS [redacted], ALFRED B. NOVAK and [redacted]

At approximately 10:00 A.M., [redacted] was observed to leave his residence alone and, when he had proceeded a secure distance from his home, he was approached by SAS [redacted] immediately recognized the agents as those who had previously talked to him and he greeted each agent cordially and shook hands with them. [redacted] advised the agents that his [redacted] business was slow at this time of the year and he stated that he and his family were considering moving in the near future to a low cost city housing project which was being built in the [redacted] area.

b6
b7C
b7D

The agents and [redacted] for a brief period, discussed the state and city sponsored housing projects and it was apparent that [redacted] was in full agreement that the government was right in providing low cost housing projects for the working people. [redacted] pointed out that a man with a family, such as himself, was very anxious to provide his family with suitable housing accommodations where playgrounds and recreational facilities could be secured for his children. The agents took this opportunity to point out to [redacted] that this was another one of the great strides that had been made in NYC during the past twenty years where low cost government sponsored projects had been erected so that Negroes and white persons without discrimination could live together in harmony.

RM

1 - [redacted]

HPL:KMC

102 MAR 25 1954

b7D

Letter to Director

[redacted]

In this regard, the agents brought up the fact that FULAND JACK, a Negro, had recently been elected President of the Borough of Manhattan by the Democratic Party. They pointed out to [redacted] that this is certainly an indication that Negroes were being treated equally by the citizens of NYC. [redacted] remarked that this was a great step forward for the Negro people and that he was certain that all Negroes were very proud of JACK'S election. [redacted] stated that the ALP deserved some of the credit for getting HULAND JACK elected. Thereafter the agents pointed out to [redacted] that it was not the ALP but was the Democratic Party of the City of New York which placed JACK on the ticket and was the Party which got him elected.

b7D

In regard to the ALP, [redacted] stated that he was still [redacted] the ALP and he further advised that he was very sorry to see VITO MARCANTONIO leave the ALP. [redacted] continued that, if MARCANTONIO thought that the ALP was being controlled by the CP, he should have stayed and fought the Communists and not run out on the ALP. The agents pointed out that perhaps MARCANTONIO thought that it would be a hopeless fight inasmuch as the CP may have complete control of the ALP. [redacted] advised that this was not true. [redacted] stated he has been in close touch with the ALP for years and he did not believe that the CP had control of the ALP. [redacted] stated that he knows there may be Communists in the ALP but he believed that they did not control the entire Party.

b7D

The agents pointed out to [redacted] that the fact that the "Daily Worker" constantly praises the ALP and that the ALP line follows the CP in all its twists and turns indicates pretty conclusively that the ALP is controlled by the CP.

b7D

Letter to Director

[redacted] stated that, even though there were CP members in the ALP, he saw nothing wrong in it inasmuch as he pointed out that it was not illegal to belong to the CP and further that he believed that the US Supreme Court will not uphold the decision that the CP is dangerous to the US and has taught the overthrow or destruction of this government.

The agents pointed out to [redacted] that, in the recent Smith Act cases, the government has conclusively proven that the CP does advocate the overthrow of the US government and that further it has been shown that the CP acts as an agent for the Soviet Union. [redacted] advised that he still is not convinced that the CP is dangerous and he advised that he has read the literature which agents had left with him on prior occasion. [redacted] stated that he has tried to look at both sides of the picture and still cannot come around to the agents' way of thinking.

b7D

At this point in the conversation, the agents gave [redacted] the article entitled, "Breaking the Communist Spell" by the Director which was reprinted from "This Week Magazine" of 11/1/53 and the article entitled, "What America Means to Me" by CHARLES C. SPAULDING from "The American Magazine". [redacted] advised that he would read both of these articles and he stated that the name CHARLES C. SPAULDING is familiar to him as one of the well known Negro leaders in this country.

b7D

[redacted] reported that he considered himself "a free thinker" and further that he would continue to look on both sides of the picture and, should he ever change his mind, he would call the agents.

[redacted] stated that, sometime in the future, he might be willing to talk to the agents and thoroughly discuss any associations he has had with the "left wing" movement.

b7D

Letter to Director

[redacted]

At this point, the interview was discontinued and [redacted] cordially shook hands with each agent and invited the agents to talk to him again if they were in his neighborhood. This interview lasted approximately twenty minutes and was observed by SA ALFRED P. NOVAK at a discreet distance and nothing unusual was observed that would affect the security of the contact.

Evaluation

Throughout the interview, [redacted] was courteous and respectful to the agents. He apparently has made up his mind at this time that he will not talk to the agents regarding Communist matters. [redacted] from his statement, still considered himself a "free thinker" and apparently will have to make up his own mind as to whether his loyalty lies with his associates in the ALP and the CP or the government.

b7D

Consideration for Recontact

[redacted] has indicated he will not talk to Bureau agents regarding CP or "left wing" matters at this time. Considerable effort has been made during the past year to convince him to cooperate with no success. No further efforts to develop him as a confidential informant under the TOPLEV program will be considered at this time. The AFO will plan to review [redacted] file again after a period of six months and if additional information has come to this office's attention indicating that another recontact with [redacted] might be profitable, a separate letter will be directed to the Bureau requesting a recontact.

DIRECTOR FBI (100-3-99) (100-371232)

March 16, 1954

SAC, DETROIT (66-3360) (100-18000)

Digitized by srujanika@gmail.com

CP, USA-TOPL V
INTENSIVE SENSITIVITY = C

FRANK ANDRE
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Attention: Assistant Director A. E. BELMONT

Remylot March 4, 1954.

Following the initial contact with Subject on February 19, 1954, no information was received from Informant and sources of the Detroit Office reflecting Subject to have made a disclosure to the Party.

On March 4, 1954, surveillance disclosed Subject returned from Johnnie's Lunch to Subject's place of employment, Angel's Poultry Market, at approximately 1:45 P.M. A telephone call was made to Subject by SA WWP G. COOK at this time from a cafe located one block away. During the call Subject exhibited a negative attitude making out he did not recall the previous contact and abruptly hanging up when invited to get together with agent after work.

Unless advised to the contrary no further contacts with this Subject are planned.

PGC/aes
REGISTERED

100-3-77-✓

NOT RECORDED

~~50 MAR 22 1974~~

SAC, Philadelphia [redacted]

100-3-99-1

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

March 15, 1954

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b6
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b7D

[redacted] WAS.
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet dated March 8, 1954.

Authority is granted to contact the subject away from residence and place of employment in accordance with the plan outlined on page seven of referenced letter.

In conducting this interview you should be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Tolev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

b7D

JDD:DE NOTE ON YELLOW: Subject is completely underground and contact will only be made when Informant [redacted] who furnished us information on subject's whereabouts.

[redacted]
(See page 7 incoming let)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Shandy _____



ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Director, FBI (100-3-99; [redacted])

3/8/54

SAC, Philadelphia [redacted]

ATTENTION: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A.H. BELMONT

CP, USA, TOPLIV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] was.

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INTERNAL SECURITY - C ---

Background

whom were born in [redacted]

[redacted] both of

Subject attended elementary school from 1932 to 1940, junior high school from 1940 to 1941, and high school from 1941 to 1944. During his schooling he was a "brilliant student" and [redacted]. As a result, he [redacted] He attended the [redacted]

He was inducted into the Army on [redacted] and was discharged for reasons of dependency as a PFC on [redacted]. He had no foreign service.

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The following are the employments of the subject:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Unknown (See below)

[redacted] to date

[redacted]

R/Gmmt
Registered Mail

100-3-99-V

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MAR 17 1954
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3/8/54

[redacted]
Director, FBI

In [redacted] and his family moved from Philadelphia, and his movements until 10/52 are unknown. During this period he was underground and had no open Party contacts. Since 10/52 [redacted] has been living in and near [redacted] Pa., where he is employed as a [redacted]. He has [redacted] for his employment and residence, and the [redacted] for his CP work. He was instructed to do so by the District Committee of the CP, EPD. [redacted] is currently the CP, EPD.

[redacted]
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[redacted]
Pa.

Draft Status

In April and August 1953 [redacted] mentioned that he was concerned about his failure to notify his draft board (LB #135, Philadelphia) regarding his change of address to [redacted] Pa. He said that although he served in the U. S. Air Force and received an honorable discharge, he could probably be prosecuted under the Selective Service Act for failure to notify of his change of address.

Mr. [redacted] of the Selective Service Board in Philadelphia advised that it was the U. S. Attorney's practice in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania not to authorize prosecution for technical violations of the Selective Service Act of 1948 and accordingly the Selective Service Board did not intend to take any further action in the subject's case.

In 10/53 one informant noted that [redacted] automobile was registered in the name of [redacted]

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Marital Status

[redacted] was married on [redacted] Pa., to [redacted]. His wife was born on [redacted], to [redacted]. Her father was born in [redacted] and her mother was born in [redacted]. The wife's parents now reside in [redacted] Calif.

In 1949 [redacted] was the [redacted] CP, EPD. In 1953 she was a member of the [redacted] CP, EPD.

There are [redacted] as a result of this marriage.

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3/8/51

[redacted]
Director, FBI

Personality

One informant said that [redacted] is a Communist because he is an enthusiastic believer in symbolism, and he believes every bit of power should be derived from the people and any power over and above that is evil.

[redacted] appears to be a well-read Communist and has advocated and instituted CP schools in the [redacted] for the membership. He also advocated that a portion of each CP meeting in the Section be devoted to educational reading of CP literature and discussion of current problems. [redacted] that this literature include some of the works of STALIN, including "Foundations of Leninism" and "The History of the CP SU (B)." b6
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Regarding the recent Smith Act arrests in this area, [redacted] said in 7/53 that no matter how many CP leaders were arrested there would always be others to take their places.

When [redacted] was arrested after attending a meeting in Philadelphia [redacted] stated that he believed he, too, would have been arrested had he been at that meeting. It was pointed out that [redacted] attempted to go to the meeting but lost the address and as a result, after driving from [redacted] to Philadelphia, could not find the meetingplace and drove back to his home in [redacted].

Hobbies

[redacted] has no known hobby. It appears that he spends all his free time with his CP duties.

CP History

[redacted] was a member of the AYD in 1946 and indicated that he was a member of the CP for a period of seven months prior to that time. In 1947 he was a member of the [redacted] and later in that year became the [redacted] CP.

In 1948 he was a member of the [redacted] and was [redacted] CP, EPD, at the County Convention held that year.

In 1949 he was the [redacted] and was a member of the [redacted] the CP, EPD.

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3/8/54

[redacted] Director, FBI

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In 1950 [redacted] was the [redacted] CP, FPD. He held this position when [redacted] of that year.

In [redacted] appeared in [redacted] Pa., and was the [redacted]. He was also a member of the [redacted]. He operated in that capacity until [redacted] was at which time he [redacted]

In [redacted] had placed limitations on his CP activity in the [redacted] in order to carry out special assignments for the [redacted]. These special assignments are not known.

In [redacted] because he felt handicapped in conducting the business of the section. At this time he was also made [redacted] as noted above.

All during his CP membership, he has been extremely active in all phases of CP [redacted]

Since living in [redacted] is very security conscious and has taken several measures so that only a very few trusted members of the section will be in contact with him.

After the Smith Act arrests he relinquished his membership in the [redacted] so as not to jeopardize the identities of the other members. He also cut down the CP meetings to three individuals at a time to be held infrequently. He also sold his car and cancelled a CP education school, and moved to a new location.

In [redacted] said he was going "completely out of circulation" regarding the [redacted] affairs. He said he would not contact anyone and no one should contact him except in an emergency. He also said that if it was necessary for him to leave the [redacted] area he would go to another state, live under an assumed name, and obtain employment in some large industry. It is noted that no one in the [redacted] area knows his true identity.

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Family

[redacted] mother of the subject, was divorced from his father about 1941. She has been active in the CP in the [redacted] until recent years (1950).

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3/8/54

[redacted]
Director, FBI

[redacted] is currently under deportation proceedings by INS.

[redacted], father of the subject, has been a CP member for many years and has been on the Communist payroll. He has been a CP [redacted]. He is said to have [redacted] about 1931-33. At one time the CP wanted to send the subject to a national training school; however, his father, [redacted] counseled him against it and as a result he was sent into industry instead.

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Factionalism

In 7/53 [redacted] said that since STALIN's death LAVENTI BERIA has endeavored to advance himself in rank and prestige regardless of the CP. [redacted] stated the recent Berlin uprisings against the CP have given it a "black eye" and that the Party has tried to advance too quickly in Berlin and in Germany. [redacted] also said the CP, USA, would not support a third party until it determined that the people were ready for it. This appears to be the current CP line.

In 8/53 [redacted] suspected he was being surveilled and though he was scheduled for arrest and expressed concern over this. He also expressed disgust at his treatment by the District Committee in that he was not given a more responsible position in leadership following the Smith Act arrests in Philadelphia. He was told by the District to "lay low" and virtually discontinue CP activity until further notice. The informant who furnished this information believes that [redacted] has "softened up" in his attitude toward militant leadership and appears to have abandoned his hoity air of icy leadership, becoming "more human." During his tenure in the [redacted] has been very strict, extremely security conscious, in his relationships with other members in the [redacted]

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Finances

[redacted] owns no real property and his only income is his salary, which he earns at the [redacted]

He does not appear to be pressed financially and his salary from the [redacted] if any, is irregular.

Women

5

[redacted] is not known to be involved with any woman except on a strict business basis.

b7D

3/8/54

[redacted] Director, FBI

Knowledge of the CP Underground

Since [redacted]

[redacted] it may be presumed that he has extensive knowledge of the underground operation of the CP. It may also be presumed that as a result of his position as [redacted] he will have further knowledge of underground activities and individuals who are in the same status.

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Reaction to the Harboring Statute

[redacted] has not been contacted regarding the CP fugitives.

Associates

[redacted] is not known to have any known Party friends or associates.

In Party business he associates with such individuals as [redacted]

[redacted] currently in an underground status.

Criminal Record

[redacted] record.

[redacted] has no known criminal

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Approach

[redacted] the following instructions for members of the [redacted]

"We must tighten the security of our members, leaders, and organization by exercising the greatest vigilance against exposure to the class enemy. They use many methods of spying within the Party to obtain vital information for the purposes of intimidation and prosecution. The FBI is the chief gestapo agency of the government and is the vicious enemy of all that is decent, progressive, and democratic in American life. When Communists and Progressives are approached by FBI Agents for any reason they should take a determined stand and refuse to talk to them, to cooperate, to go voluntarily to FBI Headquarters for questioning, refuse

b7D

3/8/54

[redacted]
Director, FBI

to allow them in your homes, or have anything to do with these vile characters. We are not a secret organization. We have always sought the widest publication for our programs...."

Since the above was prepared, and as noted elsewhere, [redacted] is said to have "softened up;" however, there is no indication other than from this one informant that he has "softened up" to any appreciable degree.

Prior surveillances have shown that [redacted] who lives within three blocks of his employment, walks both to and from work, leaving work about 5:00 p.m. It is anticipated that two top-level Agents will intercept him somewhere between his place of employment and his home at the first secure opportunity.

It is also anticipated that he will be approached on the same day that [redacted]

[redacted] the Smith Act trials in Philadelphia. This is believed to be the proper time for such an approach because it is anticipated that [redacted] may leave the area immediately upon learning that [redacted]

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He will be apprised of the FBI's jurisdiction, both in the internal security field and as regards the enforcement of the Selective Service Act of 1948. He will be questioned regarding his status with his draft board and will be questioned regarding the last time he has changed his address.

He will also be apprised of the Bureau's jurisdiction within the matters of national security and will be told that as the responsible agency, the FBI is interested in his activities as a member of the CP and will continue to be interested until such time as he is no longer a staunch advocate of Marxism - Leninism. After the above discussions, the CP generally will be discussed and any conversational leads that are indicated will be followed up and exploited.

The Bureau is requested to authorize the contact as set out above, noting that it is to be made on the day that [redacted]
[redacted] the Smith Act trials.

SAC, Albany

March 11, 1954

Director, FBI

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPICAL (100-3-99)

SECURITY INFORMATION PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

There are transmitted herewith copies of three pamphlets entitled "Democracy Vs. Communism," "Who is the Imperialist" and "The Phantom American Negro" for use in connection with the captioned programs of the Bureau. The availability of this material should be brought to the attention of all agents in your office who are assigned to internal security and related investigations.

A small supply of these pamphlets is being maintained in the Central Research Unit at the Bureau in the event additional copies are required by your office.

Enclosures

2 - Baltimore	(with enclosures - 10)	2 - Newark	(with enclosures - 20)		
3 - Boston	"	10	2 - New Haven	"	10
2 - Buffalo	"	10	2 - New York	"	75
2 - Chicago	"	25	2 - Pittsburgh	"	10
2 - Cincinnati	"	10	2 - Philadelphia	"	25
2 - Cleveland	"	10	2 - Portland	"	10
2 - Denver	"	10	2 - St. Louis	"	10
2 - Detroit	"	25	2 - San Francisco	"	10
2 - Indianapolis	"	10	2 - Seattle	"	25
2 - Los Angeles	"	50	2 - Springfield	"	10
2 - Milwaukee	"	10	2 - Washington Field	"	10
2 - Minneapolis	"	10			

Tolson _____
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Nichols _____
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Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Laughlin _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Rm. _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

JFC:mpm

SP6/EP/AS/Rej
03-14-54
83-1343

1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue, Rm. 1243 (detached)



DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

March 12, 1954

SAC, LOS ANGELES [redacted]

b7D

[redacted] was.

SM - C

Re Bullet to Los Angeles, 5/5/52; Los Angeles let to Bureau, 3/9/53.

Referenced Bureau letter to Los Angeles authorized an interview with subject under the ~~TOPLEV~~ program. He was first contacted by Bureau agents on June 30, 1952, and was also subsequently interviewed by agents in an effort to develop him as a security informant.

Referenced Los Angeles letter to the Bureau advised that subject

[redacted] the FBI. Due to this action by subject, no further effort was made to develop him as a confidential informant.

[redacted] House Committee on Un-American Activities Special Investigator, assigned to the West Coast area, advised SA [redacted] [redacted] on March 8, 1954, that he plans to subpoena subject in connection with the hearings to be held by HCUA in San Diego commencing April 19, 1954.

Since subject is no longer being considered for development as a confidential informant, the Los Angeles Office has no objection to his being called as a witness by HCUA. No objection will be interposed to Mr. [redacted] in connection with the above committee's desire to subpoena subject unless advised to the contrary by the Bureau.

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REG.
ITW/lca

cc: 1-LA 62-1664

Bon

100-3-99-1
NOT RECORDED
140 MAR 16 1954

60 MAR 19 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Copy:njs

SAC, Seattle
Director, FBI

March 10, 1954

[redacted]
SECURITY MATTER - C

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SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

U.S. - T. p/c

Reurlet dated March 4, 1954, requesting authority to contact [redacted] under the Torlev Program.

There is no indication from referenced letter that the subject is a Communist Party leader of any kind and on page four of referenced letter you advised that there is no indication he is participating in underground activity.

Interviews under the Torlev Program are to be confined to active high-level Communists either in the open or underground Communist Party. Individuals who do not fit this description should be considered for interview under the Security Informant Program or the regular interview program of security subjects.

Due to his past activities and connections, there is no objection to an interview with the subject under the Security Informant Program.

Your contact with him should be made in accordance with previous instructions relating to the Security Informant Program.

Advise Bureau results.

JDD:DE

100-3-77-4
NOT DISCLOSED
172 MAR 12 1954

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ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SAC, Detroit (66-3360)(100-18000)

March 11, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99)(100-371232)

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

FRANK ANGEL
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet dated March 4, 1954.

Authority is granted to recontact Angel whenever feasible away from residence and place of employment.

In conducting this interview you should be guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days, the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the contact has not been made and when you anticipate conducting the interview.

JDD:DE NOTE ON YELLOW: Subject has been active in CP affairs since 1948 in the Down River Section, District 7, CP and Dearborn Communist Club. In 1950 he was the organizer for the Down River Section; in 1951 organizer for the Dearborn Communist Club. In 1952 he was organization secretary of the Down River Section and was active in CP attempts to infiltrate the United Steelworkers - CIO. When the Detroit Smith Act subjects were arrested, he was active in raising funds for appeal. During 1953 there were attempts by certain CP members to expell subject for certain marital difficulties, but subject convinced the Party he was still loyal. He was replaced as section organizer, however, and at the present time holds no official position. In view of subject's attitude during the contact of February 19, 1954, it is believed he should be recontacted.

Tolson _____
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Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
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Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Mias/Gandy _____

ORIGINAL FILED IN 1/1



Director, FBI (100-3-99) (100-371232) (AMED)
(REGISTERED) March 4, 1954

SAC, Detroit (66-3360) (100-16000)

(O)
QB, USA-TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY-C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FRANK ANGEL
INTERNAL SECURITY-C

Attention: Assistant Director A. H. DEMONT

Renylet dated January 5, 1954, Bulet dated January 8, 1954 and
my airtel dated February 19, 1954.

Surveillance of the Subject by Toplev Agents reflected he opened the poultry market owned by the Subject's family at around 6:00 a.m. working inside the rear of the establishment with doors closed until approximately 7:45 a.m. when the front doors were opened. At this time a truck driver employed by Angel's Poultry Market arrived. The Subject took breakfast at Johnnie's Cafe, located across the street from the market, around 8:00 a.m., thereafter working continuously until 2:00 p.m. when he quit for the day.

On February 18, 1954 the Subject was followed from his place of employment to the 12th Street area where he was lost in heavy traffic. It would appear at this time that the Subject may have been on his way to make contact with one of the CP functionaries, many of whom are located in the 12th Street area.

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On February 19, 1954 surveillance by Toplev Agents [REDACTED] and FIELD G. COOK, assisted by SAC [REDACTED] disclosed that the Subject went to Johnnie's Cafe for lunch emerging therefrom at 1:30 p.m. At this time the Subject was approached by SA [REDACTED] with other Agents standing by in position to observe the contact. Several photographs of the contact taken by SA [REDACTED] with a telephoto lens are enclosed herewith for the Bureau.

b7D

When approached, the Subject circled the Agent suspiciously and, accordingly, no attempt was made to shake hands as it appeared the Subject feared he might be served with a subpoena. In this connection, [REDACTED] has advised that District 57 CP has successfully convinced the majority of its members that FBI Agents are acting as "spotters" for the HCUA so they can be served.

FGC:MAE
REGISTERED MAIL AMED
Enclosures 5

100-3-99-
NOT RECORDED
101 MAR 17 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-3-771232-18

Letter to the Director

Re: CP, USA-TOPL.V
IS-C

FRANK ANGEL
IS-C

ANGEL seemed reassured to some extent when advised of the Agent's official identity at which time the confidential nature of the Bureau's work as well as the separation from other agencies was emphasized.

ANGEL at first seemed to be in a hurry to get away declaring that he had never been involved in anything which would require discussion. His general line was that he had always lived in Michigan, had nothing to discuss, and found it impossible to talk about his friends and could never become a "stool pigeon". When advised that it was well known that he had been in difficulties with the CP organization, he exclaimed in a somewhat surprised manner, "So you know about that!", but he could not be induced to elaborate or otherwise engage in any discussion regarding CP matters. Extreme caution was exercised in this respect in view of the fact that [redacted] a valuable Informant, continues to operate in ANGEL's District.

b7D

At one point ANGEL observed, in connection with his declaration he could not talk about his friends, that he would not care to have the Agent's job. Although continually making movements as though to return to his place of business, ANGEL seemed to desire to linger and prolong the conversation, it being noted that he lit a fresh cigar while talking.

The Subject's attitude, while somewhat brusque, was at no time antagonistic nor did he attack the FBI as an organization other than to mildly protest that the Bureau should concentrate more on securing better housing facilities, improving the economic status of the workers, etc. He did not attempt to press the point further when advised of the Bureau's jurisdiction.

ANGEL was urgently requested to consider the points raised during the discussion wherein the Bureau's security responsibility was presented. When advised he might again hear from the Agent, he only stated that he could think of nothing he would have to discuss. The Subject declared that his primary interest at this time was merely to conduct himself as a good citizen and to assist in the conducting of the poultry business owned by his family. The contact terminated at 1:55 p.m. when ANGEL excused himself stating that it was necessary that he return to work.

Letter to the Director

Re: CP, USA-TOKLEV
IS-C

FRANK ANGEL
IS-C

EVALUATION

In view of ANGEL's proclivity for reporting to the CP organization contacts by the Bureau with other Subjects, it is quite likely that his prolonging the contact was for the purpose of obtaining data regarding the Bureau's method of operation. On the other hand, it was noted that when during the discussion reference was made to the known efforts of the CP to bring about economic depression and the consequent effects upon the business operated by ANGEL's family, he appeared to be affected and from this point more interested in what the Agent had to say.

It was also impressed upon ANGEL that he could expect little in the way of consideration from the CP in view of the treatment afforded him to date.

It is planned that a re-contact either by telephone or in person will be attempted within the next two weeks.

SAC, [Albany] ✓

Typed 3/26/54

Director, FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED-1 COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV (100-3-99)

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

4-32-54
83-1343

There are transmitted herewith copies of a publication entitled "The Kremlin's Trojan Horses," for possible use in the captioned programs of the Bureau. This booklet describes the means by which the Communist Parties in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria overthrew the legitimate Governments of those nations after World War II.

A small additional supply of these booklets is being retained in the Central Research Unit at the Bureau in the event additional copies are required by your office.

CLASSIFIED AND

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CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

7-24-91 7-24-87

CONFIDENTIAL

APR 1 - 1954

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
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
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Miss Gandy
- 1-Baltimore (With Enclosures - 10)
 - 1-Boston (with Enclosures - 10)
 - 1-Buffalo (With Enclosures - 10) 717265
 - 1-Chicago (With Enclosures - 25) 717266
 - 1-Cincinnati (with Enclosures - 10) 717267
 - 1-Cleveland (with Enclosures - 10)
 - 1-Denver (With Enclosures - 10) 717268
 - 1-Detroit (with Enclosures - 25) 717269
 - 1-Indianapolis (with Enclosures - 10) 717270
 - 1-Los Angeles (with Enclosures - 50) 717271
 - 1-Milwaukee (With Enclosures - 10) 717272
 - 1-Minneapolis (With Enclosures - 10) 717273
 - 1-Newark (With Enclosures - 20)
 - 1-New Haven (With Enclosures - 10)
 - 1-New York (with Enclosures - 75) 717274, 275
 - 1-Pittsburgh (with Enclosures - 10)
 - 1-Philadelphia (With Enclosures - 25)
 - 1-Portland (With Enclosures - 10) 717276
 - 1-St. Louis (With Enclosures - 10) 717277
 - 1-San Francisco (With Enclosures - 10) 717278
 - 1-Seattle (With Enclosures - 25) 717279
 - 1-Springfield (With Enclosures - 10) 717280
 - 1-Washington Field (with Enclosures - 10)

JFC:bg

F10

100 - 3 - 99 - 1791





*A study of the Communist technique
in the countries of Eastern Europe
which led to the overthrow of their
legitimate governments, 1945-48.*

THE KREMLIN'S PLAN

Between the autumn of 1944 and the spring of 1948—that is, in a period of about three and one-half years — five countries of central and southeastern Europe succumbed to Communism, in the guise of becoming “people's republics.”

This was accomplished in each country against the will of the majority. Despite agreements acknowledged by Stalin at Yalta and Potsdam, designed to safeguard the independence of Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and pledges given for the holding of “free and unfettered” elections, all vestiges of free government disappeared in the nations bordering on the Soviet Union.

That this state of affairs was brought about by the Kremlin there is no doubt. The important questions are: What was the plan that made possible the penetration and eventual seizure of power in the states where the Communists were in a minority?

What strategy and what tactics were employed by the Kremlin and its national puppets to undermine and finally to overthrow all the postwar

governments erected amid the social and economic ruins in the wake of Nazism's collapse?

An understanding of the methods of force, pressure, and subversion directed against non-Communist governments, political parties, and individuals is the first step in combatting the universal menace of Communism. The roots of this technique go back to the early days of the Russian Revolution.


The overthrow of non-Communist governments by a disciplined minority, regardless of the sentiments of the “masses” and even of most of the so-called “proletariat,” has become a permanent feature of Leninist-Stalinist theory and practice, as distinguished from the doctrines of Karl Marx, who envisaged a “proletarian revolution” following the decay

Lenin used a “disciplined minority” and “decisive force” at a “decisive time” to overthrow majority rule.



and final break-down of capitalism.

Lenin was the first to realize this distinction and to put it to practical use. In January 1918 his armed sailors dissolved the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in which the Bolsheviks won only 25 per cent of the vote against parties that were overwhelmingly "proletarian"—that is, Socialists and



Hungary's General Farkas reviews puppet troops beneath huge pictures of conspirators—Lenin, Rakosi and Stalin.


Mensheviks—in aims and programs.

Lenin's formula for seizing power was simple enough: "A decisive superiority in the decisive place at the decisive time—this law of military success is a law of political success also, especially in that bitter struggle between the classes which we call revolution." He

said further: "The Bolsheviks disposed of 'storm troops' in the army which in the decisive place at the decisive moment ensured us with a decisive majority."

Lenin was then referring to the November 1917 *coup d'état* but in fact he used precisely the same methods against his leftist political allies who had helped him to power; he crushed the Socialists and Agrarians as ruthlessly as he had the aristocracy and "capitalists" of traditional Russia. Stalin and his adherents improved on Lenin's teachings.

A year after the Bolsheviks established their primacy in Russia, Bela Kun, a professional revolutionist and close friend of Lenin, attempted a similar *coup* in Hungary and



Demonstrations furthered Red plots.

for four months subjected that country to a Red Terror.

The reason for the downfall of the short-lived Bela Kun regime was afterward studied and analyzed for the lesson it taught Communists, and the Hungarian revolutionists who escaped to Moscow with their leader. Among them was Matyas Rakosi who returned in 1944 to plot the creation of a Communist Hungary. Communist leaders in Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria also profited from the conclusions arrived at by the "Muscovites" (as the Hungarian exiles in Moscow came to be known).

During the years 1919-44 the "Muscovites" were not isolated from their homeland. Year by year, through spies and couriers, they gathered detailed information on every phase of Hungarian social, economic, and political life which might be of future use.

This was done in the case of other countries by exiled Communists living in Moscow or moving surreptitiously back and forth between the Soviet Union and their native lands. In several of these countries, between the two World Wars,

Communism was not extinguished; it was merely dormant, waiting its opportunity.

Matyas Rakosi, a veteran of the Kun fiasco and postwar generalissimo of Communism in Hungary, has written at length about the technique by which democracy was uprooted and destroyed in his country. His speeches and writings, which together form a textbook on applied Communism today, explain Leninist-Stalinist principles in action outside the boundaries of the USSR. The pattern varied in detail and timing, but it was fundamentally the same in each of the five border states.

First came Lenin's precept of "decisive force" applied at the "decisive time." The force in the case of Hungary and the other border states was the victorious Red Army, which in 1944-45 extended across Eastern Europe from the Elbe to the Danube. Yet the Soviet High Command did not of itself effect the political seizure of these countries. The Soviet Government was still, in theory, committed to the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements regarding "free and unfettered elections." Moreover, outright

conquest or annexation, as happened with the Baltic Republics, was not in the Kremlin's program for the other border countries.

The fact that the Kremlin, and Stalin in particular, gave repeated assurances that the Soviet Government had no territorial designs on its neighbors misled many democratic leaders in Eastern Europe into believing that they could "do business with Stalin" on a friendly and cooperative basis.



Stalin assured adjacent countries that the USSR had no territorial ambitions.

That was precisely what Stalin wanted them to believe.

Rakosi explained the role of the Red Army when he stated: "What was the role of the So-

viet Union in the creation of a People's Democracy? The heroic army of the Soviet Union liberated us from the terrible serfdom of the German Fascists and of their Hungarian satellites. The Soviet Army also protected us from diplomatic interference on behalf of the Western Powers."*

This "protection" was extended to minority Communist parties to the fullest extent during the period when the other war allies were engaged in demobilizing their armed forces, leaving only token occupation forces. Consequently, non-Communist diplomacy was shorn of its power in the eyes of the Kremlin plotters.

The Red Army of occupation, on the other hand, had effective means of weakening the strength of democracy in areas which it controlled. But more remarkable than the disintegration of democratic processes under relentless Soviet pressure were the courage and tenacity with which the democratic elements fought to stem the Red tide.

Rakosi has referred to other

* From a lecture in the indoctrination course of the Hungarian Workers' Party, February 29, 1952.

key principles that he inherited from both Lenin and Stalin. One of these he calls the "zig-zag" policy: that is, the temporary advances and retreats which have characterized Soviet or national Communist Party tactics from time to time. The zigzag policy generally is a temporary expedient designed either to lull the suspicions of opponents or to provide for an "adjustment" of the Communist Party program to a particular situation. It often affords a smokescreen for the basic and unchanging strategy of the Kremlin within a



"Peace" rallies such as this in Rumania characterize Communist propaganda.

given country or in international affairs.

Before the Hungarian Communists achieved unquestioned control, for example, they advocated "full freedom for pri-

vate property," although they were planning complete nationalization as soon as they came to power. A similar line was taken early in the Groza pro-Kremlin government of Rumania.

The theory of the "next link in the chain" is one of Communism's most potent weapons, according to Rakosi, who speaks of discovering one link in the chain which, "if we grasp it with all our strength, permits us to hold the chain in our hands and secure access to the next link in the chain."

In this figure of speech the chain signifies Communist control; the link might be personal, social, or political: to attack and destroy prominent non-Communists; to infiltrate and take over a trade union or some other important organization; or to secure a key ministry in a government of which the majority was non-Communist.

Closely associated with the "link" theory were the tactics of penetration and subversion of opposition or non-Communist parties, organizations, and institutions.

The Bela Kun revolution was a violent and explosive

one. The Communists of 1919 not only liquidated their opponents at once, and by hundreds of thousands, they put the full program of nationalization and communization into effect in a rain of swift blows. The resulting reaction, as violent as the first, wrecked the Communist hopes for a proletarian dictatorship.

With this fiasco as an object lesson, the "Muscovites" and other Moscow expatriates proceeded with greater caution during and immediately after World War II. The more circumspect approach had another advantage; it gave a specious air of legality to maneuvers that were actually designed to overthrow legitimate governments. In most instances, the heads of democratic governments were not aware of the danger until it was too late.

In the days immediately following the German thrust into Russia, Stalin assured all the nations threatened or engulfed by Hitler's forces that the Soviet Union had no territorial ambitions and no desire to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations.

In 1942 Stalin declared: "We

have not and cannot have such war aims as the imposition of our will and regime on the Slavs and other enslaved peoples of Europe who are awaiting our aid. Our aims consists in assisting these peoples in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny and then setting them free to rule in their own lands as they desire."

These and similar protestations of Soviet disinterestedness were repeated during the years of the war and for a short time thereafter. Stalin's emphasis on freedom from Nazi rule and on the restoration of national sovereignty was in fact the first "link in the chain" of popular slogans with which the Moscow-trained expatriates on their return seduced their countrymen in Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia.

The most important tenet of Rakosi's theories of applied revolutionary tactics was the principle of "divide and rule." To this end, conflicts and dissension between non-Communist parties and between factions within those parties were encouraged and at times instigated by the Communist minority.

This technique was explicitly revealed by Hungarian Communist Minister of Interior Laszlo Rajk (who was later purged as a Titoist) :

"If you have four enemies and you want to get rid of all four of them, the thing to do is to make an alliance with all the four, assuring them of full cooperation. After a while start to persuade three that the fourth one is a menace to the whole alliance and get their help in having him removed. After a while persuade two that the third one is a

menace to them all and, while assuring them of the very sacredness of the common aims, get their help in removing the third," and so on, until there is only a single remaining enemy to be dealt with.

In Hungary the Communist mechanism of penetration into the country's legitimate governmental structure and the fragmentation of non-Communist parties were most clearly illustrated, although these techniques were successfully applied in all the border states.

Moscow's postwar Communist empire was erected on the basis of these elements—outright force as represented by the Red Army; diplomatic pressure by the Kremlin; infiltration and subversion of legal governments; suppression and terrorism by Red-dominated security police, and propaganda to explain away these outrages. In the following pages the story of each country will illustrate the application of Leninist-Stalinist strategy to these purposes.



HUNGARY

"The Soviet Union does not wish to meddle in the internal affairs of Hungary; in general, the people of small nations are frightened needlessly of Soviet oppression. If the Soviet Union would undertake to oppress or influence small nations it would betray the ideologies of Lenin and invalidate its practices in the past."

J. V. Stalin, in an after-dinner speech to visiting members of the Hungarian Government, April 1946.

HUNGARY

The first steps taken by Soviet power in Hungary seemed to refute the Lenin-Stalin thesis regarding the tactics of communization. On crossing the Hungarian border in the fall of 1944, the Red Army loosed a reign of terror which overspread the country in an orgy of looting, rape, and mass deportations as ruthless and destructive as the excesses committed by Nazi armies in the Ukraine.

Terrorism was not confined to the upper or middle class; it involved working-class sections as well. No home or person was safe from brutal intrusion and tens of thousands of young men were rounded up and deported to unknown destinations in the East.

If the Kremlin hoped to win the Hungarian populace to the doctrines of Marx-Lenin-Stalin, why were such violence and plundering permitted?

Apparently the aim of Soviet policy was to cause widespread fear, confusion, and economic disorganization at the very time when Stalin was announcing his proposal for a "just peace" for defeated Hungary. Thus the "zigzag" policy

was demonstrated in its most acute form. Nevertheless, the great mass of the Hungarian people and their leaders were not intimidated. They were, however, deceived as to Stalin's intentions.

Hungary was occupied for a considerable length of time by large Soviet forces. Soviet military authorities were in effective control of the whole country. Immense quantities of the nation's physical assets, including entire industrial plants, were seized and shipped eastward. Of the total war damage, estimated at \$345 million, about \$124 million was attributed to seizure of food, goods, and equipment.

This figure was in addition to the \$300 million exacted by Moscow in the form of war reparations which, paid in installments of goods and products at prewar values, reached a huge figure. Later Soviet exploitation of the country's resources through "joint stock companies" was ruthless and unremitting.

The Allied Control Commission, that is, its British and American members, objected vigorously to the methods employed by the Soviet occupa-

tion authorities. But the only real force present was the Red Army, and the Soviet Command was deaf to objections not backed by armed might, a circumstance which the West was reluctant to admit.

On January 21, 1945, a Hungarian armistice was signed by the three Allied Great Powers in Moscow. Previously, on December 21, 1944, a Provisional National Assembly had met at Debrecen, a city in northeast Hungary close to the Rumanian border. The Assembly was organized as the Hungarian National Independence Front, which consisted of the National Peasant Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Smallholders' Party, the Trade Unions (whose status as a party had been demanded by the Communists), and the Communist Party. The inclusion of the Red-dominated trade unions was another device to

increase Communist influence in the guise of calling them a party. Attempts to make the sovietized unions a political arm of the state still go on.

Like the other provisional governments in Eastern Europe, the coalition government of Hungary was described as a "united front." But the post-war United Front was a very different type of coalition from the Popular Front governments of the 1930's, exemplified by the Socialist-Communist combination of Leon Blum in France.

The Hungarian "National Independence" Front of 1945 was accurately described later as to its purpose by Rakosi, who said of the United Fronts of postwar Europe:

"Ostensibly to destroy the German Fascist 'conquerors,' wide anti-Fascist coalitions were set up by the Communist Parties in these countries,

Opposition leaders (left to right): Independent, Zoltan Pfeiffer; Catholic Party, Rev. Bela Varga and Istovan Barankovics; Social Party, Charles Peyer.



according to the advice and directives given by Comrade Stalin. These coalitions included anti-Hitler peasants, small bourgeois and even elements of the medium bourgeoisie, in opposition to Hitler—in brief, all those who were ready to take part in the struggle for liberation."

The United Front, in short, was a catch-all for anti-Fascist sentiments, which in the long run the Communists proposed to use exclusively for furthering the ends of Communism.

How were the representatives to the provisional government selected? They were chosen—"elected," according to the Communists—by National Committees. These committees were political devices used by the Communists in Eastern European countries following the collapse of Nazi power. They were organized in all "liberated" areas, and everywhere they assumed the functions of local government. Dominated by the Communists who organized them in the first place, they took over all local administrative operations, including police activities.

Although the method of



Socialist Szakasits (left) congratulated by Communist Rakosi on "unification."

"electing" deputies insured that the National Assembly would be heavily leftist in character, the democratic elements mustered a respectable showing in the Assembly and refused to bow to Red Army pressure. Members of the Debrecen government, however, were prevented by the Red Army authorities from entering the "Operational Zone" of the Soviet Command.

The provisional government exercised only shadowy authority in its restricted "Rear Zone" while the National Committees were free to carry on their pro-Kremlin activities everywhere without any such limitation. Newly organized local political police, responsible to Red Army Intelligence, arrested many Fascists and Nazi collaborators; they also

apprehended great numbers of persons accused of being "Fascists" who were in no sense so disposed. At the same time, self-seeking opportunists among the former pro-Nazis foreswore their previous allegiance and were welcomed by the Communist Party. The political police drew most of its recruits from ex-Nazis.

The first important measure passed by the National Assembly was the land reform law of March 17, 1945. This was the major plank of the Smallholders' Party, which had subscribed to thoroughgoing land reform before the war and reaffirmed its program at the conference of agrarian leaders held in London in 1943.

In Hungary, the leaders of the agrarian movement were Ferenc Nagy and Zoltan Tildy, leaders of the Smallholders' Party. The party had a strong following not only in rural areas but also in the towns.

The Communists seized on the land reform program as their own, and exploited it fully. After the passage of the bill, Red Army lorries covered the entire country from village to village, distributing leaflets which proclaimed that the

"Communist land reform program" had been put into effect. The Red-dominated National Committee controlled the actual expropriation of the land and its local distribution. They were thus in a position to coerce "uncooperative" peasants and to bribe poor peasants and landless people with the offer of land.

Although approximately one-fifth of the total population benefited by the land reform, the average size of the parcels was too small to support a family. The result was that by 1951 some 200,000 peasant families were forced to join Soviet-type collective farms to ensure their survival; their "ownership" vanished and they became drudges of the State.

On September 26, 1945, the United States Government announced its willingness to recognize the Hungarian government, provided that "free and unfettered" elections were held in accordance with the Yalta Agreement. Two days later the Soviet Government, without consulting its allies, granted unconditional recognition to the Hungarian provisional government. The reason for this hasty recognition became

apparent in another three weeks when a Soviet-Hungarian trade pact was concluded, giving Moscow virtual control of Hungary's economy. Protests by the United States and Great Britain went unheeded.

In the general elections, held on November 4, 1945, the Communists with Soviet backing expected to win a majority of the votes by a comfortable margin. They were taken aback however, to discover that when the ballots were counted, they had won only 17 per cent of the total vote. Of the balance, the Smallholders secured 58 per cent, a clear majority.

It is worthy of note that this was the first general election held in eastern Europe after the war; the Communists had not yet perfected their technique of voiding the popular will. The elections in Bulgaria came two weeks later, but the violations of democratic procedure in that country were so numerous and flagrant that the non-Communist opposition parties boycotted the elections. In Rumania and Czechoslovakia elections were held in 1946, and in Poland not until 1947. The Communists in those countries profited by their ex-

perience in Hungary.

In the new Hungarian Government the Communists demanded and received a key post — the Ministry of Interior, which went to Laszlo Rajk, a leader of the Hungarian Communist Party which had been outlawed before and during World War II. This Ministry gave the Communists complete control of the political police and the organs of investigation. The head of the political police was Lieutenant General Gabor Peter, a sinister figure reportedly a former Soviet citizen. Rajk and Peter, who were responsible for the imprisonment and death of uncounted thousands, were themselves purged at later dates.

The elections were followed by a wave of arrests by the political police who claimed to

Laszlo Rajk, the Kremlin's executioner, was a victim of Moscow's wrath.



have unearthed a monarchist plot against the government. At this time, Cardinal Mindszenty, Catholic Primate of Hungary, sent out a pastoral letter condemning the "inhuman acts of revenge" committed by the political police. This was the famous churchman's first challenge to Moscow's henchmen; the last one pre-




President Tildy did not foresee that Red plots would wreck his government.

ceded his arrest in 1948.

On February 1, 1946, the Republic of Hungary was formally established, with Zoltan Tildy as President, Ferenc Nagy as Premier, and Bela Varga, a Catholic priest, as President of the National Assembly. All were leaders in the Smallholders' Party.

Despite evidence that the Ministry of Interior was engaged in suppressive political activities, the leaders of the majority party were not only conciliatory toward the Communists, they expressed confidence in the Kremlin good will.

Premier Nagy stated on January 22: "I declare that no decent man and no one who plays a fair game in Hungarian political life can believe for a moment that the Communist Party plans that Hungary should become one of the member states of the Soviet Union. From the moment of its entry into the political arena, the Communist Party has called itself a Hungarian and national party." And President Tildy told an American newspaper correspondent: "I have not observed that the Communists are trying to impose their will upon



Socialist leader Szakasits felt the iron fist of Moscow, agreed to a "merger."

the Government. But even if they should, they would not succeed because the Smallholders' Party is too strong."

The conciliatory attitude of the Smallholders was also reflected by the Social Democratic Party whose leader, Arpad Szakasits, stated on October 19: "Hungary does not desire an Iron Curtain between the East and the West. The Social Democratic Party recognizes the necessity of a sincere and firm friendship with the Soviet Union, but this must not stand in the way of a similar friendship with the Western powers."

In April 1946, Premier Nagy headed a delegation that visited Moscow to discuss the terms of the forthcoming peace treaty and other matters. After his return, Nagy an-




Announcing merger with Communists, Szakasits sealed his party's fate.

nounced: "In connection with the peace treaty, we met the greatest understanding." Social Democratic Minister of Justice Ries, a member of the delegation, affirmed that the "Soviet Union will be the country which will fight in the peace conference for every just demand of Hungary."

At a dinner given in Moscow for the Hungarian delegation, Stalin explained that the Soviet Union had never harbored any ill will toward Hungarians, even during the war, and added: "The Soviet Union does not wish to meddle in the internal affairs of Hungary."

These statements and sentiments illustrate the misleading tactics of the Kremlin's "zig-zag" policy and the effectiveness of Communist propaganda



Portrait of Stalin looks down on puppet officials who accept Moscow as "friend."

in Hungary which pictured Moscow as the nation's friend. The Kremlin had other plans.

The spring of 1946 was a difficult period for the new government. Despite a loan by the United States and aid from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Hungarian economy underwent rapid deterioration, due in large part to Soviet occupation costs for the Red Army and large-scale removal of the country's basic resources and assets by Soviet authorities — estimated to have totaled \$124 million in value. Inflation reached staggering proportions; the savings of the middle class were wiped out and wages of industrial workers fell behind living costs.

The Communists made the most of this situation. They had succeeded in bringing all the unions into the Trade Union Council and having secured control of the Council's executive committee, they were in a position to call strikes or stage mass demonstrations for political purposes.

On March 7 there were demonstrations throughout the country accompanied by extreme economic demands. In the provinces these rallies were often an excuse for anti-Semitic riots which were tolerated by the political police as a means of distracting attention from Communist intrigues.

As a result of the leftist rabble-rousing activities and Soviet pressure exerted in Budapest, the Smallholders' Party expelled twenty of its members (the Communists had demanded the expulsion of sixty). This marked the beginning of Communist attacks on the Smallholders designed to weaken the party's parliamentary strength.

Early in 1946, the Communists organized a leftist bloc composed of their own party, the Trade Union Council, the

Social Democrats, and the National Peasant Party, a leftist rival of the Smallholders. During the May 1 celebration the coalition issued its slogan — “Keep Left!” This was the first stage of the Communist tactic of “divide and rule.”

In May the Ministry of Interior claimed to have unearthed another conspiracy against the state, involving a prominent priest and two members of Parliament. This was the signal for widespread arrests and purges. A by-product of the “conspiracy” was the decision of Minister of Interior Rajk to move against all non-Communist youth groups. On July 3 he dissolved 1,311 youth organizations, including the Boy Scouts and Catholic youth groups.

The leftist bloc on October 19, following earlier demands for the nationalization of heavy industry, demanded state control of all banks and a state monopoly of school text books. Yielding to insistent pressure from the Left, the Government on December 1 announced that it was taking over the largest industrial plants, which would be organized as the Heavy Industrial

Center (NIK). For months, the Government had to face one crisis after another, most of them inspired by the Communists.

During these months of periodic disturbances, the “hard core” members of the inner Communist clique were actively engaged in fomenting dissensions among the non-Communist parties and, by infiltrating them separately, causing division within the party ranks.

The Smallholders were undermined by a splinter party in March 1946, and this process of disintegration continued. The Social Democrats split into factions, the more moderate one under Karoly Peyer urging the leftist group of Deputy Prime Minister Szakasits to disassociate itself from the Communist Party.

In December Rakosi unleashed a venomous attack on the Smallholders, which was echoed by Communist speakers throughout the country. On the last day of the year a former Hungarian General and 250 others were arrested for “conspiracy.”

The new year—Rakosi calls it the “year of decision”—opened in an atmosphere of

tense uncertainty in the midst of which, undeterred by the animosity of the Communists, Cardinal Mindszenty continued to inveigh against the "anti-Christian" acts of the Ministry of the Interior.

The Communists were now ready to spring a major trap; that is, the downfall of the most prominent leader of the Smallholders outside of Tildy and Nagy. He was Bela Kovacs, secretary-general of the party and its widely popular "strong man."

Minister of Interior Rajk on January 4, 1947, announced the discovery of a new "anti-Republican conspiracy," and shortly almost a hundred Smallholder deputies were named as involved in the alleged plot, including Minister of Reconstruction Misteth and Kovacs, who was described as the ringleader. An intimidated Parliament waived the parliamentary immunity of the accused deputies, who were promptly arrested by Gabor Peter's political police.

A Communist demand for a waiver in the case of Kovacs brought unanimous opposition from the peasant deputies who stated: "We take a stand

against any such endeavor to try to defeat the Smallholders' Party by violence."

The Kremlin's strategem now took the form of "decisive force." On February 26, Soviet agents abducted Kovacs during his voluntary appearance at a police interrogation. He was then charged by Soviet authorities not with conspiracy against the Hungarian Government, but with "having actively participated in the formation of anti-Soviet terror groups . . ." and "organizing espionage directed against the Soviet Union."

When the American member of the Allied Control Commission requested that the circumstances of the arrest of Kovacs be investigated by the whole Commission, the Soviet member rejected this and similar British protests on the grounds that a three-power investigation would be a "rude violation of the legal rights of Hungary's People's Courts"; secondly, that the American note was an "attempt to infringe on the legal rights of the Soviet occupation authorities."

Thus the Soviet High Command, which had removed Ko-



Bela Kovacs, victim of a political trial, "confessed." But the real target of the "Muscovites" was Premier Nagy, whose son they held as hostage until Nagy resigned.

vacs from the jurisdiction of Hungarian courts, asserted the immunity of these courts from outside interference and at the same time claimed unilateral jurisdiction for its own tribunal!

Bela Kovacs was the immediate victim, but the primary target was Ferenc Nagy. Nagy, who still favored a policy of conciliation, left for a vacation in Switzerland on May 18, firm in the belief that no actual crisis impended. In his absence Deputy Prime Minister Rakosi was in virtual control of the government.

The blow fell on May 30. Charges against Nagy, contained in a "confession" by Kovacs, were made public. It was alleged that the Prime Minister was involved in a "conspiracy"—against his own govern-

ment, a fantastic accusation.

The Smallholders' Party immediately notified their absent leader and urged him to return to answer this latest absurdity. On June 2, the Smallholders and the free world were dismayed by news that Nagy had resigned his ministerial post, instead of returning.

In this instance the conspiratorial technique of the Communists was fully revealed. First, Nagy's four-year-old son was held as a virtual hostage while word was sent through indirect channels that the child would be released and delivered to his father only when the Prime Minister tendered his resignation. At the same time, Nagy's close friends were informed that if Nagy returned, he would be arrested and in time "induced" to sign

a "confession" that would ruin his party. It was also intimated that Nagy's resignation would forestall Soviet intervention and possible annexation of the country. In the face of these arguments, telephoned to him by his friends, Nagy yielded, not through any lack of courage but because he felt he could thus save his party from destruction.

Minister of Interior Rajk asserted blandly: "Nagy admitted his guilt." And Radio Moscow gloated over the supposed "admission" of guilt, charging the "leading circles" of the Smallholders' Party with complicity in the "conspiracy," which was linked in Soviet propaganda with the "fascist Horthy clique." (Admiral Horthy was the autocratic prewar Hungarian Regent.)

Smallholder leaders such as Dr. Gyorgy Donath were tried and executed.



Despite the most emphatic protests of the United States, the party of Rakosi and Rajk proceeded to destroy piecemeal all democratic opposition. A new electoral law, passed on July 17 by a Parliament in which the Smallholders' Party no longer had a decisive influence, disfranchised 10 to 20 per cent of the voters.

In the general elections, forced by the Communists on August 31, 1947, massive pressure was exerted by every agency of the Communist Party, led by the Ministry of Interior and its political police, to assure victory for the leftist bloc. The Social Democrats, no longer deceived by their former political allies, charged that there were widespread fraud and terrorism during the electoral campaign, and that on election day truckloads of Reds were carried from village to village for repeated voting.

Despite the fact that the electoral machinery was in the hands of Communists, the announced total of 1,112,000 votes for the Communists represented a gain of only 5 per cent over its previous strength. And this in a rigged election!



Orderly meetings of opposition parties, such as this one of the Freedom Party, were broken up by bands of Red thugs, who manhandled peaceful members.

Nevertheless, the Communist Party with 22 per cent of the votes was the largest single party. The other parties, especially the Smallholders, had undergone acute fragmentation, the Smallholders dropping from 58 per cent of the total to 15 per cent.


In the autumn, Rakosi attacked the remnants of the opposition and served notice that the Social Democrats would have to merge with the Communists. Before the end of the year, Zoltan Pfeiffer, leader of the Independence Party, was a refugee, as was Karoly Peyer, who had opposed the merger of Social Democrats and Communists. Other prominent members of the opposition followed them into exile.

Early in 1948, both the Independence Party and the Na-

tional Peasant Party were dissolved on orders of Rakosi. The Smallholders were reduced to an insignificant minority. In February 1948, the Social Democrats suffered a thorough purging at the hands of its pro-Kremlin faction and by March accepted the merger which meant absorption by the Communist Party.

This process was camouflaged under the name of the United Workers' Party, which in the 1949 elections offered the familiar totalitarian device of a single-party "common list" of candidates.

The final campaign of the Communists, supported by the Kremlin, was against the Roman Catholic Church in the person of its Hungarian Primate, Cardinal Mindszenty, although the clergy as a whole



Primate Mindszenty before his trial.



The Cardinal in court.



A "confession" is secured.

suffered persecution. The Cardinal had continued to denounce the Communist program as it affected the Church and the privileges of his faith. Moscow ordered his liquidation by the end of the year, and on December 26, 1948—close to the deadline—he was arrested.

After a trial marked by the police state type of "confession," the courageous churchman was sentenced to life imprisonment despite universal public indignation in non-Communist countries.

On February 1, 1949, the Republic of Hungary became a "People's Republic" and the pattern of totalitarianism was completed.


Minister of Interior Laszlo Rajk, the arch-exponent of police terrorism, in time fell a victim of the system he helped to create. On June 18, the Council of Ministers announced his expulsion from the party

Political trials, such as that of the intrepid Cardinal, are staged for their propaganda effect, in this case as part of Communist drive against religion.

and his arrest on charges of "right deviationism" and other crimes against the state—to which he dutifully "confessed" on September 16. Other party leaders shared his fate. Gabor Peter, his ruthless lieutenant, survived in office until the early part of 1953, when he too was involved in a sweeping purge that had all the earmarks of an anti-Semitic drive.

The Kremlin's subjugation of Hungary had swung full circle. Matyas Rakosi continued to explain in detail just how this had been accomplished. On February 29, 1952, he told a meeting of the Hungarian Workers' Party: "Without the heroic struggle of liberation and without the unremitting kind support of the Soviet Union, the Hungarian People's Democracy—and I may add, all other People's Democracies—would never have been created."

Characteristic of totalitarian regimes are the periodic intraparty conflicts that result in the downfall of some Red leaders and elevation of others.




Rajk trial in Budapest.



Premier Rakosi ordered it.

Vishinsky and Molotov had a hand.





POLAND

Question: "Does the Government of the USSR desire to see a strong and independent Poland after the defeat of Hitlerite Germany?"

Stalin: "Unquestionably, it does."

Question: "On what fundamentals is it your opinion that relations between Poland and the USSR should be based after the war?"

Stalin: "Upon the fundamentals of solid good-neighborly relations and mutual respect, or, should the Polish people so desire, upon the fundamentals of an alliance providing for mutual assistance against the Germans as the chief enemies of the Soviet Union and Poland."

J. V. Stalin, in answer to questions by the Moscow correspondent of the London Times and the New York Times, May 4, 1943.

POLAND

At the time when Stalin was reassuring a foreign correspondent regarding Soviet intentions toward postwar Poland, Soviet authorities were holding approximately a million and a half Polish citizens in concentration and slave labor camps in remote parts of the Soviet Union. In addition, thousands of Polish prisoners of war were held under conditions of extreme hardship in Soviet military camps. These untold thousands were the victims of the fourth partition of Poland, that between Nazi Germany and the USSR, which was a by-product of the Stalin-Hitler non-aggression pact of 1939.

Less than eight months after Stalin promised support of a "strong and independent Poland," an organization of expatriate Communist Poles was formed in Moscow, whose aims were the sovietization of Poland after the war and its subjection to the Kremlin.

Some two years after the Nazi invasion of the USSR, a "Union of Polish Patriots" was formed at Saratov in Russia with the benevolent approval of the Kremlin. The Union's founders included Boleslaw



Moscow-educated Radkiewicz, who brought Soviet police methods to Poland, imitated Lavrenti Beria.

Bierut and the writer Wanda Wasilewska, who had long resided in Moscow and enjoyed Soviet citizenship, and Stanisław Radkiewicz, who reportedly had served in the Soviet secret police. One year later this group, including a few left-wing Socialists, became the Lublin "Committee of Nation Liberation," and still later, the "Provisional Polish Government of National Unity," a Kremlin-sponsored clique that claimed authority over all Poland.

A number of obstacles, however, stood in the way of Moscow's domination of Poland.

First was the intense spirit of nationalism which for generations had withstood the pressure and annexations of powerful neighbors. Coupled

with this sentiment was a deep distrust of both the Germans and Soviets, joint authors of Poland's tragic misfortunes. The nationalistic spirit was strong among the peasants as well as in the middle and upper classes; it was especially vigorous in the military services. It was expressed, too, in the Polish Government, whose headquarters was in London.

The London Government was liberal-progressive, made up of representatives of the Peasant Party, by all odds the strongest in Poland, and the Socialist, National, Democratic, and Christian Labor (Catholic) Parties. The head of the Peasant Party was Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, an agrarian leader of European prominence, who had become

Chairman of the first Polish National Council on the death of Ignace Jan Paderewski. On July 14, 1943, he succeeded to the premiership of the London Polish Government after the death of the famous and popular General Wladyslaw Sikorski in an airplane crash.

In his first speech as Premier, Mikolajczyk stated: "The Polish-Soviet problem—this is at the present time the leading question of our foreign policy. The Polish Government approaches this problem with the maximum of good will and faith. The Polish Government desires a permanent understanding and collaboration with the USSR, based on mutual respect, and on regard for mutual rights and interests . . . An understanding between

Premier Mikolajczyk's London Government was a primary Kremlin target.



Poland and Russia is a historic necessity for both countries."

At the time of this speech a grave situation existed between the Kremlin and the Polish Government-in-exile.

On April 13, three months earlier, the German radio had announced the discovery at Katyn, near Smolensk, of the mass graves of "about ten thousand" Polish officers who, the Germans claimed, had been executed by Soviet authorities early in 1940 when the area was under Red Army control.

The London Poles, while distrusting German reports as likely to be propaganda, accepted the Berlin version since they themselves had been unable to discover from official Soviet sources the whereabouts of thousands of Polish officers who were missing from their roster of internees in Russia. After three years, these men were still unaccounted for.

Radio Moscow issued a furious denial of the German charge and laid the atrocity to Nazi perpetrators, at the same time accusing the London Poles of acting in collusion with Hitler. On April 26, the Soviet Government severed

diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London. Documented evidence points to the unmistakable guilt of Soviet authorities who, according to one account, committed an error in interpreting an order by Stalin to "liquidate" the prisoners. More than 4,000 bodies were exhumed at Katyn and thousands of other officers were never located.

Actually, the Kremlin was satisfied by the outcome, for it succeeded in one of its main objectives — to discredit the London Poles.

Another primary aim of Moscow was to destroy the national spirit inherent in the Polish armed forces that survived Poland's defeat. This meant the internment or destruction, as far as possible, of experienced officers and the weakening of the Polish Home Army, an efficient resistance organization that took its orders from the Polish Government in London. The leader of the Polish underground later was Lieutenant General Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski, known as "General Bor." He had a tightly-knit organization of resistance units spread through occupied Poland, which contin-

ually harassed the Germans, and in Warsaw he commanded a well-trained and disciplined but lightly armed body of underground fighters.

On July 22, 1944, the "Committee of National Liberation," which had been set up in Lublin with the blessing of Soviet military authorities, assumed for itself the role of sole authority over civilian government in Poland. During the following week, the Red Army was within 10 miles of Warsaw.

On July 29, Radio Moscow broadcast an appeal for an uprising in Warsaw against the Germans. The appeal was issued in the name of Osobka-Morawski, a left-wing Socialist and member of the Lublin Committee. On the following day a similar broadcast came from Moscow, urging the Warsaw Poles to throw off the Nazi yoke. These patriotic exhortations were interpreted by General Bor as an assurance that immediate Soviet help would be forthcoming if the Polish underground went into action. On August 1 the epic and tragic uprising began.


Premier Mikolajczyk was then in Moscow, wrestling with numerous problems, among

them the question of aid for the beleaguered Warsaw citizens-in-arms. But on August 4, when the situation of the insurrectionists was becoming increasingly difficult and no help was forthcoming from the Red Army or Air Force, he was informed by Stalin that unless he came to terms with the so-called Committee of National Liberation, the Soviet Government would declare the Committee to be the exclusive governing body of Poland.

Faced by this harsh ultimatum, Mikolajczyk agreed that the London Government would share cabinet posts equally with the Lublin Committee and that the reconstituted government would accept the Curzon Line as the eastern boundary of Poland. On August 9, after

Warsaw was left in ruins after Soviet aid to the patriots failed to arrive.





General "Bor," hero of Warsaw's uprising, was savagely denounced by Reds.

Mikolajczyk had come to terms with three members of the Lublin Committee, Stalin personally assured him that the Red Army would aid the forces of General Bor.

Instead, on August 14, a Moscow broadcast declared that "Polish circles" in London were responsible for the rising, which had not been "coordinated" with the plans of the Soviet High Command. From then on, in the face of a joint appeal by Roosevelt and Churchill, Moscow not only prevented the Warsaw underground from receiving effective aid, the Red Air Force ceased to challenge Nazi planes over the city, as it had done before the uprising. Later, Moscow accused General Bor and Premier Mikolajczyk of having ordered a "senseless uprising"



Vishinsky said that his Government "could not lend a hand."

and Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs Andrei Vishinsky called the heroic struggle a "purely adventurist affair" to which the Soviet Government "could not lend a hand."

On October 3, the gallant insurrection ended. The city was a mass of rubble and some 250,000 of its inhabitants were dead, including most of the resistance fighters. General Bor was a captive of the Nazis.

By one of the most flagrant betrayals in history the Kremlin achieved what it had set out to do: it had accomplished the destruction of a militant section of the Polish Home Army and the capture of its leader. After the Warsaw debacle, there still remained strong units of the Home Army to be dealt with, and the Red Army through its bands of

partisans dropped behind the German lines, carried on unceasing and relentless warfare against the Polish nationalists.

After the war, mere membership in the former Polish underground, and even association with its members, was taken by the Communist authorities as evidence of criminality, to be punished by arrest, deportation to slave labor, or execution.

On December 31, 1944, the Lublin Committee proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of Poland and was given recognition by the Soviet Government on January 5, 1945.

Meeting at Yalta in February, the Big Three issued a joint agreement which specified, among other provisions:

"The provisional government which is now functioning

Stalin at Yalta was already preparing to violate the Big Three Agreement.



in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity . . .

"This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates."

When the time came to implement this agreement, it was evident in the course of three months of fruitless negotiations between representatives of the three powers that the Kremlin wanted only such additions to the Lublin group as would accept its dictation, or else persons so little known as to command no popular following. The selection of Premier Mikolajczyk therefore was vetoed by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. It was not until June 28 that a compromise was reached which appeared to fulfill the Yalta agreement.

The Commission of Three, representing the powers, offered a government slate which included: Boleslaw Bierut, President of the National Council of the Homeland; Premier, Edward Osobka-Morawski; First Deputy Premier, Wladyslaw Gomulka (another Lublin Committee member); and Second Deputy Premier, Stanislaw Mikolaczyk.

A week before the announcement of this provisional government, Moscow had witnessed the conclusion of a series of political trials involving Polish leaders of the former underground, which again illustrated the Kremlin's "zig-zag" policy.


During the spring the Red Army had joined with the newly formed Polish security police in hounding the surviving members and bands of the former Polish Home Army. The security police was headed by Stanislaw Radkiewicz, who had held similar posts in the Lublin Committee and the first provisional Government.

As Minister of Security in the new government, he commanded a Moscow-trained force of some 50,000 men in uniform, in addition to a sizable

contingent of "volunteers." By the opening of 1945, thousands of resistance members had been rounded up, sent to slave labor, or shot. Late in March, however, there was an apparent change of policy. The Commander of the Soviet White Russian Army, General Ivanov, sent an invitation to the leaders of the former Polish underground to attend a conference at a place near Warsaw, guaranteeing safe conduct. The purpose of this meeting, according to the message, was to arrange for an amicable settlement of the status of the underground and related problems.

In the group of sixteen leaders who accepted the proposal were the commander of the Home Army, General Okulicki (who succeeded General Bor), and representatives of the political parties that had formed the Government-in-exile. After their departure from Warsaw, nothing more was heard of the Polish delegation, despite inquiries by the Poles and the Western powers.

During the San Francisco Conference, it was learned that these "guests" of the Red Army had all been arrested, charged



At U.N. Conference the USSR agreed to respect rights of small nations.

with "subversive activities" against Soviet military authorities. They were brought to trial in Moscow on June 18 and three days later, after several had "confessed," a Soviet military court found twelve of the accused guilty; they received sentences ranging from four months to twelve years.

This was the situation when Mikolajczyk arrived in Warsaw to assume his post of Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform. Of the 21 Ministries in the new government, 14 were held by former members of the Lublin Committee. The Peasant Party, which had an overwhelming majority of popular strength, had been promised one-third of the government posts and responsibilities, but it actually received only

four minor portfolios. Even these were reduced in effectiveness by the appointment of Communists to newly created Ministries which usurped the functions of the few Peasant Party officials.

No sooner was the new Government organized than its Communist members, working closely with the Polish Workers' Party (the name of the Communist Party in Poland), began to plot the elimination of the Peasant Party. One of their first steps in 1946 was to organize a rival peasant party, which they designated as the "Peasant Party-New Liberation." As in all the other border states, the Communists claimed full credit for the land distribution program which, in fact, had been developed by the traditional peasant parties.

The Land Reform Law had been passed in September 1945. With the machinery of land reform in their hands, the Communists sought the support of poor peasants and landless persons.

The Bierut clique also struck at the Peasant Party in the temporary parliament. According to the Moscow agreement of August 1944, the Party was

to receive one-third of the representatives, or 145 seats. At the first session of the Parliament, President Bierut offered the Peasant Party only 30 seats, a figure that was raised to 52 in the session of December 1945 to January 1946. Peasant deputies attended, chiefly to lodge protests against the high-handed tactics and extremist bills of the pro-Kremlin majority which, in fact, had no mandate from the people.

The principal weapon used against the Peasant Party was police terrorism, carried on by the security police in collusion with the Soviet NKVD. In September the Peasant Party held its first postwar meeting at Krakow, during which it passed a series of resolutions affirming the need for a democratic Poland "governed by law and justice, and a sound and just economic structure." The Communist reaction was to denounce the Peasant Party and Mikolajczyk as "reactionary servants of capitalism."

Between that time and the congress of the Party, held in Warsaw in January 1946, arrests and even assassinations of Peasant members multiplied.

The Peasant Party congress repeated its demand for an end of police terror and early and free elections. When the pro-Soviet regime learned of the defiant stand of the Peasant Party, a spokesman for President Bierut delivered an ultimatum—the Peasant Party would have to join the government bloc by March 1 or face extinction. Undaunted by this threat, the party leaders refused, whereupon the reign of terror was resumed.

Disregarding the Moscow agreement, which called for early general elections, the Bierut Government postponed a test of its strength until January 1947. During the interval, the Communists put into effect a wholesale conspiracy to void the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements regarding "free" elections.

Every element of the state machinery of coercion and repression was thrown into action. As the date of the elections, January 19, drew near, thousands of Peasant Party members were held under arrest or detention without warrants; their homes were illegally entered and searched, membership cards and party

documents were confiscated; party premises were wrecked and party meetings broken up by armed thugs. About 25 per cent of the party branches were suspended in areas where the Peasant membership was greatest. More than a hundred murders of party members were reported and countless cases of severe manhandling.

The Peasant Party press was heavily censored and deprived of all but a small quantity of newsprint. Seventy-five party candidates were arrested before the elections, 40 more names were stricken from the electoral list, and most of the remainder were threatened or persecuted.

Early in January the United States Government called the attention of its co-signers of

Minister of Security Radkiewicz votes in a fraudulent election.



the Yalta Agreement, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, to the violations of the Agreement then taking place and stressed the sanctity of international agreements.

The Soviet reply, dated January 13, charged that "certain members" of the Polish Peasant Party had maintained contacts with the "illegal underground" and had resorted to "every kind of threat, violence, and murder in order to interfere with the normal conduct of the electoral campaign for the Sejm (Parliament)." It was the duty of the Polish Government, the note added, to take measures against "these criminal elements" and therefore it would be "inadmissible to interfere with the carrying out of such measures, particu-

Seizing power by terrorism, the Government celebrates a sham "victory."



larly on the part of foreign governments."

Thus the Kremlin not only adopted the technique of the Nazi "Big Lie," it denied the right of the Western co-partners to question electoral violations of the Yalta pact on the grounds that the forthcoming elections were "internal affairs of Poland."

Actually, violations of the Yalta Agreement began immediately after its signing and continued with increasing frequency and violence up to and after the general elections. The Government bloc was credited with 394 seats out of the 444 seats in the Sejm; the Peasant Party was allocated 28 seats and the rest went to minor parties.

Kremlin puppet Boleslaw Bierut presides over an intimidated Parliament.



The Peasant Party was virtually extinguished, but its voice in the Sejm was not silenced. When the Parliament met on February 4, Mikolajczyk declared: "This gathering, which calls itself a parliament, was brought into being by a fraudulent election, not by the will of the people."

The venerable leader of the Polish Socialist Party, Zygmunt Zulawski, who had founded the independent Socialists without ties to Moscow, rose to speak: "For the first time I now take part," he said, "as an Independent Socialist, in the debate on the declaration of the 'new' government which . . . represents the continuation of the same political thought that was revealed in Lublin." He there-

Moscow satellites Poland and Bulgaria sign a mutual aid pact.



upon traced the destruction of democratic processes under the Lublinites.

Within the next six months all vestiges of independent political, economic, and social life in Poland were practically annihilated. The pro-Kremlin faction of the Socialist Party, headed by Osobka-Morawski, for a time resisted merging with the Communists. Joseph Cyrankiewicz, secretary-general of the party and Premier after Osobka-Morawski yielded the post in January 1947, held out against involuntary union with the Communists for a year. After returning from a visit to Moscow in January 1948, however, he proved more docile and in March announced his acceptance of the merger, which meant the disappearance of his party as a separate

Poland's Cyrankiewicz greets a Moscow boss, Foreign Minister Molotov.



political entity. The new party, completely dominated by the Communists, was named the United Polish Workers' Party.

During the summer of 1948 the Communist Party, which had insisted on a drastic purge of the Socialists, underwent the first of its own series of purges. Wladyslaw Gomulka, one of the most fanatical members of the Polish Politburo, was suddenly dismissed from his post of Vice-Premier, expelled from the party, and shortly after was arrested on charges of "nationalist deviationism" (Titoism) and other high crimes against the state.

After the merger of Socialists and Communists, a sweeping reorganization of the Government took place. Every office of importance except the premiership went to a Communist, while eight of the Politburo's eleven members were Communists. Premier Cyrankiewicz was retained as a convenient figurehead and as a reward for his services to Moscow, and was still Vice-Premier in 1953. The subjugation of Poland was completed in 1949 when Soviet Marshal Konstanty Rokossovsky was transferred to Poland

to head the Polish armed forces and to act as Minister of National Defense.

In November 1952 President Boleslaw Bierut submitted a new government to a servile Parliament. He remained as President. The new cabinet was composed of eight Communist Vice-Premiers; and of 28 Ministers, 27 were known Communists.

Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and a few other democratic leaders escaped in 1947 from the political prison that was once the Republic of Poland, but most of the anti-Communist leaders and great multitudes of their followers were liquidated by the political police or condemned to forced labor.



When Stalin needed friends, he declared that Poland should be "strong and free."

In June 1944 Stalin had cabled President Roosevelt:

"You are familiar with the point of view of the Soviet Government and its endeavor to see Poland strong, independent, and democratic, and the Polish-Soviet relations good-neighborly and based upon durable friendship."

That was when Stalin needed the help of the free world.



CZECHOSLOVAKIA

*"We have not and cannot have such war aims
as the imposition of our will and regime on the
Slavs and other enslaved peoples of Europe
who are awaiting our aid. Our aim consists in assisting
these people in their struggle for liberation
from Hitler's tyranny and then setting them free
to rule in their own lands as they desire."*

**J. V. Stalin, in an Order of the
Day, 1942.**

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovakia fell to the Communists partly through the trustfulness of its democratic leaders who believed that they could safely "do business with Stalin." Another contributing factor was the failure of Western diplomacy at Munich, which led the nation to feel that it had been betrayed by the West at a time when Moscow seemed ready to help support the country's independence. Traditionally oriented toward Western culture and institutions, the Czechoslovak people were grateful to their powerful neighbor in the East whose armies had helped rout the Nazi hordes that oppressed all Central Europe.

Thus toward the end of the war, there was a dual attitude on the part of the Czechs—de-

Symbol of the Kremlin's stranglehold was this picture of Stalin in Prague.



votion to the democratic principles of the West and sincere admiration for the Russians who had helped to rescue them from Hitler. The Kremlin therefore had certain initial advantages, offset by the spirit of independence prevailing in the Republic and the international stature of its most prominent leaders—President Eduard Benes and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk of the Government-in-exile.

The prewar government of the First Republic had not been greatly concerned about the activities of the Communists. The Government, which included representatives of the influential Agrarian Party and the Social Democratic Party, was generally tolerant of opposition parties and, with its own broad program of socialistic reform, was not disturbed by the presence of deputies who echoed the Kremlin.


One of these was Klement Gottwald, a veteran of the early Communist movement who had joined with Bohumir Smeral in founding the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1921. In the 1930's, the party had less than 100,000 members, but it was relatively

compact and well-disciplined, deriving its main strength from some of the industrial unions, and its voting potential was about 10 per cent of the electorate.

When the Nazis occupied Czechoslovakia, Gottwald hastened to Moscow, where, during the war, he consolidated his relations with the Kremlin and associated closely with groups of expatriate Communists, including Georgi Dimitrov, the redoubtable Bulgarian Communist, Hungary's Matyas Rakosi, Poland's Boleslaw Bierut, Rumania's Ana Pauker, and other instruments of Moscow's program for the sovietization of Eastern Europe.

Although the Benes Government in London had elements of strength and unity lacking in some of the other *émigré* governments, its members

Red targets were President Benes (right) and Foreign Minister Masaryk.



were aware of the many problems and difficulties to be faced on their return from exile.

There was the question of the Sudeten Germans and the claims of Poland to the Tesin industrial area. A further problem related to the autonomous province of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, of which the population was mostly Ruthenian with a Hungarian minority—an awkward aftermath of the Versailles treaty. Finally, under Hitler, Bohemia and Moravia had been separated from Slovakia, posing the question of a postwar separatist movement in Slovakia.

The Kremlin was as well informed regarding these vexatious problems as were President Benes and his associates. Professing friendship for Czechoslovakia, Stalin planned to make use of all the Republic's "contradictions" in his war on democracy.

Towards the end of 1943, President Benes paid a visit to Moscow in order to negotiate a Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation. On December 12 the President felt that he had achieved a signal triumph when he and Stalin signed the



Stalin beams as Benes and Kalinin mark the signing of mutual aid pact between their countries, shortly to be violated.

treaty. "The views of the Soviet leaders were realistic, quiet, and sincere," he wrote later. But despite the friendly atmosphere of the conversations with Stalin and his leading deputies, there was one disturbing note; that came during lengthy discussions with Klement Gottwald.

The "Gottwald program," delivered dogmatically by its author as the basis for Communist participation in the Czechoslovak Government, included the deportation of the Sudeten Germans and the immediate full-fledged nationalization of the country's economy as soon as the war ended. These sounded suspiciously like Kremlin proposals and Benes declined to commit himself on the program as a whole.

Back in London, Benes developed a project that he en-

visaged as a means of furthering the Resistance movement in Czechoslovakia. This was the organization of "National Committees" at local and provincial levels, which would represent the Government-in-exile and carry on the functions of local government until a provisional government would be established after the war.

The Kremlin quickly perceived that in the National Committees it had a ready-made vehicle for infiltration and subversion. While the Benes Government directed its underground organization for the benefit of the whole Allied war effort, the Soviet High Command was busy setting up a network of spies and saboteurs responsible solely to Soviet military authorities.

At the same time, the National Committees were infiltrated by Communists trained and disciplined in party tactics, who were prepared to assume leadership at the coming of peace. The committee chairmen were universally Communists or fellow travelers. Thus when provisional governments were organized in the states bordering the Soviet Union, their in-

fluence was already undermined by Red-dominated National Committees operating in every village, district, and province.

The Red Army reached the Carpathian Mountains, Czechoslovakia's eastern boundary, early in April 1944, but there its advance forces halted and did not proceed further until November, when Soviet troops moved into Ruthenia. The interruption of the Red Army's advance may have had political as well as strategic significance, particularly allowing the Slovaks' uprising of August 1944 to be crushed by the Germans.

In May the Benes Government in London concluded a treaty with Moscow which was to come into effect as soon as Soviet forces liberated any Czechoslovak territory. On the surface, its provisions appeared to be reasonable: two military zones were to be created, the "Operational Zone," where the Soviet High Command would have exclusive authority, and the "Rear Zone," where authority would be delegated to an "Administrative Delegation" representing the London Government.

During that autumn, reports were received by the London Government concerning a "Slovak National Liberation Movement" in Slovakia. The announcements, which might indicate the formation of an autonomous Slovak State, filled the London exiles with apprehension. This was precisely what the Kremlin had anticipated. Having laid the foundation in their own Red underground in Slovakia, the Moscow planners dangled this movement as a threat to the London Government. Their objective, however, was not an independent Slovakia, but the acquisition of Ruthenia, an area in which Stalin had informed President Benes that the Soviet Government was not interested.

No sooner had the Red Army "liberated" Ruthenia than the Ruthenian "National Committees" came into the open with demands for the incorporation of the Province in the USSR. This was put forth as the "spontaneous desire of the Ruthenian people."

The Czech Administrative Delegation, in the meantime, had been permitted by Soviet military authorities to func-

tion only in a tiny pocket of London-administered territory at Chust in the extreme southeast of Ruthenia. There it remained, unable to exert any authority beyond the limits of this restricted "Rear Zone."

In Ruthenia the Red Army not only began to recruit "volunteers," it engaged in a reign of looting and terrorism, as was apparent from a message sent from Chust to London by Dr. Frantisek Krucky, a member of the Administrative Delegation.

"It is necessary to act now," the message read. "The Czechoslovak Government's authority cannot be exercised. Where is the Treaty? Czechoslovak property is being stolen in front of our eyes. The Red Army even carries the telephone wires away. Nobody seems to have the courage to oppose them. The NKVD (Soviet secret police) is here and operates . . . if you do not interfere in Moscow we cannot master the situation. It is forbidden to communicate with you. I am calling you in secret. Your answer must be worded cautiously. Signed: Krucky."

President Benes endeavored to forestall the Soviet absorp-

tion of Ruthenia by instructing Ambassador Zdenek Fierlinger to negotiate the Ruthenian question with the Soviet Government. Fierlinger was joined in Moscow by Social Democrat Frantisek Nemec, chief of the Administrative Delegation. But Stalin and Molotov professed to be surprised by the Czech complaints. Was not the Ruthenian movement a "spontaneous and emotional" expression of the Ruthenian people? Fierlinger, a fellow-traveler, was only too willing to see the Kremlin's point of view.



Fellow-traveler Fierlinger was willing to fall in with the Kremlin's schemes.

In January 1945, Subcarpathian Ruthenia was incorporated *de facto* in the Soviet Union. The Benes Government was subjected to pressure on two fronts; the bogey of Slo-

vak autonomy was revived and at the same time the Kremlin indicated that it would recognize Poland's claim to industrial Tesin if the London Government refused to accept Ruthenia's annexation. At the end of January President Benes yielded: his Government bowed to the loss of Ruthenia and gave unconditional recognition to the new Warsaw Government of the Lublin Poles.

Despite these blows to the London Government, President Benes believed firmly that democracy in his home land could not be shaken. In his farewell-to-Britain speech on February 23, 1945, he declared:

"Of one thing I am profoundly convinced. My people will never abandon their democratic way of life. Their own bitter experience has taught them that government, when divorced from the consent of the governed, becomes tyranny."

During the spring of 1945 the Red Army swept across eastern Czechoslovakia and established contact with Slovak partisans who were mostly trusted Communists. Again

the detachment of Slovakia from the tripartite Republic became a paramount question facing the *émigré* Czechoslovak Government. President Benes and several associates flew to Moscow where they engaged in ten days of secret and intensive negotiations with Klement Gottwald, Rudolf Slansky, secretary-general of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and Kremlin representatives.

The political diversion created by the Slovak partisans on orders from Moscow was successful. The upshot of the Benes-Gottwald conversation was the acceptance by the London group of Gottwald's proposals and the formation of a "Government of the National Front." In return for these concessions, the Red Army transported Benes and his associates to Kosice, a town in eastern Slovakia, which became the temporary capital of the provisional government. The place was remote and strictly delimited within the "Rear Zone." On April 5, 1945, the "Kosice program" was announced.

The Kosice program bore the impress of Gottwald's

Kremlin-inspired dialectics, in which rosy promises were liberally seasoned with pro-Soviet propaganda. Appeal to national pride in a rebuilt Czechoslovak Army was adroitly mingled with a worshipful tribute to the Red Army: "Appreciating the exceptional merits of the Red Army of liberation and in order to secure our future, the Government wants to strengthen even more the fighting cooperation between the Czechoslovak Army and the Red Army, in which the Government sees the example for the building of a new, really democratic anti-Fascist Czechoslovak Army." Months later, when the Communists found they were unable to subvert the Czechoslovak Army, they voted to keep it at a minimum strength!

The Kosice proclamation also stressed the idea of Slav unity, a form of pan-Slavism that suited Moscow at the moment, and went far beyond the terms of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of 1943 in binding the new Government to the foreign policies of its powerful neighbor.

Despite these far-reaching concessions by the Benes group,

President Benes himself did not lose faith in the power and resurgence of democracy. In a radio address he stated: "The Czechoslovaks, being Slavs and neighbors of the Soviet Union, are naturally influenced by Soviet Russia and its socialistic system. At the same time, however, Czechoslovakia will be a parliamentary democracy and will follow its own methods."

The withdrawal of the Red Army forces in the late autumn of 1945 confirmed his optimistic belief that the Kremlin would abide by the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance. Already, however, there were danger signals, had he chosen to heed them.

The Communist chairmen of the National Committees were in effective control of civilian local authority. They were backed by armed Communist militiamen who appeared in every community. Well-paid professional Red agents and propagandists were in evidence everywhere.


The "people's courts," institutions set up under the Retribution Act of May 1945, were conducted under Minister of Interior Vaclav Nosek,



In Czechoslovakia, where tolerance and democracy were watchwords, the Communist regime set up totalitarian rule.



The so-called "people's courts" condemned political victims, priests, and laymen to slave labor or execution.



a Communist. They tried ex-Nazis and collaborators; they also arrested or persecuted non-Communists who betrayed anti-Communist sentiments. The head of the investigative service of this Ministry was Jindrich Vesely.

Fellow-traveling Fierlinger became Premier of the provisional government, holding that post for a year—just long enough to swing his Social Democratic Party into line with the Communist Party. Another sop to the Social Democrats was the selection of Bohumil Lausman as Minister of Industry.

During this period, the Communists were engaged in tightening their hold on the labor movement. The concentration of all the trade unions in the Central Labor Union (URO) gave the Communists an opportunity to solidify their control at the top, in the central committee. Antonin Zapotocky, a former inmate of Buchenwald concentration camp and a leading Communist, headed the URO and planned the secret party tactics. Four months after the 1948 coup he was rewarded with the premiership. White-



Red unionist Zapotocky was rewarded for crushing unions' independence.

collar workers, including those in the civil service, were brought into the URO, thus extending its influence to fields outside of manual work.

Subversion of the Army proved more difficult, despite the efforts of the pro-Communist Minister of Defense, General L. Svoboda, to reorganize the military services along the lines of the Red Army, including the addition of "educational officers," or commissars. The officers' corps was to a great extent purged of "unreliable elements," and replacements were made on the basis of records showing active participation in the Resistance—records which, it happened, were supplied by the Communist-sponsored Union of Partisans. Nevertheless, the Army was not thoroughly reliable from the Communist viewpoint and had

to be discounted as a means of overturning democracy.

The peasants of Czechoslovakia, by and large, were opposed to undue interference by the state in their economy. Before the war, the Czechoslovak cooperative movement was one of the most active in Europe and the Agrarian Party held the balance of political power in agricultural areas.

The Agrarians, whose party had not been permitted to reorganize after the war, were at a further disadvantage when the Communists demanded and received the Ministry of Agriculture. For this Ministry not only controlled the distribution of land under the land reform decree of June 1945; it had charge of all marketing operations, fixed quotas for the delivery of farm products, and arranged for the distribution of badly needed agricultural tools and supplies furnished by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

In the distribution of about seven million acres of expropriated farm lands, the Communists took all the credit and disposed of the parcels to poor peasants and landless people who were expected to vote for

Communist candidates in the forthcoming general elections.

On January 25, 1946, President Benes declared: "You will remember that seven months ago people abroad were saying, 'The Red Army will never leave Czechoslovakia.' I told them they were wrong and you will see we are again masters in our own country." What President Benes failed to discern at that moment were the less visible aspects of Soviet intrigue and Communist penetration into every element of the country's social, political, and economic life.

In the elections of May 26, 1946, there may have been less evidence of strong-arm and terroristic activities by Communists and the political police than in other elections in Eastern Europe, principally because the Communists felt sure of their strength.

The vote, however, was a blow to the non-Communist parties. The total vote for the leftist bloc of Communists, Social Democrats, and Slovak Laborites was 3,601,699 against 3,456,687 for the National Socialists, People's Party, Slovak Democrats and Slovak Freedom Party. Moreover,



Premier Gottwald (at left), Nejedly, and Fierlinger, before the plot was hatched.

the leftist bloc—thanks to Fierlinger—now presented a united front, while the non-Communists were of divided counsel.

The Communists won 38 per cent of the total votes, and that gave them the choice of ministries as the majority party. Yet their margin of victory in the new Parliament was narrow—only six deputies more than the total of their disunited opponents.

Klement Gottwald, the Kremlin's pawn, became Premier. In his first speech before Parliament he again stressed the necessity for close collaboration with the USSR and proposed the complete nationalization of the nation's economy. But he also promised "constitutional protection for private enterprise in small and middle-size business and all private property justly gained, espe-

cially for farmers, business men, intellectuals, and manual workers." These promises, after February 1948, were forgotten.

Despite the initial advantages secured by the Communists in the elections, it became increasingly plain during the following year that their strength was waning. In 1947 the Social Democrats became restive under Communist dictation; finally, at the Social Democratic Congress held in November they ousted Fierlinger as the party's head and named Bohumil Lausman, who was not in the pro-Red camp.

This move challenged the supremacy of the Communists, who foresaw the possibility of a coalition against them in Parliament and a reduction in their own voting strength in the next elections, scheduled for the late spring of 1948. In December 1947, a popular poll conducted secretly by the Communist Ministry of Information indicated that the Communists were likely to lose from 10 to 15 per cent of their voting strength. If they also lost the support of the Social Democrats, they would become a minority in Parliament.

Popular opinion had further veered against the Communists because of the attempted assassination, in the summer of 1947, of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, Vice-Premier Peter Zenkl (Chairman of the National Socialist Party), and highly-respected Minister of



Ailing Benes (right) confers with Slansky and Hungarians Rakosi and Farkas.

Justice Prokop Drtina. The discovery of explosives addressed to these leaders involved a Communist deputy, among others. The country was deeply stirred by the sinister implications of the plot.

In an effort to recover lost ground, Communist Minister of Interior Nosek accused the National Socialists of "conspiring against the state," but the subsequent investigation backfired when witnesses admitted that they had been bribed or intimidated into ap-

pearing against the defendants.

Although the Communists had experienced a setback, rumors at the end of the year were disquieting: it was said that weapons were being distributed to left-wing peasants and workers. In January 1948 the left-wing Peasants' Union and the Central Labor Union issued demands that went far beyond the radical economic program of the Government; they amounted to a bid for full communization.

President Benes and his associates, alarmed by these threats to legitimate authority, decided that elections should be held as soon as possible, ahead of schedule. But a parliamentary maneuver, designed to precipitate an election through the resignation of twelve non-Communist Ministers, came too

Mass demonstrations in Prague preceded Communist seizure of power.



late. The Communists had planned a *coup d'état*, which was accomplished during the week of February 19-25.

As a preliminary to the *coup*, alarmist posters appeared on every hand, warning against imaginary foes of the state, "foreign interventionists," and such. The Central Council of Trade Unions announced that it would hold a mass convention in Prague on February 22, and the Peasants' Union issued a similar call for February 29. These announcements were to assure the presence in the capital of armed masses of civilians, obedient to Communist orders, which would give the impression of "popular demonstrations."

Minister of Interior Nosek at this time completed a "police reform," his term for sovietizing the police force. When Nosek ordered several police regiments to Prague, at the time of the *coup*, they had to take a new oath of allegiance—not to the Government, but to Premier Gottwald.

When mobs began to swarm through the streets, they found the police cooperative; only non-Communists were arrested, including students from

Charles University who paraded in protest against the Red-inspired disorders. At one point the police fired on a group



At height of the Czech crisis, Zapotocky threatened to call a general strike.

of students, inflicting a number of casualties.

A one-hour general strike, called by the URO, served as a warning that the trade unions under Zapotocky were prepared to paralyze all the normal functions of the state.

On Sunday, February 22, the "convention" of the URO became a signal for open defiance of the legitimate Government. Inflammatory speeches, threats and slogans uttered by Red leaders were broadcast by the Communists, who controlled the radio system through the Ministry of Information. Since all means of communication, press and ra-

dio were being taken over by newly formed "action committees," the only available news throughout the country came from Communist sources.

On February 25, President Benes capitulated to an ultimatum delivered by Premier Gottwald. It is a matter of speculation that he might have called on the Army to restore the authority of his Government, but he was aging and enfeebled and, above all, a humanitarian. He could not face the prospect of civil war, and he apparently retained some vestige of faith in democratic processes. These processes soon vanished in their entirety.

The actual transfer of power throughout the country was accomplished mainly by the action committees which, at the time of the *coup*, according to previously prepared plans of the Communist Party, took over every government office, public institution and service, and those private enterprises deserving of Communist attention. The action committees were armed or accompanied by armed units of the "workers' militia," a Red organization.

While the action committees solidified their hold on the en-



tire state apparatus, widespread purges of officials and officers, public and private, were under way. The purge in the industrial plants of "unreliable" foremen and technicians was so drastic that the Central Action Committee had to call a halt to it, for fear production would be impaired.

On March 10, 1948, a cowed and docile Parliament gave the new regime a vote of confidence by 230 out of 300 votes. On that same day, Jan Masaryk committed suicide, or more likely, was murdered by his political executioners.

President Benes yielded to the Kremlin's henchman Gottwald (upper left) as the streets of Prague echoed to Red-inspired riots. The new Premier (left) appointed a pro-Kremlin cabinet.



On the same day the Communist government was installed, Jan Masaryk plunged to his death. Below, Red plotters made outward show of mourning.




Kremlin shadows fall across the country as President Benes and Foreign Minister Clementis (right) meet with the Soviet Ambassador and (below) Gottwald is acclaimed by Communists.

Democracy as an institution had perished in Czechoslovakia but it took months of harsh measures to "purify" the universities, which remained to the end one of the last bulwarks of the nation's political and intellectual freedom, outside of the Church. The clergy did not escape pressure and persecution.

In 1948, fellow-traveler Fierlinger fulfilled the dictates of the Kremlin by merging the remnants of the Social Democratic Party with the Communist Party, thus effecting the former's disappearance.

When President Benes refused to sign the new, Soviet-type constitution and resigned, it was signed on June 8 by Klement Gottwald, who was elected President by the National Assembly. Antonin Zapotocky became Premier.

The Communist regime has claimed thousands of victims; the flight from the once-free Republic is indisputable evidence of Communism's failure.



Purge is the handmaiden of Communism. Scores have been liquidated, like Clementis (right) and Slansky (below).





RUMANIA

*The Soviet Government declares
that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring
any part of Rumanian territory or
of changing the social system existing in Rumania."*

Statement by Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov when the Red Army crossed the Prut River, Rumania's eastern frontier, April 2, 1944.

RUMANIA

When Soviet forces in April 1944 crossed the Prut River, which separates Russian from Rumanian Moldavia, the Kremlin had to consider what advantages and handicaps lay ahead, aside from the overt conquest of Rumania—a policy specifically disclaimed at that moment by Stalin's spokesman, Foreign Minister Molotov.

In Rumania and Bulgaria the Kremlin confronted monarchies—a weak one in the case of the Bulgarian Regency over a child King; a relatively strong one in the person of Rumania's young and popular King Michael, who bore none of the stigma of irresponsibility associated with his father, ex-King Carol.

During World War II, Rumania suffered a double calamity: in June 1940, during the entente of Stalin and Hitler, the Soviet Union seized Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and in September the *Diktat* of Vienna (the so-called Vienna Award) gave the northern half of Transylvania to Hungary and a strip of Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. Thus the country was stripped of the acquisitions it had gained

by being on the winning side in World War I.

Unable to endure these assaults by his powerful neighbors, King Carol abdicated in favor of his nineteen-year-old son, who in September 1940 assumed a throne overshadowed by the pro-German authoritarian regime of Marshal Ion Antonescu. In 1941 Rumania followed Hitler's Reich in declaring war on the Soviet Union, and sent 15 divisions to fight on Russian soil. Rumanian oil fields supplied about one-third of Germany's war needs and its resources in grain and timber were valuable assets to Hitler.

The political atmosphere of prewar Rumania and its parties had formed a complex and often bizarre pattern that mirrored the essence of Balkan rivalries and intrigues.

Hitler got Rumania's oil from Antonescu but Moscow reaped the final benefits.



The two main traditional parties were the Liberal Party, which members of the Brătianu family had controlled for several generations, and the National Peasant Party of Dr. Iuliu Maniu, a fusion of Maniu's National Party of Transylvania with the Peasant Party of Ion Mihalache.

The program of the National Peasant Party was liberal-reformist, emphasizing aid to agriculture, civil liberties as opposed to authoritarianism, and the extension of education to underprivileged classes. Its orientation was strongly toward Western Europe. In the latter respect all the parties except the insignificant Communist Party were in agreement. Rumania was not Slavic by race, language, or creed; through a succession of governments that ranged from progressive to reactionary, the nation's foreign policy never swung toward Moscow.

The almost universal regard in which Iuliu Maniu was held by his countrymen, both peasants and townsmen, was a factor that had to be assessed by the Kremlin when the Red Army stood on Rumania's border. Against his undoubted au-

thority, which even Antonescu respected, Moscow could rely on a band of exiles it had harbored for many years. Among these was Ana Rabinsohn Pauker, who had been a member of the Comintern and enjoyed the Kremlin's favor until her disgrace in May 1952.

Originally a Social Democrat, she became a Bolshevik and married Marcel Pauker, who was liquidated in the USSR in 1938 as a Trotskyite. Before that, she had been active as an agitator among left-wing unionists in Rumania, was often arrested, and by 1941 had been in prison for six years.

In that year, Dictator Antonescu, in temporary agreement with Doctor Maniu, arranged to trade her for an anti-Communist Rumanian then in Soviet custody. Six years later, Ana Pauker repaid this benefaction by directing the execution of Antonescu and seeing that Iuliu Maniu, then 74 years of age, was sentenced to solitary confinement for life.

After Moscow welcomed Ana Pauker in 1941, she was accorded Soviet citizenship, and became a Red Army officer

and a member of the executive committee of the Comintern. During the German-Soviet war she supervised all propaganda directed to Rumania, issued directives to the Communist underground there, and helped indoctrinate enough Rumanian prisoners of war to form two army divisions. These were of great help to the Red Army when it entered Rumania.

The Rumanian Communist Party had never had any following of consequence, even among the industrial workers who in the main were Social Democrats. In fact, the quality of Rumanian Communist leadership was such that a quisling had to be found in another quarter. He was Petru Groza, a Transylvanian "business man" and ex-lawyer.

Dictator Antonescu, ousted by the King, was later executed as a war criminal.



Ana Pauker, transported by the Red Army, prepared to betray her country and inaugurate a reign of terror.

After some experience in right-wing cabinets during the 1920's, Groza turned leftward in 1933 to found the Transylvanian Plowmen's Front, a circumstance that brought him back into politics.

Ex-Lawyer Groza, a Kremlin tool, was ready to welcome Soviet authorities.



Leadership of the Social Democrats rested with Titel Petrescu, a lawyer and journalist whose views were closer to those of Maniu than to the Communists.

The National Liberal Party was headed by Constantine (Dinu) Bratianu, who joined with Maniu in opposing the Antonescu regime during the war and urging Rumanian neutrality. The party itself, however, had lost much of its early influence. Ex-Premier Gheorghe Tatarescu, an outcast of the National Liberal Party, formed a dissident group after the entry of Soviet troops into Rumania, and emerged to become a fellow-traveler favorable to Kremlin policies.

In the summer of 1944, the stage was set for a dramatic shift in Rumanian political and foreign affairs. Since April, the Red Army had moved across Rumanian Moldavia, driving back the German forces while, in its rear, Soviet authorities and Moscow agents were busy sovietizing the entire province, with the usual accompaniment of looting and terrorism.

On August 11 the National

Democratic Bloc (NDB) was established, largely through the efforts of Doctor Maniu, who brought his National Peasant Party into a working coalition with the National Liberal Party of Bratianu, the Social Democratic Party of Petrescu, and the Communist Party, nominally headed by Lucretiu Patrascu, a Bucharest lawyer and Marxist writer.

As early as 1943, young King Michael had begun to take an increasing part in the government. His sympathies were with the Allies from the start and he foresaw the eventual defeat of the Axis. On August 23, 1944, King Michael arrested Marshal Antonescu and, having been assured of the allegiance of his leading generals and their troops, he overthrew the military dictatorship.

Two days later, a state of war was announced with Germany because of the latter's hostile activity against Rumania, and 15 Rumanian divisions turned on their former war allies. The Rumanian Army fought 18 major battles with the Wehrmacht, suffered 170,000 casualties and took 109,000 German prisoners.

Later, Stalin bestowed the highest Soviet decoration on King Michael.

The Armistice Convention was signed in Moscow on September 12, 1944. Under its terms, northern Transylvania was to be returned to Rumania. An Allied Control Commission was set up, composed of the representatives of the Big Three, but the chairmanship of the Commission was reserved for the Soviet representative, who also figured as the representative of the Allied Military Command. In practice, as the Western members of the Commission discovered later, this meant that Soviet policies prevailed.

In addition to military commitments against the Axis, Rumania was obligated to ar-



Popular King Michael overthrew a fascist dictatorship but faced intrigues.

rest war criminals, disband Fascist organizations, and permit the passage of Soviet troops. The Rumanian Government was also required to restore any loot taken from the USSR by Rumanian soldiers and to pay \$300 million in war reparations. This reparation bill during the postwar period grew by leaps and bounds, for it had to be paid in goods and products based on prewar monetary values, whereas the Rumanian Government made deliveries at vastly inflated prices.

The declared purpose of the Armistice Convention was to safeguard the "independence and sovereignty" of the nation.

Ana Pauker entered Rumania with the Red Army and with her came a number of other expatriates, including Vasile Luca and Emil Bodnaras, who played a major part in instituting the Commu-



Peasant leader Maniu with the Kremlin's "hatchet-man," Andrei Vishinsky.

nist regime in Rumania. Later, they became key Communist officials in the future Groza Government.

Following the *coup d'état*, King Michael decreed the formation of a new government under General Constantin Sanatescu. This interim "government of the generals" at once became the target of Communist attacks. Faced by growing leftist opposition, the Sanatescu Government was compelled to resign on December 2, when the King called on General Nicolai Radescu to form a government of "National Union." For the moment, the Communists agreed to co-operate, but they had already undertaken divisive tactics.

On October 12, following a Communist-staged mass demonstration, the leftists formed a coalition made up of Communists, Social Democrats, the Plowmen's Front, and two minor splinter parties. The coalition took the name of the National Democratic Front (NDF), thus wiping out the National Democratic Bloc (NDB) formed several months earlier.

The Radescu Government was beset with difficulties from



Demonstrations in Bucharest featured pictures of Stalin, Pauker and Groza.

the start. Moldavia and southern Bukovina, which had been overrun by the Red Army, were being thoroughly sovietized; the former administrative apparatus was swept away and in its stead all local and district posts were filled by Communists or fellow-travelers, many of them imported from Moscow. In Wallachia and Transylvania the Government still retained administrative authority, but its officials were frequently labeled "collaborators," "war criminals" or "Fascists" by the Communists. When their removal was effected, the replacements were generally Communists who had the backing of the Soviet Military Command.

By degrees the Rumanian Communists and Soviet authorities turned their attention to General Radescu himself; his Government was charged with "protecting Fascist elements" and "undermining pop-

ular democracy." Nevertheless, the Communist Party gave lip service to cooperation with the Government up to the end of the year. In January 1945, Ana Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej, Communist Minister of Communications, journeyed to Moscow to seek the advice of the Kremlin. After their return, January 24, the strategy of Communist penetration and planned violence began to unfold.

In January, Communist control of organized labor was tightened when Gheorghe Apostol, leader of the Red-dominated railroad union, brought all the country's unions into the National Confederation of Labor. Through their hold on

Communist Party boss Gheorghiu-Dej brought back Stalin plan from Moscow.



Communist rowdies led the armed violence against legitimate government.

the Confederation's central committee, the Communists were able to promote disorders and demonstrations from a single headquarters. Organized riots soon took place, as Communist propaganda against the Government became shrill and vituperative. Soviet authorities, on the other hand, forbade political rallies of the historical parties on the grounds that they led to "disorders." In Moscow, *Pravda*

Pauker directed persecutions and was rewarded with the vice-premiership.



and Radio Moscow took up the hue and cry against Radescu, declaring him "incapable of establishing stability and order in Rumania with democratic means." The Communist Under-Secretary of Interior Teohari Georgescu led the blasts aimed at Radescu.

The traditional parties tried to come to the Government's aid by issuing manifestoes but the Communist-led printers' union refused to print these bulletins. The official organ of the National Liberal Party continued to appear but without the party's platform; the National Peasant Party's newspaper, rather than submit to union censorship, suspended publication. These actions marked the beginning of the destruction of Rumania's free press.

Disturbed by the growing evidence of Communist intrigues against the Government, General Radescu addressed the nation on February 11 in a speech at the Aro Theatre in Bucharest. He sharply criticized the policy of the printers' union as a threat to freedom of the press. He also announced that the Government would defer action on

land reform for two reasons: breaking up the large estates would interfere with the current crop planting, and the soldiers at the front should be consulted in any redistribution of land.

Answering the Red assaults on the Government, the General declared: "So long as the reins of government are in my hands, I will defend peace and order in the country at all costs, not with the thought of suppressing anyone, but because I am convinced that that is the only road to follow." Thus spoke the veteran anti-Fascist who had fought against Codreanu's anti-Semitic Iron Guards and other reactionary elements in prewar Rumania.

The Kremlin determined that Radescu must be eliminated and so informed its Rumanian henchmen. Two days after the General's speech the National Democratic Front ordered a mass demonstration against postponement of land reform. This passed off without incident for it was only designed to test crowd mobilization. Less orderly demonstrations soon followed, culminating on February 20 in an

armed attack by NDF followers on the Bucharest Malaxa Steel and Locomotive Plant. This attack coincided with attempts by the NDF to seize prefectures in the provinces.

At the Malaxa plant the non-Communist workers, who were in the majority, battled the Communist attackers. The Red press immediately denounced the non-Communist workers as "Fascists" and "saboteurs of the Armistice" and called for another mass demonstration on February 24.

That day, some 50,000 workers were forced by their Communist plant bosses to parade down the Calea Victoriei. When the head of the procession reached the Ministry of Interior building opposite the Royal Palace, a group of about 500 marchers suddenly attempted to force an entrance to the palace. Troops posted near the entrance fired over the heads of the crowd but ricocheting bullets resulted in several casualties. Disorders continued throughout the night.


On the same evening General Radescu broadcast an impassioned denunciation of the Communist-inspired riots, naming Ana Pauker and Vas-

ile Luca as the principal instigators. "Under the mask of democracy," he cried angrily, "a democracy which they trample underfoot at each step, these frightful hyenas hope to obtain control of the country!"

While the Moscow press and radio gave out completely distorted accounts of the events of February 24, the Red Army moved to disarm the loyal Bucharest garrison, claiming that Rumanian forces in "rear areas" were a threat to Soviet armies at the front.

This stratagem cloaked the fact that the Soviet Military Command had removed the last remaining obstacle to unrestrained Communist violence. Thereupon the NDF announced another mass demonstration for March 8. Meanwhile, Com-

Premier Radescu declared that Communists "trample democracy underfoot."



unist workers were supplied with arms, especially the militant *Aparea Patriotica*, which corresponded to the "workers' militia" of the other border states.

Moscow now took a hand in the situation by direct, overt action. On February 27, Andrei Vishinsky, Vice-Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, acting on orders from Stalin, arrived in Bucharest accompanied by Marshal Malinovsky, Soviet Chairman of the Allied Control Commission. In an audience with King Michael, Vishinsky harshly demanded the dismissal of General Radescu and the formation of a new government. Otherwise, he added significantly, he would not be responsible for "the continued independence of Rumania."


According to the King's rue-

ful comment afterward, Vishinsky on leaving banged the door of the audience chamber so violently that plaster fell from the ceiling.

After some delay, the King yielded. A mandate was offered to Prince Barbu Stirbey, one-time Premier, but when the Prince was unable to form a Government, a limited mandate—for a coalition government only—was offered at Vishinsky's suggestion to Vice-Premier Petru Groza. This effort was fruitless. Vishinsky's ultimatum was known to the Peasant and Liberal Party leaders, who declined to enter a government formed under such circumstances.

Vishinsky made a third visit to the King, during which he disclosed the Kremlin's *diktat*: Groza must become Premier,

King Michael was aware of the Kremlin's power when he faced Vishinsky.



and his cabinet must be "willing to ignore party lines and to prosecute the NDF program without hesitation"—that is, the program dictated by the Kremlin.

On March 6, 1945, Petru Groza became Premier, and a few days later General Radescu, whose life had been threatened, found refuge in the British Legation.

The accession of Groza to the premiership came three weeks after the Declaration of Yalta, issued in the name of the Big Three on February 12. The Declaration stated that the three Allied Powers agreed jointly to assist the people in any European liberated state or *former Axis satellite* "to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment, through free elections, of governments responsive to the people." The principal Allied Powers further agreed to consult together on the measures necessary to discharge their joint responsibilities in this regard.

Violations of the Yalta Agreement by Moscow and its

puppets were taking place in all the liberated border states at the very moment when Generalissimo Stalin affixed his signature to it; they had preceded the Agreement and they followed it, without cessation.

The Groza Government, freed from non-Communist representation, moved swiftly to consolidate its hold on the entire state apparatus.

The Communists claimed the three key ministries which they particularly needed: Minister of Interior, Teohari Georgescu, who also controlled the *Siguranta*, or security police; Minister of Justice, Lucretiu Patrascu; and Minister of Communications, Gheorghiu-Dej. Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca held less conspicuous ministerial posts, and Emil Bodnaras became Secretary of

Stalin gave orders for a new government to be headed by Petru Groza.



the Presidency of the Council. As members of the Politburo of the Rumanian Communist Party, Pauker, Luca, and Bodnaras exerted greater influence than their titles indicated, for the Politburo initiated all actions taken by the Government.

Groza's Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister was Gheorghe Tătărescu, leader of the dissident National Liberal Party.

The Social Democrats received two minor ministries—Education, and Mines and Petroleum—and a third that was important, the Ministry of Labor. This went to Lothar Rădăceanu, a fellow-traveling Socialist who eventually formed a dissident group and led it into the Communist Party through a merger.

A concentration camp for political offenders was established at Caracal and was soon filled to overflowing with ex-Fascists as well as followers of Iuliu Maniu and other democratic opponents of the NDF regime. While the liquidation of known pro-Germans was going on, former Iron Guards and others associated with the Antonescu dictatorship

were welcomed by the Communists, providing they accepted the NDF program without reservation.

Doctor Maniu did not remain silent on the issues raised by the intervention of the Kremlin in Rumanian internal affairs. On March 8, two days after the Groza Government was formed, he declared that the Soviet Government had violated the Armistice Convention, which promised to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of the nation, and the provisions of the Yalta Agreement regarding "broadly representative" government in Rumania.

On March 17, the United States Government, in the first of several strong indictments of the Groza regime, announced that it would require discussion of the Rumanian political situation "in the spirit of the Yalta Agreement." The American protest was censored in the Rumanian press and the Kremlin blocked consideration of this issue by the Allied Control Commission. The question of political opposition in Rumania was not raised until the Potsdam Conference in July.

While the Big Three were in



Iuliu Maniu in a "frame-up" trial was condemned to imprisonment for life.


session at Potsdam, the Kremlin-supported Groza regime was actively engaged in trying to suppress all political opposition. On July 1, Tatarescu's followers staged a "General Congress of the National Liberal party" in the course of which its dummy delegates formed the dissident National Liberal Party. The Communists at this time organized a dissident National Peasant group with which they hoped to counter Doctor Maniu's National Peasants; however, this fractional party won no substantial following among the peasants.

On July 18, while the Potsdam Conference was in session, Iuliu Maniu delivered a severe arraignment of the

Groza regime, calling for a return to parliamentary institutions and declaring that the country "must no longer suffer dictatorial government imposed from outside."

The Potsdam Agreement of August 2, to which Stalin and Molotov were a party, expressly provided for freedom of the press in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. It also directed that the newly-created Council of Foreign Ministers should negotiate peace treaties with the three countries and stated specifically in this connection that the negotiations should be undertaken with "recognized democratic governments" of those countries.

The ink was hardly dry on the Potsdam Agreement when the first of the mass trials under police-state procedures began in Rumania. Thirty-three youthful members of the National Liberal Party were arrested, charged with a "conspiracy against the war Allies" and organizing "terrorist" groups against the government. During the brief trial, September 10-13, the "evidence" was all in the form of "confessions" extracted by the customary police methods.



Stalin had no intention of keeping faith when he signed the Potsdam Agreement.

The prosecution even cited as an overt act the publication in Rumanian of the life of Abraham Lincoln. Three defendants were acquitted, there was no verdict in the case of five, and 25 were convicted and sentenced to terms ranging from one month to seven years.

Early in August the Soviet Union, acting independently of the other powers, accorded unconditional recognition to the Groza regime. The vigorous protests of the British and American Governments against this unilateral action, which was in contravention of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, were ignored by the Kremlin.

At the urging of the opposition, King Michael on August 19 advised Groza that in view

of the political situation he would consult the leaders of all parties regarding a change of government. Two days later, the King called for Groza's resignation. Groza flatly refused to surrender his mandate—a situation without precedent in European constitutional history—and at the bidding of the Kremlin, set out for Moscow. The King then appealed to the Yalta signatories, with the result that the Kremlin bluntly declared that the Groza Government was "democratic and entirely representative."

The issue was raised at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in September and led to the disruption of that Conference when the Kremlin made it plain that it would not tolerate a change of government in Rumania or in Bulgaria, where a similar impasse had been reached. Despite Soviet support, Premier Groza, from August 1945 to January 1946, had some difficulty in carrying on the routine functions of government, for the King refused to sign any of Groza's decrees.

The Communists now prepared to execute one of their

favorite tactics—a riot engineered by trained *provocateurs*. On the King's Name Day, November 8, 1945, while thousands of loyal citizens gathered to cheer the young monarch, the Communists staged a counter demonstration. During the subsequent disorders, squads of *sigurantza* and Moscow-trained Rumanian troops fired on the loyalists, inflicting many casualties.

Communist Minister of Interior Georgescu at once placed responsibility for the rioting on leaders of the opposition parties. On November 9 and 10, several hundred members of the Liberal and Peasant Parties were arrested. By December, when the Big Three Foreign Ministers met in Moscow, the Groza regime had practically achieved the sup-

pression of the free press in Rumania.

At the Moscow Conference the Foreign Ministers agreed that the provisional regimes in Rumania and Bulgaria would in each instance have to include two members of the opposition, truly representative of their parties but willing to "work loyally" with their Governments. As a further condition for recognition by the Western powers, these Governments were required to prepare for "free and unfettered" elections to be held "as soon as possible."

The Foreign Ministers, including Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, agreed that all democratic and anti-Fascist parties should have the right to take part in these elections, and that the reorganized Gov-

The Groza regime crushed opposition parties and their leaders. On the King's Name Day the Communists instigated rioting which resulted in casualties. They also staged a demonstration at the funeral of so-called Communist "martyrs."



ernments should "give assurances concerning the grant of freedom of the press, speech, religion, and association." A Commission of Three, representing the Conference Powers, was set up to implement the Moscow decisions.

When the Commission arrived in Bucharest, the National Peasant Party proposed as its representative Ion Mihalache, second in command of the party, and the Liberals offered Bebe Bratianu, their party's secretary-general. Commission member Vishinsky vetoed both candidates; it was evident that the Kremlin would accept no opposition representatives of standing or influence in their parties.

In the hope of averting political disaster, the opposition parties selected two relatively obscure individuals, Emil Hatieganu for the Peasants, and Mihai Romniceanu for the Liberals. As Ministers-without-portfolio, they found themselves without authority or function in the re-constituted Groza Government.

Having "reorganized" his Government, Premier Groza so informed the Commissioners on January 7. In forwarding

this information, he appended a statement that categorically and without reservations promised to abide by all the terms specified in the Moscow decisions. On February 4, 1946, the United States and British Governments accorded recognition to the Groza Government, conditional on the fulfillment in good faith of the declaration made by Premier Groza.

Suppression and terrorism of opposition elements followed on the heels of Groza's promise of freedom of the press, speech, and right of association. By April more than 70 violations of the Groza pledge were reported by opposition leaders. Opposition papers were permitted to resume publication, but they were drastically censored and deprived of all but a small amount of newsprint. Soviet authorities intervened directly in the press situation and ordered the editor of the Peasant Party newspaper *Dreptatea* to reverse the paper's anti-Government policy. By the summer of 1946 attacks by armed bands of terrorists on Peasant and Liberal party members were prevalent.

The Groza Government, aft-

er months of delay, fixed the date for general elections—November 19—but in the meantime the Senate of the National Assembly was abolished, restrictive legislation was enacted, and in July a new electoral law disenfranchised thousands of Rumanians, chiefly on grounds of opposition to the Groza Government.

With the approach of election day, fraud and terrorism went hand in hand. Following the protests of Maniu and Bratianu against the flagrant intimidation of their followers, the British and American Governments despatched strong notes to Foreign Minister Tatarescu, calling attention to reported violations of the Moscow decisions. Tatarescu replied that the "democratic principles of freedom and justice" would "remain the constant guidance of this government's actions in the general elections." He well knew that the Kremlin would support these high-flown evasions.

The elections held on November 19 were possibly the most patent examples of vote-juggling in Eastern Europe, up to that time. When reports of a Peasant Party victory

were received at the electoral headquarters, the central committee in Bucharest halted all tabulation of votes and directed electoral officials throughout the country to compile new records giving the Government bloc an overwhelming majority. As publicly announced, the electoral count was 4,766,000 votes for the Government coalition, which yielded 348 seats, as against 1,040,000 votes for the combined opposition, giving these parties 35 seats.

The answer of the Peasant and Liberal Parties was a communique denouncing the purported election results as void and illegal; the opposition deputies then refused to occupy the seats assigned to them in the National Assembly.

The way was now open for the establishment of a full-fledged Soviet-type state, but an economic disaster intervened. During the winter and spring of 1946-47, the Rumanian economy, shaken to its foundations by Soviet exploitation and the Government's extreme measures, including the hasty land reform, underwent alarming deterioration. The country also experienced the



When famine struck Rumania in 1947, more than \$3,500,000 worth of American food went to feed 500,000 starving people who owed their lives to the American Red Cross.

most severe famine conditions in its troubled history, especially in Moldavia where 20,000 persons were reported to have starved to death.

In June Foreign Minister Tatarescu attributed a "wave of discontent" to the fact that general production was only 48 per cent of that in 1938, and that 50 per cent of the current production went to meet the Armistice terms. This rash statement was hardly palatable to the Kremlin, which decided that Tatarescu's usefulness was nearly over.

The collapse of the Rumanian economy, however, only spurred the Groza Government to further acts of persecution as it sought to make the opposition parties the scapegoats of the country's sorry plight. The sinister nature of this campaign became apparent to the opposition, and

on July 14, 1947, a group of ten party leaders, including Ion Mihalache, attempted to leave the country.

They were seized by the police and stigmatized as "traitors." This was the signal for an all-out attempt to liquidate the opposition, particularly its venerable leader, Iuliu Maniu, whose Peasant Party was accused by Minister of Interior Georgescu of "crimes and subversions" against the state. On July 30, the Government officially outlawed the National Peasant Party.

The trial of Iuliu Maniu, Ion Mihalache, and others opened in Bucharest on October 29 before a military tribunal headed by Colonel Alexander Petrescu, who had been director of concentration camps under Dictator Antonescu. The outcome was a foregone conclusion. On November 11, Ma-

niu and Mihalache were sentenced to solitary confinement for life and the other defendants were given terms ranging from one year to life.

Fellow-traveler Tatarescu was forced to resign as Foreign Minister on November 7, and on the same day Premier Groza delivered an ultimatum to King Michael: the new Foreign Minister would be Ana Pauker and the new Minister of Finance, Vasile Luca, a protégé of the Kremlin. With Ana Pauker in charge of foreign affairs, a sweeping reorganization took place; some 160 foreign service officials were ordered home, of whom 25 obeyed the summons, the rest finding political asylum abroad.

On December 30, King Michael, surrounded in the Royal Palace by a *sigurantza* guard, was presented with an abdication proclamation by Groza who demanded the King's signature. The young King submitted after several hours of indecision, and the brief announcement told the end of the monarchy.

In the elections of March 28, 1948, the Government bloc—to the surprise of no one—re-

ceived a "popular majority" that assured it of 405 out of 414 seats. The first measure of the obedient National Assembly was to adopt the familiar constitution of a "People's Republic."

All remnants of opposition were swiftly eradicated. The Independent Social Democratic Party headed by Titel Petrescu was dissolved after the arrest of its leader. The pro-Groza Social Democrats under Radaceanu were forced, in February, to merge with the Communists as the Rumanian Workers' Party.

By the end of 1948 the nation was firmly in the grip of the Groza Government. After purges and persecutions of the dissident clergy, the Church was brought under government control. All educational and cultural activities became Marxist-Leninist in character. Trials and liquidation of "bourgeois" and "Fascist" elements involved peasants, non-Communist workers, Zionists, churchmen, Socialists, and Liberals. In 1952, Foreign Minister Pauker, Finance Minister Luca, and Georgescu were purged; Moscow, however, spared Premier Petru Groza.



BULGARIA

*"It is not our aim to seize foreign lands
or to subjugate foreign people. Our aim is clear
and noble . . . We want to free our Ukrainian,
Moldavian, Byelorussian, Lithuanian, Latvian,
Estonian, and Karelian brothers from the outrage
and violence to which they are being subjected
by the German-Fascist scoundrels."*


J. V. Stalin, Order of the Day
No. 130, May 1, 1942.

BULGARIA

Georgi Mihailov Dimitrov, one of the most astute and implacable Communists in Eastern Europe, had every reason to believe that the alignment of Bulgaria within the framework of the Kremlin's postwar program for Eastern Europe would be relatively swift and, for the Communists, painless. It was, but not before Dimitrov had to deal with a man who championed democracy to the very steps of the gallows and dramatized the fate of Bulgaria to the free world—Nikola Petkov.

In many respects Bulgaria seemed to the Kremlin planners an ideal subject for penetration by the Moscow-trained Bulgarian Communists, some of whom had long enjoyed Soviet citizenship.

Bulgaria is primarily an agrarian state in which the peasants, with a generally low standard of living, constitute more than three-quarters of the population. Before World War II, there were few industrialists and only a small class of business *entrepreneurs*. Organized labor was of less importance than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. A good part



Pictures of Stalin and Dimitrov look down on dutiful Communist marchers.

of the middle class derived its income from government or local public service.

The Coburg Monarchy, which dated only from 1887, was neither strong nor popular. After the death of King Boris during the war, the Monarchy was represented by the Regency Council acting for seven-year-old Simeon II. The actual power was in the hands of a group of pro-Nazis.

In the 1920's, the strongest political organization was the Agrarian Party, with the Communist Party a poor second; in the 1922 elections the Communists polled 182,000 votes, marking the high tide of their influence.

The leader of the Agrarian Party during World War I was Alexander Stamboliski, who opposed Bulgaria's alliance with Germany and after the war served as Premier. For a time there was an uneasy

concordat between Stamboliski's Agrarian League and the Communists, but the latter never ceased to attack the "peasant government of political and social reaction."

Both parties were driven underground in the reaction of 1923 when Alexander Tsankov engineered a *coup d'état* in the course of which Stamboliski was assassinated. In 1931, the Agrarians split into two groups —the Right Wing of Dimov and Gichev and the *Pladne*, or Left Wing Agrarian Party of Dr. G. M. Dimitrov (not related to Communist Dimitrov).

The *Pladne* (derived from the party's newspaper *Pladne*) reflected the desires and attitudes of the bulk of the peasantry, which were characterized by intense individualism and attachment to private land ownership, combined with a desire for needed land reform and for a further extension of the type of cooperative movement peculiar to Bulgaria. This was the *zadruga* system, a traditional form of community cooperation. Modern cooperatives were also firmly established and formed the basis for political action.

Prominent in the ranks of



Agrarian leader Dr. Dimitrov saw his party crumble under Kremlin blows.

the Communists who were hounded during the Tsankov regime were Vasil Kolarov, Traicho Kostov, and Anton Yugov — all destined to play leading parts in the postwar sovietization of Bulgaria. Georgi Dimitrov, the protégé of the Kremlin, who had been guiding the underground activities of the Bulgarian Communists from strategic points in Europe, achieved the stature of a martyr in 1933, in connection with the famous Reichstag fire trial. The Kremlin rescued him from Hitler's prison; Stalin conferred Soviet citizenship on him, and he was elevated to the innermost circles of Communists in Moscow.

Kolarov, who was also granted Soviet citizenship, was elected to the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party. Kostov, the most dynamic of the



Dimitrov while in Moscow exile (1934-1945) was often shown with Soviet notables Stalin, Voroshilov, and Molotov (in front). Kolarov (right) was another expatriate.

trio, was in and out of Bulgarian prisons during the 1930's and was serving another sentence when he was released during the Fatherland Front *coup* of September 9, 1944.

The Fatherland Front, created principally through the efforts of Georgi Dimitrov, came into being in July 1942, as a coalition of the Workers' (Communist) Party, the left-wing Agrarians, the Socialists, and the *Zveno*. Unlike other "united fronts" of Eastern Europe, it was an underground "government" that functioned during the war on its native soil and came into the open when Soviet forces crossed the Bulgarian frontier in the autumn of 1944.

The *Zveno* (Link) organization first emerged as a definite political group in 1928. It was

an anti-monarchist club of aristocrats, intelligentsia, and businessmen, who cooperated with a similar element of the Army through the "Officers (or Military) League." The social and political philosophy of the *Zveno* members resembled the later *Fascismo* of Musso-Fascist in foreign policy.

Later the *Zveno* adopted a pro-Russian foreign policy and therefore proved useful to the Kremlin. One of the *Zveno* founders was Kimon Georgiev who in 1923 had joined Tsankov in suppressing the Agrarians and Communists alike. When King Boris ousted Georgiev in 1935, the victim of the King's displeasure retired to obscurity, biding his time. He was prepared to welcome the Russians when they came.

The Social Democratic Party, led by Grigor Cheshmedjiev,

had a less substantial following than in other European countries, but the Communist Party needed its close cooperation in order to win trade union support. The three conservative parties tolerated by the pro-Nazi regime—Democratic, Popular, and Radical—lost what influence they possessed after Bulgaria's defeat.

One of the strongest cards held by the Kremlin *vis-à-vis* Bulgaria was their historic racial tie. In May 1943, the Kremlin sponsored a Slav Congress in Moscow, presided over by its favored adopted son, Georgi Dimitrov. Appropriate expressions of encouragement for pan-Slavism were uttered by Stalin and other Soviet leaders. This was an early move by the Kremlin to con-

Kostov leads applause as a Soviet General addresses a crowd. Later he was a scapegoat of his own party.



solidate its hold on the Slavic nations well in advance of their "liberation" by the Slavic Fatherland.

At the end of August 1944, as the German armies reeled before the blows from East and West, the government of Premier Bagrianov was succeeded by that of Moraviev, a right-wing agrarian whose associates had opposed Bulgaria's pro-German policies. Premier Moraviev's Government, seeing that Bulgarian neutrality was not feasible, declared war on Germany on September 6. The proclamation, however, was not published on that date for, according to reliable accounts, Communists in the War Ministry persuaded the Premier to withhold the announcement until September 8.

On that date, the Soviet Government declared war on Bulgaria—there had been no previous declaration of war between the two countries—and thus, for a brief moment Bulgaria was at war with both Germany and the USSR!

This seeming anomaly made sense to the Kremlin: it provided an excuse for Soviet troops to enter Bulgaria and to remain there in strength un-

til a Communist regime was firmly in the saddle. An armistice concluded in Moscow followed the two-day "war" but large Soviet forces, which had crossed the frontier on September 9, were maintained in Bulgaria for more than two years —at the country's expense.

As Soviet troops poured across the Bulgarian frontier, the Fatherland Front, supported by the Military League, staged a *coup* by arresting Muraviev's Government and taking control of all governmental and local facilities through its FF committees, which corresponded to the "national committees" of other border states.

At this stage the Zveno group held a strategic position. The FF controlled the underground and hence the national committees, but the Zveno, led by Kimon Georgiev, was allied with General Veltchev, head of the Military League, who had an influential following in the regular army.

On October 1 Georgiev converted the Zveno into a Kremlin tool officially called the National Union Zveno, of which he became chairman. As the first Premier of the FF provisional

government, he was of special service to the Communists, since he gave a middle-class front to a revolutionary movement, the real nature of which was obscured for the time being.

General Veltchev became the first Minister of War in the Georgiev cabinet, and Anton Yugov, appointed Major General on September 9, headed the Ministry of Interior. His aide was Dimo Dichev, chief of the newly constituted "State Security Police." Yugov and Dichev, as was the case with other Communist officials holding such posts in Eastern Europe, proceeded to inaugurate a reign of terror equaling in violence those of neighboring Kremlin - sponsored regimes. These disciples of Lavrenti Beria were materially aided

Terrorist Dragoitcheva (right) is pleased as also future Premier Chervenkov.



in this work by Tsola Dragoitcheva, a professional revolutionist whose efforts to exterminate non-Communists were matched only by Ana Pauker's in Rumania.

Dragoitcheva's activities as Yugov's adviser in the "war trials" of 1945 led to death sentences for more than 2,000 and long-term sentences for over 6,000 alleged "fascists" and "collaborators." Only a small part of the 11,000 defend-



Terror stalks Sofia streets as alleged "traitors" are rounded up by Red police.

ants in these trials fell into the category of "war criminals" as defined by the United Nations. Among the victims was Dimiter Gichev, a leader of the right-wing Agrarians.

Nikola Petkov, Doctor Dimitrov's second in command of the Agrarian Union or Pladne, had remained in Bulgaria aft-

er the arrest and escape of Dimitrov early in 1941. Petkov was sent to a concentration camp in March of that year, but on his release three months later, he continued his organizational activities and when the FF was established, brought in his Agrarians as a supporting element. At the outset he favored cooperation with the Bulgarian Communists and, like most Bulgarians, was sympathetic toward the Soviet Union.

After the September *coup*, Petkov was a member of the armistice delegation that was sent to Moscow. There he lost some of his illusions regarding the masters of the Kremlin, but continued to believe that sincere cooperation with Moscow was the only feasible course. He brought back discouraging news to Doctor Dimitrov, who had returned to Sofia on September 23: the Kremlin insisted on the elimination of Dimitrov as secretary-general of the left-wing Agrarians (Pladne).

In December the Pladne received a virtual ultimatum on this question, and Doctor Dimitrov was finally convinced that the only alternative to his

resignation as secretary-general of the party would be its suppression by Soviet authorities. On January 21, 1945, Doctor Dimitrov bowed to superior pressure and withdrew in favor of his friend Petkov.

The FF coalition was beginning to show signs of cracking from the presence of the Agrarians and moderate Social Democrats. The "war trials" held between January and May 1945 were designed in part to correct this situation. In addition to the widespread liquidation of non-Communists, they served as a warning to other parties to fall into step with the Communists.

The first intimation of what was in store for the Social Democrats came during a conflict with the Communists over a relatively minor issue—the proposed merging of two cooperatives. The cooperative known as *Napred* (Progress) was controlled by the Social Democrats; that of *Trud* (Labor) by the Communists. *Napred* was by all odds the larger and stronger of the two. Yielding to Communist insistence, the Social Democrats finally agreed to the merger only to discover, after the reorganization, that

the *Trud* clique had a majority on the executive board of the combined organization.


During this period the Agrarian party came under heavy pressure from the Communists. Communist deputies in Parliament presented ever stronger demands aimed at weakening the Agrarian representation; Nikola Petkov was urged to dismiss the central committee of Pladne and replace its members by Communists. Petkov's attitude toward his former political allies stiffened and he refused all these demands.

Unable to sway Petkov, the Reds on May 8 engineered a coup: they convoked a "special meeting" of Pladne attended by Communists masquerading as Agrarians. The party's legitimate central committee was dismissed and a new one nominated. When Petkov was invited to join the fraudulently elected committee, he bluntly refused. Thereafter, he was marked as a target by his opponents, although the Communists were in no hurry to dispose entirely of such a popular figure. To further maim the Agrarians, Minister of Interior Yugov ruled that Pladne's

headquarters, publications, and other property be transferred to the counterfeit "Agrarian Union," thus depriving Petkov of all his party's facilities.

Meanwhile, Doctor Dimitrov, who had been under house arrest since April 23, was secretly informed that the Communists were preparing to bring him to trial and extract a "confession" that would implicate leading members of Pladne. Escaping from his confinement, he sought refuge in the American Embassy which for the next three months was practically besieged by militiamen.

On June 6, the Government published an election law designed to govern electoral procedures in the general elections set for August. This decree, prepared by Yugov's Ministry, not only assured victory in advance for the Fatherland Front through the single-slate device, it placed the electoral machinery in the hands of Yugov's 120,000 "militiamen," made up of Communists, ruffians, and ex-jailbirds. Petkov on July 26 sent a detailed memorandum to the Allied Control Commission, stating his objections to the new law and urging postpone-



At the Congress of the Fatherland Front Red boss Dimitrov is acclaimed.

ment of the elections.

The memorandum was signed by two other leading members of Pladne. All three were immediately branded "traitors" and "enemies of the people" by the Communist press and party spokesmen.

The U. S. Department of State on August 12 sent identical notes to the Regency Council, Premier Georgiev and all party leaders, stating that the United States Government would not recognize the Bulgarian Government or sign a peace treaty until "free exercise of political rights was sufficiently guaranteed." On August 20 the British Foreign Office followed with a statement that it was in agreement with the American position.

The counter-moves of the Kremlin were characteristic: Premier Georgiev denounced the American stand as "interference in Bulgarian domestic

affairs"; the Soviet Government accorded full recognition to the FF as the Government of Bulgaria; and Stalin graciously released Georgi Dimitrov from Soviet citizenship so that he could take part in the coming elections in the country from which he had been absent for eleven years.

However, the Western protests for the moment seemed to have a salutary effect. The date of the elections was advanced to November 18. There was a brief respite for the Opposition from police persecution and several hundred political prisoners were granted amnesty. Nikola Petkov was even allowed to reopen his political headquarters and resume publication of the party organ. Doctor Dimitrov was able to find refuge abroad through the aid of the U. S. political adviser to the Allied Control Commission.

The truce lasted for less than two months.

In July, Petkov and four Opposition Ministers resigned their portfolios over the growing totalitarianism of the regime, and in September they announced the terms for the participation of their followers

in the coming elections: these included revision of the electoral law and an end to the dictatorial methods of the FF. When the FF, "purified" of the opposition parties, rejected these terms, Petkov and his associates urged all their party followers to boycott the elections.

The boycott was maintained up to election day, amid a campaign of unbridled terrorism directed from Moscow by Georgi Dimitrov, who returned to Bulgaria a few days before the voting to supervise the last-minute details. The electoral technique followed the electoral law precisely; the outcome would have been little different even if the Opposition had taken part—the FF Government was given a "popular mandate" by 86 per cent of the registered votes, according to the Government's bland announcement.

The sovietization of Bulgaria was under way, but the FF proceeded with a certain amount of caution, for its Government had not yet been recognized by the Western powers. The refusal of the Opposition to participate in the elections left the Georgiev regime

in an awkward position.

On December 26, the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, considering the political impasse in both Rumania and Bulgaria, recommended that the FF Government include two members of the Opposition. When the FF received this advice, it agreed to the Ministers' recommendation with the proviso that the additional Ministers accept the FF program. As a concession, the FF assured the opposition parties of inclusion in the single-slate ballot of future elections!

On being informed of the FF proposal and the conditions attached to it, Petkov remained obdurate. He repeated his party's previous demands for a non-authoritarian government, freedom of the press and other means of communication, and formation of an Army responsible to the Bulgarian people and not to the Communist-dominated Government.

Stalin himself, recognizing the seriousness of the situation, ordered Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky to proceed from Bucharest to Sofia for a personal interview




Vishinsky came with an ultimatum.

with Petkov, to transmit the Kremlin's ultimatum to the Opposition.

The meeting, which took place early in January 1946, was attended by Vishinsky, Petkov for the Agrarians, Socialist Kosta Lulchev, and Independent Stoyanov, the last three representing the Opposition. Toward the end of the interview, when Vishinsky gruffly ordered Petkov to see that two members of the Opposition entered the Government, Petkov replied that he was "not in the habit of receiving orders from any foreign officials," and added: "I get orders from my people and my organization."

"I have seen many like you," Vishinsky growled, "just as stubborn and as arrogant. But you can't fight against the Soviet Union."

Petkov replied: "We are fighting, Mr. Vishinsky, for



Veteran Socialist Lulchev said "no."

our ideas and to defend the rights of our people. This is our trust and no one is in a position to make us deviate from it."

Vishinsky retorted: "You are too insignificant for that, and history will only pass you by."

History, on the contrary, has not passed Nikola Petkov by.

Rebuffed by the Opposition, Vishinsky left Sofia on January 12.

The Communist technique of inducing the fragmentation of non-Communist parties was proceeding rapidly, however. It even extended to such minor parties as the Radicals, who split into pro- and anti-FF factions.

At the beginning of the new year the National Union Zveno, which had felt secure under the leadership of Premier Georgiev and Minister of War Veltchev, began to experience a

division in its ranks that led ultimately to its destruction. Late in the Spring, during the Zveno Party Conference, the pro-Kremlin faction launched a vicious attack on General Veltchev, who opposed a drastic purge of the Army officers' corps, a proposal of his rival, Major General Anton Yugov, Minister of Interior. The purge took place in the summer and was accompanied by a reorganization of the Bulgarian Army along the lines of the Red Army. General Veltchev was placed on inactive status, resigned his Ministry in September and accepted the post of Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland—a position that kept him away from the scene of the coming elections, scheduled for October 27.

During the summer of 1946 the monarchy was abolished by a popular referendum. The Regency Council was dissolved and a "Bulgarian People's Republic" was proclaimed, subject to establishment after the elections. In the meantime the country was governed by a parliamentary committee headed by Vasil Kolarov. Thus a Soviet-type government was inaugurated by a political ma-

neuver that had shown its effectiveness in Poland—a referendum, in which the electoral machinery was wholly in the hands of Communists.

In preparation for the October elections, the FF and Yugov's political police resorted to the usual but more pronounced terrorism against the Opposition. Pladne meetings were broken up by gangs of thugs; some 50 Pladne candidates were arrested and 24 members of the party were assassinated. In a quarter of the constituencies—areas in which Pladne strength was greatest—that party was denied permission to submit candidates.

Despite fraud and violence, the election results, as announced by the Government, were less spectacular than might have been expected. The Communists were credited with 53 per cent of the total vote, but the Opposition secured 101 seats in the National Assembly, as against 364 for the FF coalition. Outnumbered more than three to one, the Opposition bloc nevertheless remained a stubborn and vocal minority.

Georgi Dimitrov became Premier and Kimon Georgiev

Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister. The Grand National Assembly or *Sobranie* immediately set to work on a new constitution modeled on that of the USSR.

Protesting the results of the elections, claimed by the Government, the Opposition stated: "What has taken place was not an election, but a war between the police and the people. The elections were without any question fraudulent." And when the Assembly convened on November 8, Opposition deputies shouted: "Long live victory! Down with the dictatorship!"

One of the pre-election victims of Yugov's police was Petar Koev, an aide of Petkov. He was arrested in August and underwent brutal beatings at the hands of the security police. Elected to the Sobranie, he was released on a claim of

Premier Dimitrov reaped a Red harvest when the opposition was liquidated.



parliamentary immunity, but was re-arrested in January 1947. This was preliminary to the assault by the FF on its principal target—Nikola Petkov.

On January 30, Premier Dimitrov denounced Petkov as a "foreign agent" and shouted that "Koev must be hanged!" This was a plain intimation of what was in store for the Pladne leader.

While a "confession" by Koev involving Pladne was being methodically prepared by Yugov's inquisitors, the Opposition led by Petkov continued to challenge the FF majority. During the April session there were physical encounters between Government and Opposition deputies on the floor of the chamber. Petkov did not cease to thunder his denunciations of the program and methods of the regime.

On June 5, 1947, Nikola Petkov was deprived of his parliamentary immunity and arrested on the basis of the contents of the Koev "confession." The charge against Petkov read in the Assembly by Kolarov—"conspiring to overthrow the regime by force"—linked him with the "Military Alliance"

and other alleged conspiratorial groups.

At the end of the lengthy arraignment Petkov voiced his simple *credo*: "In the struggle for freedom and democracy our family lost my father and my mother . . . I know my fate will be the same. However, I want this death because through it freedom for the Bulgarian people will sooner triumph." And as he left the rostrum he pronounced the solemn invocation—"Long live freedom!"

Petkov was convicted on August 16 of conspiracy against the state, economic sabotage, espionage for "Western capitalists" and other crimes. Sentenced to death, his last words to the Court were: "I will die but Bulgaria will be free."

On September 23, Nikola Petkov was hanged in the Sofia prison amid a general outcry from all parts of the free world. The night before his execution he refused to appeal for mercy in the guise of "confessing" to the truth of the indictment.

The U. S. Department of State, on June 11, August 18, 23, and 26, and September 3, delivered a series of emphatic notes and representations to

the Soviet member of the Allied Control Commission and the Soviet Foreign Minister in Moscow, urging a review of the Petkov case. The British Government was equally emphatic in this connection. To these vigorous remonstrances the Kremlin replied that any "intervention" on behalf of Petkov would be a "violation of Bulgaria's national sovereignty"—a stock argument of Moscow in all such instances.

The so-called "Dimitrov Constitution," adopted by the National Assembly on December 4, 1947, paved the way for the erection of a fullblown, totalitarian police state. The Iron Curtain fell swiftly on the last remnants of democracy in Bulgaria. Pladne was outlawed and its members forbidden to take part in politics.

Lulchev's Socialist Party

was destroyed after its leader announced his opposition to the government in January 1948. Kosta Lulchev was brought to trial in November and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment which at his advanced age meant a death sentence. The pro-Kremlin Socialists had already merged with the Communist Party. By the summer of 1948 all other parties were reduced to impotence and their complete annihilation came early in 1949, when the Zveno and Radical parties "voluntarily" merged with the FF and thereafter disappeared.

At this time, too, the liquidation of religious independence was being completed. Fifteen Protestant churchmen, charged with espionage for the Western powers, were tried in February 1949 and in March they were sentenced, four to life

Petkov led the Opposition in defying the majority of the Kremlin-ruled Parliament.



imprisonment and the rest to terms ranging from five to fifteen years.

In the same month, too, the first of the intra-party purges took place, involving no less a personage than Traicho Kostov, veteran revolutionist and hero of the partisan resistance. One of the most ruthless of the inner clique of Communists, Kostov once declared: "Any hand raised against the Fatherland Front will be cut off without mercy!" Now, Kostov, like Laszlo Rajk of Hungary, underwent the same process of liquidation he had inflicted on countless others. On December 14, he was found guilty of "plotting with foreign spies" and sentenced to death. Ten co-defendants received long sentences.

In the general elections of December 18, 1949, the FF re-

ceived 97.66 per cent of the total vote, a typical result in "people's democracies."

Georgi Dimitrov did not long survive to enjoy the fruits of his labors for the Kremlin. In April 1949, he had been granted sick leave and went to the Soviet Union for treatment. He died there in July. The Georgi Dimitrov Mausoleum in Sofia is an impressive structure. The grave of Nikola Petkov is neglected and obscure, but his words before the Court that tried him are not forgotten.

"This is a struggle for the liberty and the very existence of the Bulgarian people. And if I die in this struggle, thousands of others will continue it."

Bulgaria's toiling workers still whisper Nikola Petkov's name reverently.

A martyr in the cause of freedom, Nikola Petkov is not forgotten by the free world.





HARVEST OF SATELLITES

The steps by which the countries of Eastern Europe were sovietized were similar but not identical: nor did they follow the same sequence everywhere. They had one basic feature in common, however: in every instance the drive to communize the border states was led by a group of expatriates in Moscow who worked closely with, or under the direct supervision of, the Kremlin.

Some of these Communists in exile had long enjoyed Soviet citizenship; a few were high in the inner councils of the Kremlin. In 1944-45 they formed the nuclei of provisional governments that acquired authority through the pres-

ence of the Red Army. In some instances the Communist "hard core" was concealed by the "United Front" of a political coalition; nevertheless, the core membership had already begun to instill its poison in the political body of each nation before and during the emergence of governments-in-being.

If the record of the war years is scrutinized, it becomes apparent that the various assurances regarding "national sovereignty and independence," given to the peoples of Eastern Europe by Stalin and his deputies, were intended merely to smooth the road to the planned sovietization of these states.

The Agreements of the Kremlin with its Western allies concluded at Yalta, Potsdam, and the Moscow Conference, were designed mainly to disarm Western diplomacy and neutralize world opinion. These pacts, personally endorsed by Stalin or his Foreign Minister, were violated by the Kremlin and its puppets as soon as they were signed; their letter and spirit had been violated before they were approved by Moscow and even while the signatories were in session.

A résumé of the stages in the Kremlin's aggression against democracy begins properly in 1942 when Stalin assured the Eastern Europeans of his Government's "clear and noble" aim in assisting the peoples subjected to Hitlerism and then "setting them free to rule in their own lands as they desire." This year and the following one marked the initial stage of organization by the Moscow expatriates, looking toward the eventual domination of their native countries by a foreign power, the Soviet Union.

While the war was at its turning point, Communists became an active element of the underground in every country, as co-partners with other groups in a dangerous enterprise. Already, however, they were planning to use the Resistance as a springboard to future political power. In general, at the end of the war, Communist members of the Resistance furnished battle-toughened units that appeared in every community and served to cow unarmed civilians in "liberated" areas.

As the war approached a climax, the Kremlin seized

upon another device for insuring control over embryonic regimes—the National Committees, an idea borrowed from President Benes' national pro-



Stalin's picture flanked (left to right) by Benes, Wasilewska, Dimitrov and Tito. Red portraits change with time.

gram. The National Committees were the framework for the sovietized structure which the Kremlin proposed to erect along the borders of the USSR.

From the National Committees, through their choice of deputies, came in part the provisional national assemblies; but it is to be noted that at this stage great differences existed in the status of the first civilian authorities functioning in liberated areas.

While the *de facto* premiership of the new governments

was important, certain key ministries were of far greater importance to the Communists. First came the Ministry of Interior — in Poland the key post was the Ministry of Public Security—controlling the political or security police, and in some instances a “workers’ militia.” Other ministries had significance if they contributed to Communist ascendancy in a particular field: Agriculture, for the distribution of expropriated lands; Justice, for the sovietization of the Judiciary; Information (an important post during the *coup* in Czechoslovakia) and so forth.


In the beginning, the Communists were content to hold a few portfolios in the early cabinets, but these posts were of primary importance. They were also likely to remain in the background during the initial phase of the “United

Front” coalition government.

The United Front usually contained every political element except conservatives and vestigial minor parties. In fact, the period of Nazism, followed by war and Red Army incursions, had so weakened the upper middle class, business people, and industrialists, that no substantial conservative party emerged in Eastern Europe. Too, many conservative political and industrial figures were compromised by the taint of Fascism and collaborationism. Further, in the first onrush of the Red forces across frontiers, Soviet authorities made sure of liquidating as many as possible of the surviving members of the middle class who might be expected to oppose leftist programs.

The United Front issued strong appeals to this spirit of nationalism and anti-Fascist

Mass displays and organized parades are major propaganda elements in Red regimes.



sentiments, thus serving to cement diverse elements. The Communists were in the forefront of this "patriotic" movement, which they soon turned to their own advantage. The "nationalism" of 1944-45 was dead and safely buried in the pan-Kremlinism of the late 1940's, even its vestige in national Communism serving as grist for the intra-party purges of the last few years.

"In revolutionary tactics under a bourgeois regime," Stalin wrote in *Foundations of Leninism*, "reform naturally becomes an instrument for disintegrating this regime, an instrument for strengthening revolution."

Following this precept, the Communists seized upon all reform movements in Eastern Europe, especially land reform, and claimed them as their own. Land reform, the

Pauker was still in favor in this parade.



long-time program of the Agrarians, was taken over by the Communists and for the most part carried out by local committees dominated by Communists. It is a measure of the Kremlin's control of the puppet governments that early in 1948 Soviet Deputy Minister of Agriculture Konstantinovski could demand the start of a collectivization campaign in the "new democracies." Thus land reform, as adopted by the Communists, hastened the communization of the border states.

Because of the unnatural alliance in the United Fronts of peasant parties with Communists, internal divisions soon appeared.

Throughout the greater part of Eastern Europe the Agrarians formed a major political element. In industrial Czechoslovakia, however, their influence was equaled by that of the Social Democrats, and in Rumania they found allies in the Liberals. The Social Democrats, including the Socialists who were traditionally associated with International Socialism in the West, were stronger in urban and industrial areas. Their influence was slight in



Political trials, such as that of Archbishop Grosz (left) also involved foreign nationals, American Robert Vogeler and British Edgar Sanders, shown at right.

agricultural Bulgaria.

There were only these two outstanding political movements in postwar Eastern Europe—the Peasant or Agrarian parties and the Socialists or Social Democrats. After assessing the potential weight of their competitors, the Communists applied an appropriate strategy in each case.

With the Social Democrats, who tended to believe that they could “do business with Stalin,” the Communists came to terms, in order to share the popular following enjoyed by their party, particularly in the trade unions. In time, however, the Social Democrats developed fissions between the majority that cherished its independence and the minority faction adhering to Moscow. The Communists thereupon set out to weaken and finally extirpate the moderate Socialists.

At the end they absorbed the leftists through “mergers.”

The trade unions, traditional strongholds of the Social Democrats, were taken over by the Communists through the device of centralizing all the country’s unions, including white-collar workers and technicians, and then gaining control of the executive committee of the nationwide union.

In the case of the peasant organizations this process was less successful. The farmers’ cooperatives were infiltrated by Reds but their absorption in the Communist apparatus for the most part was not effected until the state machinery itself was sovietized.

Attempts by Communists to set up rival peasant parties with the same names as the historical parties won them relatively few adherents. However, Communist activities in

land reform did have some effect in securing the temporary support of poor peasants and landless people. When these were forced into collectives, the results were less satisfactory from the viewpoint of agricultural production.

Minor political parties were destroyed outright or disintegrated piecemeal. The anomalous Zveno party of Bulgaria outlasted most of the others, but it too was ingested by the Communist Party.

The political maneuvers of the Communists were accompanied everywhere by persistent and widespread terrorism, purges, and liquidation of opponents. These persecutions often took the form of trials conducted by the "people's courts" or military tribunals, and were based on alleged discoveries by various Ministries of Interior of "plots," "conspiracies," and "terrorist activities" against the state or the Soviet authorities.


The nature of these trials is too well known for comment. One type, however, deserves special mention. This was the apprehension of a secondary figure whose subsequent "confession" would involve the pri-



Communist imperialism employs tools such as Groza to achieve its ends.

mary target. In Hungary, for example, the Kovacs "confession" was aimed at Ferenc Nagy; in Bulgaria, that of Koev was used against Nikola Petkov. The same device was later employed in the unending series of political trials that began in the late 1940's and involved churchmen, surviving members of former opposition parties, American and other nationals, and even Communist leaders.

In conjunction with the subversive mechanism perfected by the Communists, the use of mass demonstrations for political objectives was one of the most effective. Again and again, large numbers of Communists and fellow-travelers were mobilized at critical moments and at "decisive" points, to give the illusion of great popular movements. These might in some instances be orderly meetings, or, more



Stalin was the arch-conspirator but the theory and strategy came from Lenin.

often, provocative, to the point of revolutionary violence like that which toppled the Benes Government. Thus aggressive, well-disciplined minorities were able to overcome the disunited opposition of the majority.

Throughout all of Eastern Europe, during the period when the Kremlin was undermining and extinguishing democratic processes, carrying on "a war between the police and the people," and victimizing opposition leaders, its operations were conducted be-


hind a fog of propaganda that partially concealed their true significance. At the same time, evasive and misleading pronouncements came from the Kremlin whenever the Western powers voiced objections and protests.


Of the democratic leaders in Eastern Europe — Agrarians, Social Democrats, and Liberals — who believed that they could safely "do business with Stalin," all are dead, in prison, or in exile.

The last words of Nikola Petkov, Bulgarian patriot, were prophetic:

"Today, this is a struggle which is waged within our country; however, the day is very close when it will be carried on outside our country."

Today, the struggle is on a worldwide scale.





100 - 3-99 - 1791



SAC, Detroit (66-3360)

April 14, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) 1792

RECORDED-19 EX - 107

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet dated April 2, 1954, setting forth
the status of this program in your office.

It is noted that you indicate authority has
been received under this program to interview [redacted]
[redacted] The Bureau files do not
reflect authority to interview these individuals has
been granted under the Toplev Program.


Authority has been furnished by the Bureau
to interview [redacted]

You should continue to follow this program
closely and accelerate your efforts in order that it
may be concluded as soon as possible.

b6
b7C
b7D

JDD:DE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Trotter _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____



58 APR 19 1954

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-3-99)(REGISTERED)(AMSD) DATE: April 2, 1954

FROM: SAC, Detroit (66-3360)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - TOLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - CCONFIDENTIAL

Rebulets dated April 7, 1953, April 17, 1953 and mylet dated March 3, 1954.

1. Toplev Subjects being investigated preparatory to requesting Bureau authority to interview:

2. Authority received but not interviewed:

b6
b7C
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3. Contemplated interviewing:

Letter to the Director

Re: CP, USA-TOPLEV
IS - C



b6
b7C
b7D

4. Total number of Subjects to be contacted:

Approximately 28.

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

April 2, 1954

SAC, SAN FRANCISCO [redacted]

CP, USA TOPLEV
IS-C

b7D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] was.

ATTN: Asst. Director A. H. BELMONT

IS-C

TM
Remylet dated 12/16/53 and 11/10/53.

b7D

This office has been attempting to develop a source on
the captioned subject in view of her position on the [redacted]
[redacted] CP. Efforts to date have been un-
successful, but are continuing.

In view of the above this office is withdrawing its
request to interview the subject under the TOPLEV program. If in the
future the development of a source does not materialize this office
will resubmit its request to interview the subject.

ET:alp
REGISTERED

100-3-99-1
NOT RECORDED
158 APR 16 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL
RJ

58 APR 21 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99)

DATE: 4/2/54

FROM : *[Signature]* SAC, NEWARK SAC SUBJECT: *[Signature]* COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
~~TOPLEV~~
IS-C~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7D

ReBulet 4/7/53.

Status of program at Newark is as follows:

1. Under investigation to request Bureau authority:
-

2. Bureau authority received to contact or recontact:
-

3. Authority requested to recontact:
-

4. Under consideration for future interview:
-
- None.

REGISTERED MAIL

EGB:AM

RECORDED-45

100-371-1793

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APR 1 1954

V
T

[REDACTED]
EGB:bar/am

FBI, NEWARK

4/1/54

AIRTEL

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DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTENTION: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A. H. BELMONT)
CI, USA, TOPL W; IS-C; [REDACTED] SRI - C. INTERMILITARY
ADVISED 3/31/54 THAT HE HAD CONTACTED SUBJECT ON 3/30/54.
SUBJECT EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL ALMIRATION AND CONFIDENCE IN
THE INTERMEDIARY AND ASKED FOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO THINK IT OVER
UNTIL THE EVENING OF 3/31/54, AT WHICH TIME HE WOULD BE
RECONTACTED BY THE INTERMEDIARY. THE SUBJECT APPEARED TO BE
IMBRESSED AND GAVE INDICATION THAT HE MAY COOPERATE. BUREAU
WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

HOTSPOTTER

END

CC: [REDACTED]

357

✓
NOT RECORDED
12 APR 5 1954

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

SAC, New York [redacted]

April 6, 1954

RECORDED - 90 /M- 3-99-1794

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

EX-10A

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

100-3-99

Reurlet dated March 31, 1954.


Authority is granted to contact [redacted]
whenever feasible away from residence and place of
employment.

In conducting this interview you should be
guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to
interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it
is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days,
the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the
contact has not been made and when you anticipate
conducting the interview.

JDD:DE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____



354
58 APR 18 1954

UNRECORDED COPY HELD IN
FILE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

JK
JW
TO : Director, FBI (100-3-99)
ATTN: Asst. Dir. A. H. BELMONT
FROM : SAC, New York
SUBJECT: CP, USA - TOPLEV-
IS - C

DATE: 3/31/54
PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Nichols
Mr. Tolson
Mr. Clegg
Mr. E. M.
Mr. Tamm
Mr. W. J. Crowley
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

b7D

[redacted] was
SM - C

The above named individual is being considered for interview under the Toplev Program.

The following is noted concerning his background and Communist activities:

BACKGROUND

Subject was born [redacted]
He entered the US [redacted] He
was naturalized as an American citizen on [redacted]

b7D

Early employment records of the subject in the US indicate that prior to coming to the US, he had five years of education in [redacted] and attended night school in the US for four years.

Subject resides with his wife, [redacted]
[redacted] NY and, according to information furnished by [redacted]
subject and his wife are among the [redacted] Communists in the [redacted] in NY. Subject was previously [redacted]
[redacted] which organization informants advised was organized under orders of the Cominform.

At the present time, subject is reportedly employed as an [redacted] at an unknown location in his home community, [redacted] NY and continues to reside at [redacted] NY. Current information concerning his activities is received regularly from [redacted]

b7D

Communist Activities

In 1944 subject was identified as [redacted] the IWO. During that year he was a member of the [redacted] the CP, USA, and while in [redacted] was in frequent contact with prominent CP functionaries.

RM

RECORDED - 90

1- [redacted] (TOPLEV)

APR 1954

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JAC:BAC

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Letter to Director, FBI

In 1949 subject was reported to have been instrumental in [redacted] known as [redacted] located in NYC.

with respect to [redacted], it is noted that [redacted]

[redacted] The informant reported that, according to reliable information, similar organizations were to be set up throughout the US. The informant said that he was told by [redacted] the Cominform.

b7D

During his association with [redacted] subject was also reportedly [redacted]

During the years 1946 through 1950, information was frequently received establishing the fact that the subject was active in the [redacted] the CP.

Subject applied for passport in 1935 at which time he stated he wished to travel to [redacted] to visit his mother and also wished to visit England and France. The passport was issued to him on [redacted]

Passport number [redacted] was issued to subject on [redacted] A refusal notice in the passport file dated [redacted] reflected that the records of [redacted] showed that the subject's transportation was charged to the account of the CP, [redacted] account.

b7D

By report dated 2/26/52, [redacted] gave detailed information concerning the subject. The informant said that the subject has been steadily supported by the CP and for more than 15 years has been known in the [redacted] in NY as a [redacted] Communist [redacted] The informant said that the subject enjoys [redacted] among Communists from the vicinity of the [redacted] home. The informant has reported that as an old Communist, subject knows well the political, technical and propaganda work of the American Communist Party. He describes subject as intelligent, aggressive, a good organizer, good speaker and a "really true type of Communist conspirator."

Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted]
On [redacted] was a visitor at the
subject's home in [redacted]

b7D

On [redacted] was held and the subject was
among those present.

Approach

If Bureau authority is granted for an interview of subject, it is contemplated that the interview will take place on the street when the subject is alone and a secure distance from his residence or place of employment. A Bureau car would be kept available nearby so that the interview could be continued in privacy if the subject showed a willingness to be cooperative with the agents.

Bureau authority is requested for such an interview to take place during the week of April 12, 1954, circumstances permitting.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

JK from

TO : Director, FBI (100-3-99)
 ATTN: Asst. Dir. A.H. BELMONT

FROM : Sac, New York

SUBJECT: CP, USA - TOPLEV
 IS - C

DATE: 3/31/54
PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

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 b7D

[redacted] was
 IS - R & GR

The above named individual who is [redacted] is being considered for interview under the Toplev program.

The following is known concerning his background and Communist activities:

Background

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Subject was born [redacted]. His parents were natives of [redacted]. According to records of INS, subject last entered the US on [redacted]. The records of the Passport Division of the State Dept. reflect that subject was issued a passport on [redacted] by the American Consulate in [redacted] for his return to the US. In his application for the passport, subject stated that he was born [redacted] in [redacted]. He thereafter went to [redacted] until [redacted]. He noted that his father had died in [redacted] his mother having previously died in [redacted].

In an affidavit executed in [redacted] to explain his protected foreign residence, the subject stated he had been brought to [redacted] by his father after the death of his mother and that when he finished high school, he asked his father to send him back to the US, but his father refused to do so. Subject further stated that when he entered the [redacted] he applied for a passport which was issued in his behalf. However, with the outbreak of war, the [redacted] government did not permit him to leave.

The subject explained that the purpose of his returning to the US was for "repatriation and to join the United States Army."

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RM

1- [redacted] (TOPLEV)

RECORDED - 90

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APR 1 1954
 23

JAC:BAC

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Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nease
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Hart
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tamm
Mr. V. Gandy
Mr. Tamm
Mr. L. Johnson
Miss Gandy

b7D

Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted]
The subject currently resides at [redacted],
NY, NY and is employed as [redacted]
[redacted], which maintains its offices at [redacted]
NY, NY.

Communist Activities

Available information reflects that subject has
been active in [redacted] Communist affairs in NYC since
1947 and is currently [redacted],
which [redacted] has been described by reliable informants
as a [redacted] which is the center of [redacted]
Communist activities in the US.

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b7D

According to a reliable confidential informant, in
November of 1948 subject was a member of the [redacted]
[redacted] of the CP, USA.

On 11/21/47 subject attended a rally sponsored by
the [redacted], an organization
designated by the Attorney General of the United States
as a Communist organization.

On [redacted] a rally sponsored
by the [redacted] of the two. The rally was
in celebration of the [redacted]
[redacted]

On [redacted] subject attended a meeting along with other
[redacted] Communists which meeting was for the [redacted]
[redacted] a CP member under [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

In April, 1950, GUS HALL, on behalf of the National
Committee of the CP, USA, extended greetings to the [redacted]
[redacted] for its efforts in rallying the [redacted]
community to united struggle for peace and national freedom."

In May, 1950, subject [redacted]
[redacted] CP, USA, to send greetings
to the National liberation coalition of the Cyprus Congress.

b7D

Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted]

On 2/23/51, subject was in attendance at a birthday party held in honor of WILLIAM Z. FOSTER, Chairman of the CP USA.

According to a reliable confidential informant [redacted] invitations to the party were sent by the [redacted] Office of the CP. There were approximately 60 persons in attendance and [redacted]

[redacted] the background history of WILLIAM Z. FOSTER. [redacted] FOSTER as a "hero" and as "father of the Party". He announced that the CP had received hundreds of telegrams and letters from all over the world paying tribute to FOSTER. An informant present at the party recalled that [redacted] "Brother Communists" and very frequently [redacted] said "We Communists."

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On [redacted] under the subject's [redacted] wherein he called for the establishment of a [redacted]

[redacted]

On 2/25/53 [redacted] described a meeting held on [redacted] under the sponsorship of the [redacted] and identified the subject as among those present. Informant reported that during a conversation with the subject, subject observed that the financial status of the [redacted] was critical and said "you know we are sunk." The subject said that the employees of the [redacted] had received only half their salaries during the previous week, but a drive was being launched for additional funds and [redacted]

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On 1/8/54 [redacted] reported concerning a meeting held on [redacted] in NYC. The informant stated that the meeting was called by the [redacted] to discuss the financial status of [redacted] and methods to [redacted] According to the informant, there were approximately 25 persons present and [redacted] acted as chairman. Subject, [redacted]

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Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted]

[redacted] urged that [redacted]. He stated that the [redacted] needed more [redacted] and requested that a car be purchased for use in facilitating contacts with [redacted]

| Approach

If Bureau authority is received to contact subject, it is contemplated that an approach to him would be made on the street when he is alone and a secure distance from his residence or place of employment. A Bureau car would be kept available nearby so that the interview could be continued in privacy if the subject showed a willingness to be cooperative with the agents.

Bureau authority is requested for such an interview to take place during the week of April 12, 1954, circumstances permitting.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99)

FROM : *JFM HEN*. SAC, LOS ANGELES [redacted]

SUBJECT: CP, USA, TOPLEV b7D

IS-C

DATE: March 25, 1954

ATTENTION: Assistant Director
A. H. BELMONT~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Eberstadt
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Tracy

Rebulets April 7 and 17, 1953.

Set forth hereinafter is the information requested in referenced Bulets:

- I. Names of Toplev subjects being investigated preparatory to authority to interview.

None.

- II. Names of subjects on whom authority to interview has been received:

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b7DLOS ANGELES FILE NO. BUFILE NO.*
*

(An asterisk in front of a name indicates that this individual has been approached on at least one occasion, and Bureau authority has been granted to reinterview him.)

- III. Names of those individuals on whom this office contemplates requesting authority to interview in the near future:

--

JMC:mkm
Registered...AIRMAIL

RECORDED - 63

EX-112

K-3-11-1796

MAR 25 1954

1354

4/17/54

4/17/54

[Redacted]
b6
b7C
b7D

LOS ANGELES FILE NO. BUFILE NO.

[Redacted]

The leadership of the Los Angeles County Communist Party is continually changing and therefore the number of Toplev interview possibilities will vary from time to time. It is presently estimated that there are still in excess of one hundred individuals who might be considered for interview under the Toplev program in the Los Angeles area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-3-99)
(ATT: A.H. BELMONT)
FROM : SAC, New York [redacted] b7D
SUBJECT: CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

DATE: 3/29/54

Rebulet 4/7/53 requesting the Field to advise the Bureau by the first of each month the names of subjects being considered for interview under the Toplev Program.

Reference is made to NYlet captioned as above to the Bureau dated 2/25/54 setting out the list of names of those persons coming under the following three headings:

I. Names of Toplev subjects being investigated preparatory to requesting Bureau authority to interview - 19 names were listed.

II. Names of subjects on whom authority has been received from the Bureau, but who have not yet been contacted - 22 names were listed.

III. Names of subjects whom the NYO contemplates considering for interview in the near future - 19 names were listed.

This is to advise that because of the Lefro investigation, the six Agents assigned to the Toplev Program in this office during the month of March, were utilized full time in the investigation of Lefro. Since no contacts were made during the month of March under the Toplev Program, the NYO is utilizing the same list of names as set out in referenced letter of 2/25/54 for future interviews. This office believes that an additional 200 CP members, those in functional positions and those in underground operations of CP, USA, can be considered for interview in the future.

Every effort will be made to develop a Toplev informant under the Toplev Program in this office.

RM

SEARCHED - 78

APR 25 1954

EWB:CF

354

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99)

DATE: March 23, 1954

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO [redacted]

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

(TOPLEV)

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Rebulets dated April 7 and 17 and June 15, 1953.

The following is the status of the captioned program in
the Chicago Division.

UNDER INVESTIGATION PREPARATORY TO
REQUESTING BUREAU AUTHORITY

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BUFILE

[redacted]
AUTHORIZED INTERVIEWS NOT YET CONDUCTED

[redacted]
BUREAU AUTHORITY REQUESTED FOR INTERVIEW

[redacted]
CONTEMPLATE CONSIDERING FOR INTERVIEW

CWC:ech

[redacted]

RECORDED-57

EX. 104

100-3-99-
37 APR 8 1954

1798

52 APR 12 1954

35

JR

DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: CP, USA, TOPLEV
IS - C



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b7D

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-3-99)
FROM : SAC, Philadelphia (66-3824)
SUBJECT: OP, USA [REDACTED] TOLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

DATE: 3/31/54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTENTION: Assistant Director A. H. BELMONT

The statistics for the Toplev Program in the Philadelphia Office during March 1954, are as follows:

[REDACTED] was interviewed during March. Letters requesting authority to interview [REDACTED] were submitted and authority received from the Bureau for each. Authority has previously been granted to interview [REDACTED]. These will be the three final interviews under the Toplev Program. It is noted that the interview of [REDACTED] will be conducted on the day that [REDACTED] Philadelphia Smith Act trial.

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It is also to be noted that personnel assigned to Toplev were used as set out hereafter:

SA [REDACTED] was assigned on a special outside the Philadelphia Division all but the final six working days of March.

SA ROBERT M. GRANT was the acting Personnel Assistant in the absence of the Personnel Assistant for two weeks. He also was used as a police instructor on seven work days in March.

SA WILLIAM E. HUGHES was hospitalized for an operation and absent all but seven work days in March.

Continuous attention will be given the remaining interviews in order to conclude this Program rapidly.

WEH:cra

Registered Mail

RECORDED - 90

EX-112

APR 2 1954

1799

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]
 FROM : JFM
 SAC, LOS ANGELES [redacted]
 SUBJECT: CP, USA, TOPLEV
 IS-C
 [redacted]

DATE: 4/6/54

b7D

SM-C

As a result of the receipt of O-1 letters from the Bureau, this office has been attempting to contact captioned individual under the Toplev program. Numerous spot checks and surveillances have been conducted. However, since subject is unemployed, his movements are usually restricted to the area of his residence, when he has always been in the company of someone else.

For these reasons Agents have been unable to contact him to date. However, surveillances are being maintained and it is hoped that [redacted] will be contacted within a period of no longer than three weeks.

REG.
 VWH:VMD

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RECORDED-89

APR 12 1954

EX-112

354
15 APR 1954

RECORDED COPY FILED IN FILE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [REDACTED]

DATE: 4/5/54

FROM : SAC, NEWARK [REDACTED]
SUBJECT:

ATT: A. H. BELMONT

CP, UGA
TOPLEV
IS-C

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~[REDACTED]
IS-C

After several unsuccessful attempts to contact the subject under favorable circumstances, a fisur was established a block away from his residence on March 2, 1954, at approximately 9 a.m. SAs WIL F. DIVINE and ALAN G. BURKE observed the subject's car parked about 75 feet away from the residence on the same side of the street. At approximately 9:55, the subject came out of his house and started towards his car. The Bureau car was pulled up alongside of it and Agent BURKE stepped out as the subject ran down his window to respond to what he apparently thought was a passer-by asking for directions. The agent identified himself to the subject and explained that he wanted to tell the subject of the FBI's responsibilities in the internal security field. SA DIVINE backed up the Bureau car and parked it behind the car, a car-length away so that it was a one man interview, although the second agent could see the subject and Agent BURKE and hear part of BURKE's remarks.

The subject appeared nervous and quickly said that he had nothing to say and that he was familiar with "that side of the story." He said he heard it in school, read it in the newspapers, saw articles in magazines and programs on television. He sarcastically stated that he was certain that that was one story with which he was familiar with. The agent stated that subject might think that he understood, but would he want to explain what [REDACTED] was doing or would he be satisfied to have it explained by an executive of Westinghouse Electric Co. He quickly replied that he would like to explain in such a situation. The agent then said if he did not mind, the agent would like to speak directly for the FBI. The agent then explained in great detail the Fureau's policy concerning labor unions and the labor-management relationship, and further, to explain in considerable detail his own personal attitude toward labor unions. The subject appeared to be impressed to some extent, but complained that people were being interfered with in their jobs and family relationships because of their thoughts on political matters. The agent pointed out that every effort had been exercised to interview him under circumstances which would cause

b7D

REGISTERED MAIL

1 cc. Newark 100-26786

100-26786

NOT RECORDED

101 APR 9 1954

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APR 16 1954

him no embarrassment. He was told that investigations were conducted so as not to cause neighborhood gossip or embarrassment with fellow workers, etc. He was told that information in FBI files was not made available to employers and that agents would not do or say anything in the course of their investigations which would confirm suspicions of employers, although admittedly employers might be anxious for such information. It was explained that a person's activity in subversive organizations would only interfere with his employment if he wished to work for the Government or at work which required clearance because of its classification in connection with military or defense operations. He seemed to be noticeably impressed with this line of discussion. He readily conceded that this country and any country had the right to exclude persons from these categories if they were opposed to the Government or advocated its overthrow.

He complained that he had been discharged from the [redacted] [redacted] because of his trip to Russia and the fact that he had discussed it with "someone" too frankly. This apparently was a reference to [redacted]

[redacted] with a Navy lieutenant [redacted]

[redacted] U. S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York concerning the manner of his going to Russia and concerning his passport.

He also complained that he could not obtain employment today in shipyards, [redacted]. He said he wished to do that kind of work and earn the kind of money that was paid for such services. He indicated that he did not desire to be a [redacted] but had sought such employment out of necessity. He said he refused to do what others in the same situation had done, i.e. becoming salesmen. He complained that he and his family were suffering because of this unfair treatment. It was suggested to him that it was publicly known that he had been active and quite [redacted] the C.I., and that perhaps people were justified in concluding that he entertained views which might seem undesirable for such employment. He replied that he had never done anything which he was ashamed of and he was convinced that he had never done anything unlawful. He stated that he was certain the FBI was aware of his acts, movements and telephone conversations.

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When asked to explain the reference to telephone conversations, he said that he considered it a fair assumption that his telephone was tapped, although he readily conceded that he had no such knowledge.

In reference to his suggestion that the Government had interfered with his employment, it was pointed out that the responsibility of running the [redacted] was in the hands of the Navy and not the FBI, and that whatever action prompted his dismissal from the [redacted] there had been no interference with his employment at the [redacted] during the entire

Director, FBI

b7D

period of the war. He admitted this was true, but suggested that it was probably because the Government assumed that he would patriotically help the war effort because it benefited the Soviet Union. The agent complimented him on the energy he had expended on the [redacted]

[redacted] The subject was obviously proud of his work in this matter and pleased that it was noted.

The subject stated that if he were going to be "framed", he would docilely submit. He indicated that this had happened to some friends of his. It is believed he was referring to [redacted]. The agent carefully explained that Congress passed laws which U. S. Attorneys were required to enforce and the FBI to collect evidence when there were violations of those laws. It was explained that the nation, as any organization, including even as small a unit as a trade union local, had to have rules and regulations to avoid chaos or disorder. It was emphasized that under such an orderly system, persons were brought to trial under the fairest system known to exist and that the courts had, in the situations he was talking about, passed on the facts of the laws and that we were all obliged to obey and comply. It was emphasized that anyone had a right, perhaps a duty, to oppose the passage of certain laws or to advocate their repeal, but as long as they were laws, we could not defy them. He indicated that this was true and reasonable. He was assured that the persons referred to by him were not "framed" and that he would not be "framed". He was assured that the evidence in these cases overwhelmingly supported the verdicts.

At several points he indicated acceptance of the agent's sincerity and an acceptance of the facts being stated as true. He expressed the opinion that perhaps other agents did not share these views. He was told that the courtesy being shown him and the consideration given to his rights and the rights of his family were not conferred out of deference or personal good will, but the recognition of such rights. He was advised that an agent who did not respect these rights would be dismissed from service.

He appeared to accept these explanations, but then changed the subject by stating that he did not intend to become a CROUCH (referring to PAUL CROUCH, whose testimony before Congressional Committee had appeared in the daily press recently.) This led to a discussion in which the agent pointed out that he had been brought up and in turn had taught his children not to tattle or squeal and that the subject shared these sentiments. The agent explained that he had taught his children that such conduct was unmanly and unbecoming, but that this would not apply to immoral or illegal conduct. It was pointed out that "squealing" at school was not intended to bar reporting narcotics peddling to students, for example. He agreed too, that it would not apply to reporting license numbers of cars involved in bank robberies and kidnappings.

The agent expressed his personal respect for the subject as a father and worker and stated that he was convinced that the subject was the kind of a man who would do his patriotic duty, however unpleasant it might be. The subject promptly and emphatically agreed that he would and that he had. He then indicated that he had reported to responsible authorities the activities of persons at the [redacted] whom he thought

[redacted] He commented, however, that no action was ever taken against those persons and that they were still employed at the [redacted] [redacted] when he was dismissed. He expressed the thought that the Government ~~and~~ to take action against the "real enemies" of the country, such as people who throw rocks at "people's homes". The agent asked if he were referring to incidents like that at Cicero, Ill. When he indicated that he was, the agent explained the Bureau's action and success in that matter. It was also pointed out that such an investigation was difficult if potential witnesses refused to testify because they are not in sympathy with the law. It was emphasized that witnesses willing to testify are indispensable to enforcement of practically any law.

The subject said that he was willing to frankly discuss his thoughts, opinions, acts and ideas with his fellow trade unionists, but would be reluctant to discuss them with anyone else. He said that he was not ashamed of anything he had done. The confidential nature of such a discussion with the agent was explained. Subject indicated a fear that it could not be relied on. Further discussion seemed to dispose of this point without entering in an agreement that he would have such a discussion. It was emphasized that protecting the identity of persons who furnish information on a confidential basis was essential to the Bureau's effectiveness in all its operations and that its reputation in this regard was well known.

As the discussion progressed, the subject became more relaxed and even friendly. He apologized for not having invited the agent back to his house, taking notice of the fact that the agent was standing in the street during the entire discussion in a very cold wind. He explained that he did not expect that the conversation would last more than a few minutes. He did not wholly reject the suggestion of another discussion. It might be said that he feebly rejected it. He jokingly suggested that the agent would get him fired from his job, having delayed him for 1½ hours. He goodnaturedly shook hands with the agent. He mentioned that he had talked a lot more freely than most other individuals in the same situation have. It was suggested that perhaps at another time there could be a discussion over a dinner or over a cup of coffee in the evening, or on a Saturday which would not interfere with his work. He readily agreed that he had not been detained by the agent, but had willingly engaged in the discussion. The interview was terminated on a friendly level at 11:25 a.m.

Director, FBI
[redacted]

EVALUATION

The subject at first was nervous and uncooperative in a well-mannered but defiant way. As the interview progressed, he relaxed and appeared to enjoy the opportunity to give expression to some of his gripes. It seemed clear that he was impressed with many of the explanations given to objections he raised. It could not be expected that he would readily abandon the attitudes, views and convictions he has held for 30 years. There was noticeable substantial withdrawal on a number of points. It was also the suggestion on his part that as he got older, he was modifying his views. The suggestion made by the agent that many persons were motivated by high ideals in joining the CP, but had abandoned it because of a realization of its failure to accomplish worthy ends, appeared to appeal to him. His response was in the nature of saying, "Well, if that had happened to me, what about it?"

b7D

This was followed by a discussion concerning informing. He appeared to follow and accept the reasoning that he would do his patriotic duty, but that there might be some difference of opinion as to what his patriotic duty was. He was obviously impressed with the reasonableness of the agent's discussion and the fact that it was directed toward his reasoning. He tried to create the impression that he was a decent person and that he wanted to be reasonable. He was quite definite in his desire to be employed more profitably and certainly indicated that he was not happy in his present work. Knowing his financial difficulties, it is believed that he is even more concerned about finances than he indicated. As an experienced party member and [redacted] it is not surprising that he was quite skillful in discussion. There was, however, a noticeable lack of militancy, hostility, with even the suggestion of whining.

Informant coverage has not developed any indication that the subject has disclosed the contact with the FBI. It is believed that he is the kind of a person who would like to brag about giving the agents a "brush-off". It is realized that he would be embarrassed to explain 1½ hours delay in arriving at [redacted] as a "brush-off".

It is believed that there is a reasonable basis to believe that further discussion might be productive. It is believed that an effort should be made to ascertain the reason for his dismissal from the [redacted] [redacted] as a primary point of discussion with him if it is favorable from our point of view. Accordingly, authority was requested by Air-Tel to recontact the subject under secure conditions away from residence and employment. Authority was granted by Bulet dated 3/29/54.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: April 1, 1954

FROM : SAC, NEWARK
SUBJECT:CP, USA
TOPLEV
IS - C~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7D

ATTENTION: ASS'T. DIRECTOR A. H. BELMONT

SA EDWARD G. BURKE contacted the informant by telephone on 2/3/54, 2/10/54, 2/11/54 and 2/19/54, which resulted in a meeting with him in his office on 2/19/54 at 8 p.m. There was considerable personal conversation concerning his professional work during which he exhibited extreme friendliness. He advised that the [redacted] [redacted] had planned to hold a big meeting but had failed to get sufficient response to warrant it, but he believed that a meeting would be held in the future. He had no other information to furnish.

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He was shown photographs in the PATRICIA BLAU case (NK 100-38534), which he was not able to identify.

He volunteered the information that he had been involved on [redacted] in protracted discussion and activity concerning a [redacted] [redacted] He became upset because of gossip which indicated some irregularity that might involve [redacted] and he had attempted to run it down. This was of interest because a confidential source had advised that [redacted] had talked to the informant [redacted] and asked if he was going Wednesday morning, (this would be [redacted] and he indicated that he would see her the following day. On the informant said that [redacted] informed the [redacted] that "our friend" had been sick all week and may not be able to go.

[redacted]
subjects. It was also indicated that one in the party was [redacted] indicated that the informant and [redacted] indicated that she would determine whether the friend was well enough to go. Shortly after she had a conversation with the informant and inquired how he was. He replied that he was better. She asked if he was going tomorrow [redacted], and he replied that he was not. She said it was all right because she knew he would go if he could.

REGISTERED MAIL

cc: [redacted]

EGB:bar

NOT RECORDED
192 APR 8 1954

[redacted]
During this interview he stated that he was planning to take [redacted]

The agent offered to attempt to borrow one for him, which seemed to please him greatly. On March 19, 1954, the agent contacted the informant and furnished him with a [redacted]. He also asked him concerning three security matter subjects who were under investigation. He was not acquainted with them but checked his office records on a person with a similar last name on the possibility that they might be related. Again he was very friendly, although the interview was not productive.

He was again contacted on 3/31/54 for the return of [redacted]. He had previously indicated a need for it again for [redacted]. The agent suggested that he might be able to induce a friend to [redacted]
[redacted]

He will be again contacted on or about 4/9/54.

EVALUATION

The personal relationship between the agent and the informant appeared to be developing in a satisfactory manner. Some concern was felt over the failure of the informant to disclose the arrangement for his [redacted] suggestion. No effort was made to explore this point due to the fact that it had been obtained through a highly confidential source, and it was not clear that he had seriously entertained the idea of going or that he knew as much about it as this office did.

The writer has emphasized in previous discussions with the informant that it was perfectly proper for anyone to [redacted] b7D
[redacted] and that we were not concerned with such activity as such. In view of this development, however, it is believed that extreme care should be exercised in contacting him and that he should not be asked concerning any person under investigation as one would normally do with an established source. Efforts should be confined to obtaining information concerning his own activity and relations with the [redacted]. It is believed that it would be prejudicial to the confidential source to question him concerning the trip to Washington.

LAC, Detroit (66-3360) [redacted]

April 7, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted] was
SECURITY ATTACH - C

Reurlet dated April 1, 1954, setting forth
the results of your contact with the subject on
March 18, 1954, during which he indicated a desire to
cooperate with the Bureau.

Authority is granted to recontact [redacted] for
as long as he is receptive, but all such recontacts
should be made away from his residence and any place of
business.

Advise the Bureau the results of each interview,
which should be conducted in accordance with existing
Toplev instructions.

JDD:DE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Trotter _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____



FJD

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ORANDUM -- UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-3-99)

DATE: April 1, 1954

FROM : SAC, Detroit (66-3360)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: CR, USA, TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

ATTENTION: Mr. A. H. BELMONT, Assistant Director

Remyletter dated March 2, 1954, Bureau letter dated March 8, 1954,
and my airtel dated March 19, 1954.

BACKGROUND

For the information of other Topley Offices the following background
information of the Subject is being set out:

The Subject was born [redacted]
and claims citizenship through his father, [redacted] who filed his
Declaration of Intention in Detroit, Michigan, [redacted] The father
was issued Certificate of Naturalization on [redacted]

b7D

Subject attended [redacted]

[redacted] a radical
element grew up among the student body and faculty and was very active in the
Southern Labor Movement and active to a considerable extent in organizing tenant

[redacted] to be agitational in
nature and to be harboring a Socialist and Communist faction that fostered
dissension among [redacted] In criminal
proceedings by [redacted]

JH:MAL
REGISTERED - AM

cc: Chicago REGISTERED
Cleveland REGISTERED
New York REGISTERED

cc: Los Angeles REGISTERED
Philadelphia REGISTERED
San Francisco REGISTERED

100-3-99-
NOT RECORDED
101 APR 9 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA, TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

b7D

Subject is employed as a [redacted]
[redacted] Detroit, Michigan.

Subject has been a member of the CP since 1934 and has attended Communist meetings with other known Communists at Detroit, Michigan. An early report from the Boston Office advised files there indicated that [redacted] [redacted] the United May Day Celebration sponsored by the Chelsea Labor Lyceum, a strong Communist center.

A statement attributed to the Subject's wife, [redacted] was reported by [redacted] on April 22, 1944. In conversation with [redacted] [redacted] replied in answer to a statement that [redacted] was in the market for a job, "Well, that sounds like you would mean the Army or Navy." [redacted] answered by saying the Army had placed him in [redacted] then said, "You don't sound very disappointed," to which [redacted] answered, "You wouldn't want me to be a hypocrite, would you? After all, I would rather save my hide for the street fighting here at home if the wrong ones win out in the coming election." [redacted] replied, "That's right, if DEWEY or the HOOVER crowd gets in, there will be plenty of street fighting to do because it will bring on a civil war. ROOSEVELT's got to have this fourth term." [redacted] was asked what would happen to the Party if DEWEY should get in, to which she replied "We will go underground." [redacted] countered with the statement, "Yes, we will go underground. All lists and records will be destroyed and all contacts will be personal."

b7D

Subject in 1943 and 1944 was a member and [redacted] of the [redacted] Los Angeles County CP; member of the [redacted] CP, and a [redacted] in 1947. He held CP membership card number [redacted] in 1946, CP membership card number [redacted] in 1947, and CP membership card number [redacted] in 1948. In 1948 Subject was [redacted] of the CP. In 1949 Subject was a member of the [redacted] and has served on [redacted] various CP organizations within [redacted]

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA, TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

b7D

Informants have reported his regular attendance at CP meetings and functions. A meeting of the [redacted] of the CP was held at the Subject's home in 1949. Subject has been in frequent contact with officials of [redacted] and in 1948 was cleared by the National Board, CP, USA, as one of [redacted]

[redacted] Subject has made heavy financial contributions to the Party and has also promoted CP publications.

Subject was [redacted]

[redacted] a State Conference of the Communist Political Association on [redacted] at the Jericho Temple, 2705 Joy Road, Detroit, Michigan.

INTERVIEW

b7D

The first of Subject on March 18, 1954, reflected that the Subject left his place of employment and proceeded to the [redacted] to a delicatessen restaurant to have lunch. At 3:10 PM as he approached his parked car, Agent JOSEPH HYBLE intercepted the Subject while Agent FRED G. COOK maintained a security watch and observed the approach. The Agent greeted the Subject with outstretched hands and shook hands with the Subject who smiled and had a puzzled look on his face. In friendly and rapid succession the Agent stated he would like to talk with the Subject, that undoubtedly the Subject knew that the Agent represented the FBI, that the Agent did not want to question, subpoena, or otherwise cause any personal inconvenience, that certainly there was no harm in a friendly discussion between two men. The Agent also acknowledged that the Subject was busy and definitely lived up to his nickname [redacted] the Agent having found it rather difficult to catch up with him during the Subject's many trips in and out of his employment. Comment was also directed to the Subject's late lunch.

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA, TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted] was,
SECURITY MATTER - C

After the Subject somewhat recovered his wits, he smilingly indicated he had a very busy day and this was the first opportunity he had to dash off for a sandwich. He also acknowledged that the Agent represented the Bureau although no credentials were exhibited. The Agent then asked the Subject whether it would inconvenience him to have a little chat and suggested either the Agent's car parked near by or the Subject's car as the Agent did not want to unnecessarily embarrass the Subject in the event friends or acquaintances observed them conversing out in the open. The Subject remarked that he and the Agent could talk in his car and that he could spare the time as he did not have to return to his employment in any particular hurry. The Subject proceeded to unlock his car and reached over to the passenger side to admit the Agent. Still continuing the friendly attitude the Agent told the Subject that both of them were mature enough to eliminate preliminaries and discuss the situation in this practical manner.

Subject was informed that he knows certainly of the fact that the Bureau has knowledge of the Subject's complete membership in the organization, of his activities and positions held within the Party. The Subject raised his eyebrows and nodded in acquiescence. The Agent remarked that he felt he knew the Subject well enough to receive some cordiality in spite of the Party's edict that members should have nothing to do with the FBI when approached. The Agent appraised the Subject's membership in the organization as advantageous in that he was in an excellent position to assist his Government much more than other dutiful citizens who have voluntarily offered their services but had never associated with that organization. The Subject was told that Party members have on many occasions voluntarily contacted the Bureau and offered their services after they had come to the realization that the Party was not good for this country.

During the Agent's presentation, it was observed that the Subject tried to interrupt and present his arguments. Upon allowing such an interruption Subject opened up by stating that the Government appears unduly alarmed over the threat of Communism. He stated he was assured with facilities such as

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA, TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

b7D

we have namely, the Armed Forces, State Police, Sheriff Departments, City Police, and the FBI, there is constant control over any threat of danger to our established form of democracy. He remarked that he had never observed any illegal activity practiced by anyone in the organization and that after the first Smith Act trial in New York which resulted in determining those subjects guilty of a violation of established law, he drifted away from the Party.

The Subject was then asked by the Agent why he continued being a member of the [redacted] of the Party, contributing \$100.00 per month regularly after 1948 until about 1952 and then \$20.00 per month for a short period thereafter. also why he continued to be active in Party related groups such as the [redacted]

[redacted] Subject made no answer to this statement. Subject expressed his loyalty for our form of Government and stated he would fight to preserve our way of life. He stated this was the best country in the world, that it surpasses any nation in production, government, etc. He pointed out that he was living well, but it took a lot of hard work. The Subject was complimented on his fortunes pointing out his [redacted]

[redacted] and reminded him that only through opportunities afforded in this and only this country could he be thankful for his personal as well as financial assent for himself and his family.

Subject was reminded that instead of volunteering to serve in the Armed Forces during World War II he obtained a job in industry which contradicted his statement that he would fight for his country when asked to do so. In explanation the Subject stated he thought he could better serve his country as a [redacted] and help production in furnishing the armed might needed to win against the enemy. b7D

The Agent then pointed out though law enforcement agencies, and particularly the FBI, have acquired a lot of knowledge concerning the CP, or any other subversive organization, that the Bureau is charged with protecting the internal security of the country and is constantly desirous of knowing more of the complete situation in order to assure our citizens of protection against any or all subversion.

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA, TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

The Subject was told that here was an opportunity to practice his loyalty for his Government by cooperating and furnishing information to the Bureau instead of professing loyalty and performing the least requirement of a citizen by sitting back and having the assurance that the situation is and always will be in hand. Other nations particularly those Satellite nations had maintained the complacence and attitude of "it cannot happen here and what have they now?" They are nations totally dominated by that long tenure emanating from the CP of Russia. The Subject stated that even though he would furnish information to the Agent and that information was confidential and available to no one outside the Subject, Agent, and the Bureau, nevertheless he had a conscience and has to live with it; that he could not "finger" anyone as it was against his principle. Further, he would be causing harm to those "duped" into the Party and innocent of any wrong doing.

The Subject was told he could assist the Bureau in evaluating information concerning such innocent persons and advise whether or not any individuals were dangerous to our country. He could help evaluate other information the Bureau has received concerning individuals as the Bureau is interested in only those who are in a position to and will cause harm to our country. In effect, he will not be "fingering" such members, he will be helping them. The Subject was further asked how could he as an individual member of the organization pass judgment by stating he will be "fingering" someone to whom harm will come. The Bureau which has made a country-wide investigation of the Communist Movement and has a better overall picture of the situation is nevertheless in no position to draw any conclusion but to obtain the facts after a full investigation and present these facts upon which a conclusion of guilty or innocence will be established by courts of law.

The Agent asked for another get-together soon at which time literature would be shown to the Subject as proof of the conspiratorial character of the CP.

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: CP, USA, TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER - C

b7D

The Subject replied that it was up to the Agent; however, he made no offer to set a date. The Subject was asked to call the Agent after he had given thought to what had been discussed and set a time for another meeting. The Subject then repeated the Agent's name several times to help him remember if and when he called. At this juncture the Agent and the Subject shook hands in a friendly manner and the Subject drove back to his employment at 4:40 PM.

OBSERVATION

It was observed that at the beginning of the interview the Subject strove to impress upon the Agent that the Communist Party was not illegal and when established law determined so he made his exist; that he himself did nothing wrong and that the country was unnecessarily alarmed over a situation it has complete control over. At first he emphasized that it was against his principle to cooperate in a manner which would cause him to "finger" anyone. He emphasized, even if he lost his job and his family would suffer, he could still not see his way clear to undertake such a status. [redacted]

[redacted] has a definite interest in the [redacted]
where the Subject is employed and who is also in [redacted]
in the [redacted] Michigan, and the
Subject's statement emphasizing his strong objection to cooperating even though he lost his job has little value, and the Agent believes that the Subject also recognized the fact that he would not go to such extent. The Agent pointed out that this is strictly a voluntary deal and certainly no retaliation could be expected from the Bureau even though the Subject was not cooperative. Toward the end of the interview, however, the Subject did not again repeat or express himself on the points mentioned above.

Bureau authority is requested to continue recontacts with the Subject as long as he is receptive to conversation with the view in mind, of course, to develop him as a confidential informant.

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99)

4/6/54

SAC, LOS ANGELES [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLER

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

b7D

[redacted] WA.
SECURITY MATTER - C

Re Bureau O-1 to this office inquiring as to when subject will be interviewed.

Please be advised that spot checks and surveillances have been made on this individual but to date no satisfactory set-up has been achieved for conducting an interview under this program; however, efforts are continuing to contact subject and it is hoped that he will be interviewed within the next few weeks.

REGISTERED

VWH:cla

APR
ORIGINAL FILE

100-3-99-1
NOT RECORDED
87 APR 12 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

DO APR 15 1954 P10

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

(100-3-99)

TO : DIRECTOR, F.B.I. [redacted]
 FROM : SAC NEWARK
 SUBJECT:

DATE: April 5, 1954

CP USA, TOPLIV
IS - C

b7D

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTENTION: Assistant Director A. H. Belmont

Because of the informant's keen interest in [redacted]

SA EDWARD

G. BURKE arranged with a [redacted] to have the pictures taken for the informant in color. The informant is a [redacted] New Jersey.

The informant was delighted with the offer of assistance. The close, personal friend of the agent is [redacted] New Jersey, employed in the [redacted]

New York City. He is [redacted]

[redacted] He was not apprised of the nature of the relationship with the informant, although he could safely be trusted with such information, if it were necessary to disclose it. He spent approximately twelve hours in surveying, conferring with the informant and actually [redacted] on Saturday and Sunday, [redacted]

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On April 15th the informant telephoned the agent at home and jubilantly announced that he had just [redacted] and was thrilled with the results. He wanted [redacted] and BURKE to see them as soon as possible.

Arrangements were made to meet at his office to see [redacted] on April 20, 1954.

At 8:30 p.m., April 20th, [redacted] and BURKE met the informant and were cordially greeted with an enthusiastic description of the [redacted]

REGISTERED MAIL
EGE:kdr

cc: 1 - [redacted]

S.O. 100-3-99
NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
200 MAY 17, 1994b6
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FBI MEMORANDUM

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

b7D

[redacted]
Letter to Bureau

He repeatedly expressed his appreciation of the agent's urging
that the [redacted] and the offer to get an expert to do the
job. He then [redacted] the

[redacted] etc. during the
[redacted] The informant at the end exclaimed "Now you know why I was
so pleased and excited when I called you."

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Later arrangements were made to contact the informant. On April 26th
by telephone he suggested that the agent ride with him to New York where he had
to buy some supplies. This was agreed upon.

At 10:15 a.m. he picked up the agent in downtown Newark and drove
to New York; discussion was on a good, personal level. At one point he changed
the subject from the personal level and volunteered the information that
[redacted]

[redacted] had been in touch with him concerning a [redacted]
[redacted] in Newark. He
said he argued against such a [redacted] since it would give
additional publicity to the [redacted] and might bcomerang if the
attendance was smaller at the protest meeting. He suggested that it be held a
week later. [redacted] concurred. He then said that they were [redacted]
[redacted] appearance.

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This was highly gratifying since another source had advised that
the informant and others were on a [redacted]
[redacted] appearance.

The informant then went on to say that he had been invited to a
dinner for [redacted] during the previous week, but had been unable to attend
it. He said he also had an invitation to a dinner to be given in honor of
[redacted] He thought

Later the event was sponsored by the Progressive Party, and that he may be able
to attend.

He then stated that a couple of weeks previously he had "a feeler"
suggesting that he hold meetings at his office. He said he was told that he
could determine whether they should be in small or large groups, all negro or
mixed, or any other factor to suit himself. He was asked to think it over.

[redacted]
Letter to Bureau

He stated that there had been no follow-up, but he expected soon to be asked for his decision. He identified the individual making the request as [redacted]

It is to be noted that [redacted] is an SI subject of this office and self-employed [redacted] (Bureau file number [redacted] Newark file number [redacted]). He seemed to infer that he would agree to some type of meeting, and accordingly was not questioned as to what action he intended to take.

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All of the above information was spontaneously furnished by the informant, without any inquiry of any kind being made by the agent.

The informant made two stops in New York, one at the supply house downtown and the other at the [redacted] where he made arrangements to [redacted] hereafter. Since he then had to visit two staff members at their offices, he suggested that the agent would prefer to be dropped off at a nearby subway station. He asked if the agent had any specific questions to ask first. When told there were a couple he suggested driving into a side street where he parked.

He was not able to furnish information on four matters presented, and this was not unexpected. On the fifth he gave a highly satisfactory reply. He was asked if he had any recent contact with [redacted] of the [redacted] in Newark. He said he had not seen him since he had [redacted] a year or two ago. He recalled that [redacted] wife was opposed to his "activities" as were a couple of employees of the [redacted]. He remembered that [redacted] was "very active" when informant got out of the Army. He stated that [redacted]. This was really the first voluntary statement of the informant in which he even admitted inferentially, direct, personal knowledge of CP activities as such.

The meeting was terminated at approximately 12 noon and the agent walked two blocks to the [redacted].
[redacted] The contact lasted approximately one hour and three-quarters.

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EVALUATION

This was, without a doubt, the most successful session with this informant. He talked freely and furnished considerable information of value and made statements holding promise of even more valuable information. It was obvious that the interest and efforts shown by the agent in the [redacted] situation was responsible for the results. The assistance given had made it possible for the informant to make an excellent impression with [redacted].

[redacted] He was extremely pleased and grateful.

[redacted]
Letter to Bureau

On the evening of April 20th the agent intentionally inquired as to the possibility of [redacted] to learn if the informant had any familiarity with regard to the equipment. The informant stated that he was considering [redacted]

[redacted] and is merely mentioned as a matter of interest.

b7D

After the last meeting with the informant it was learned that [redacted] on a call for a "conference for jobs, trade and peace" to be held [redacted] Newark. The conference appears to be on a thinly veiled CP front. [redacted] There are five topics or panels to be covered. One is on [redacted]

[redacted]
The agent was not aware of this fact at the time of the interview and the informant did not mention it, if he was aware of it.

On April 28th the agent recontacted the informant to inquire when he wanted to borrow the camera again since he had indicated intentions to take additional footage. Informant stated that he had a [redacted] to attend in New York during that week and would not be able to find time for the photography until the week of May 3rd. Accordingly it is planned to contact him on the evening of May 4th.

It would appear highly desirable to permit the informant to volunteer the information concerning the conference. The nature of the relationship with him to date is not such that he can be directed to immediately furnish such information when it comes to his attention. If he continues to progress along the lines indicated in the last contact it would appear desirable not to attempt to dominate the situation with him for the time being.

b7D

It is to be noted as previously indicated that the informant becomes highly engrossed and emotional about projects in which he get himself involved, either in connection with his professional work or as in this instance, the [redacted]. He has indicated to the agent that he has always reacted in this manner. It is also to be noted that the agent earlier speculated that the informant conducted his affairs in a rather haphazard manner. This was corroborated when the informant stated that on April 25th he had a commitment [redacted] which he had agreed to do four to five weeks earlier. On April 23rd he agreed to [redacted] morning of April 25th, without making a record of it. It then developed that [redacted] and he had promised to take her to New York.

b7D

[redacted]
Letter to Bureau

His appointments with the agent for contact obviously run into similar previous commitments. There is no method of overcoming this handicap and it must be accepted as characteristic of the individual.

The Bureau will be kept advised of the developments.

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-03-2012

EGB:mp

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBI, NEWARK

4/2/54

AIR TEL

b7D

DIRECTOR, FBI, ATTN. MR. A. H. BELMONT (100-3-99)

✓ CP USA, TOPLEV, IS-C; [REDACTED] SM-C. INTERMEDIARY CONTACTED


SUBJECT 4/1/54 AND WAS ADVISED THAT HE FEARED THAT AGENTS AS
LAWYERS COULD CONFUSE HIM BECAUSE OF HIS LACK OF EDUCATION AND HE
MUST RELUCTANTLY REFUSE THE REQUEST. OTHER POSSIBLE APPROACHES WILL
BE SUGGESTED IN LETTER WHICH FOLLOWS.

HOSTETTER

REGISTERED MAIL

1 cc. Newark file [REDACTED]

b7D



5 APR 14 1954
FYO

100-3-99-
NOT RECORDED
192 APR 8 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL -

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [REDACTED]

4/1/54

SAC, PHILADELPHIA [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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My

[REDACTED]
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Attention: Assistant Director A. H. BELMONT

Rebulet 12/16/53 and mylet 2/16/54.

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On 3/26/54 a surveillance was instituted by SAs
ROBERT M. GRANT and [REDACTED] near the home of subject.

At 9:55 a.m., [REDACTED] left his house and walked to
his car which was parked nearby. He was approached by SA GRANT
with SA [REDACTED] observing from the Bureau car.

[REDACTED] refused to talk with Agent, saying several
times "sorry" and "not interested". He did not stop, but got
into his car and drove away.

It is not anticipated that he will be recontacted
unless information is developed indicating such a recontact
might be productive. In this event Bureau authority will be
requested for the interview.

RMC:AE

Registered Mail

100-3-91-

NOT RECORDED

181 APR 9 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

52 APR 14 1954 10

Original copy filed in

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]
FROM :
SUBJECT: SAC, NEWARK [redacted]

DATE: 4/1/54

CONFIDENTIAL

b7D

CP, USA-
TOPLEV
IS-C

[redacted] SM-C

ATTN: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A. H. DELANT

Rebulet, 12/16/53

On 1/21/54, SAs EDWARD G. BURKE and VICTOR CAMPARI went to the vicinity of subject's home and selected a secure place to meet with subject. As he had requested, the subject was called by phone by SA BURKE to arrange for this specific meeting. The subject said that he had gotten the impression that a "job" was being offered to him and that he would like to know whether it was under Civil Service and would like to know the details. It was explained that it was something that he could do which would be explained to him in detail at a meeting place which was suggested. He claimed that he could not understand how he could do something that more qualified and educated persons could not do. With this, the agent offered to explain to him in person. He was told that the matter was of a confidential nature. He said he realized that and that he could not understand it. He concluded that he had more sense than to think he was qualified to hold a government job in an organization with such highly trained and educated people and decided that he had better let the matter drop. He reiterated at considerable length his faith in God and his desire to stay neutral in controversial matters. He declined to meet with agents as suggested.

He was asked whether he would be willing to meet with some other person in whom he might have confidence. He said that he would. It was explained that the matter had not as yet been discussed with the other person and would not be unless he consented to it. He stated that he would politely listen to such a person without making any comment in advance. He expressed the opinion that he could not understand what he was being asked to do and hoped that the other person would be able to make it clearer. It was not apparent whether the subject was "playing dumb" or really did not comprehend. He discussed the matter politely as on previous occasions, but exhibited the same reluctance to cooperate in the objective of the interview. The conversation lasted from approximately 5:10 p.m. to 5:25 p.m.

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REGISTERED MAIL

1 cc. [redacted]

APR 1954
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NOT RECORDED

192 APR 8 1954

MAILING ON ORIGINAL -

Letter Director
Attn: Asst. Director H. H. Belmont

[redacted]
On 1/28/54, SA BURKE contacted [redacted] N. J., who had previously been interviewed by SA T. HOWARD WALDRON in this matter. He stated that he was a former

[redacted] for many years. He also said he was a graduate of the [redacted]. He pointed out that he was the [redacted] and that the large student body and faculty of the school were White and Negro mixed. He said he knew [redacted] to have been active in CP affairs and a CP candidate for public office. In years past he occasionally received literature through [redacted] but was not personally acquainted with him. He was personally acquainted with the [redacted]. He recalled their names and knew of the present employment of the [redacted] now in the armed services. He believed that he could make a satisfactory contact with the subject, although he could not be confident that he could induce him to cooperate with the FBI.

Mr. [redacted] was told that the FBI desired to obtain the cooperation of [redacted] in a matter which could not be explained to [redacted] or any other person. He was told that [redacted] expected to be contacted by someone in this regard. He stated that he would mention these two points to [redacted] emphasizing that he could trust the FBI as an organization and the agents as individuals and urge him to do whatever was requested of him. He believed that he would contact the subject in the afternoon of 1/31/54.

The agent was impressed with Mr. [redacted] intelligence, maturity, loyalty and background. He appears to be approximately in his late 50's or early 60's, a grandfather, with [redacted]. He has long experience by the very nature of his work in a mediating capacity. It would be difficult to find a more fitting person for this particular assignment.

Since the above was dictated, five contacts were made with the intermediary. He did not promptly undertake the assignment, but made several unsuccessful attempts later. He stopped at subject's residence on three occasions without finding him home. He has telephoned for appointments several times, but the subject was not home or did not answer. The intermediary has been advised of the best time of day to find the subject at home and will continue his effort. On 3/25/54, he advised that he would be able to report by 4/1/54. It is believed that the delay is due to the fact that it is very convenient for him to make contact just after [redacted] when the subject is still at work, but inconvenient to arrange later in the evening.

There is every reason to believe he will pursue the matter diligently now.

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Director, FBI (100-3-99)
ATTN: Asst. Dir. A. H. BELMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

3/31/54
PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

[redacted]
PS:

Rebulet, 2/9/54 and Philadelphia letter, 2/5/54.

On 2/26/54, SAS [redacted] and JOSEPH A. CULLEN interviewed [redacted] on the street in the vicinity of his residence, [redacted] New York, NY. [redacted] greeted the agents in a cordial manner and mentioned that he had thought of calling them on the phone, but had decided against it because he was unable to think of any additional information concerning Communism in the [redacted]

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[redacted] On the basis of information received in referenced letter from Philadelphia, 2/5/54 that [redacted] CP [redacted]

[redacted] was specifically questioned about this conference. He stated that he could not recall ever having attended a CP conference at the [redacted] but recalled having been at one in a meeting hall located on [redacted] in 1946. He believed that this conference was probably the one agents had reference to. [redacted] said that the conference lasted for four days and the speakers at it were important CP functionaries. The only ones he could recall were JOHN WILLIAMSON, BETTY GANNETT, and PHIL BART.

According to [redacted] there were approximately 200 persons in attendance and he, [redacted], was definitely not a speaker. He noted that it was possible that he may have [redacted] in which case he would have stressed the need for a strong party membership on the Philadelphia waterfront, but he was quite certain that he had not even entered into the discussion at the conference at all. He reiterated that during the period of his CP membership, he had never engaged in any courier or espionage activities and that he has had no contact with the CP in recent years.

- 1- Philadelphia [redacted]
1- [redacted] (TOPLEV)
1- NY 100-23774 (JOHN WILLIAMSON)
1- NY 100-13483 (BETTY GANNETT)
1- NY 100-56579 (PHIL BART)

100-3-99
NOT RECORDED
131 APR 7 1954

RM

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JAC:BAC

INITIALS OR ORIGINAL
[Redacted]

Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted] As the agents have had an opportunity to observe [redacted] during several interviews, it is now believed that he has been completely frank during at least the last two interviews, therefore, it is actual fact that he is no longer connected with the CP.

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It is also evident that he has not been in touch with any of his acquaintances in the CP and, accordingly, could not successfully reactivate himself in order to be of assistance to the FBI as an informant.

[redacted] apparently has furnished all of the information which he can presently recall concerning persons active in the CP and any information which he can furnish in the future will, of necessity, be furnished on a limited scale. In view of this fact, [redacted] is not being designated as a confidential source of information, but rather will be carried merely as a source of information in this office.

No further contact is contemplated under the Toplev Program.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-03-2012

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [REDACTED]

3/30/54

SAC, SEATTLE (66-2135) [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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b7C
b7D

ATTENTION: ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR A. H. BELMONT

[REDACTED]
SECURITY MATTER - C

Reference is made to Bulet dated 2/17/54 in which authority was granted to contact the above captioned individual. Said referenced letter also indicated that if [REDACTED] had definitely indicated a desire to cooperate additional authority would not be needed to contact him in the future. Said referenced letter also gave the Seattle Office authority to compensate [REDACTED] at the rate of \$50 per month for a period of three months, effective 2/1/54, with the understanding by him that he would not receive any money unless he in return furnished information of value.

INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED]

On 3/24/54, [REDACTED] was telephonically contacted under suitable pretext at his place of employment, the [REDACTED] in Seattle, telephone MAIN [REDACTED] and via this medium arrangements were made to meet him at noon on March 24 in the vicinity of [REDACTED]

Agents prior to noon on March 24 conducted a short spot check surveillance in the vicinity of the above-mentioned address and, after ascertaining that the area was secure, parked the Bureau automobile in a spot near the intersection of [REDACTED]. At 12:01 P.M., agents met [REDACTED] and they immediately entered said parked Bureau automobile.

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Friendly greetings were exchanged with [REDACTED] for a minute or so and then he remarked that he had been calling at the [REDACTED] approximately once a week and felt certain that he was being received well there by [REDACTED] which is the [REDACTED]. He said that he has also seen a few of his former associates in the Communist Party and they apparently are still friendly towards him. [REDACTED] intimated to agents that he was quite certain that in due time he would again be back in good standing in the Communist Party in this area. Agents at this time cautioned [REDACTED] not to pursue this matter at too rapid a rate, but rather take it slow and sure in order that no suspicion might be leveled upon him by Communist Party members.

JRB:jlb

REGISTERED
AIRMAIL

APR 13 1954 F10

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100 APR 7 1954
INITIALS: [REDACTED]

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COMMUNIST PARTY OF AMERICA
APR 13 1954

SE 66-2135

[redacted] said that he understood this and thought that he had been acting accordingly by taking it rather slowly at this time.

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[redacted] was instructed by agents to prepare a written summary of his Communist Party activities relative to the reason why he originally joined the Party, his activities therein while a member and the reason why he dropped out. He was also instructed to prepare to the best of his recollection activities that took place at different meetings he attended with particular reference being made to those present and the type of meeting, where held, etc. [redacted] said that he would endeavor to prepare such a summary and furnish it to agents as soon as possible. He also mentioned that he was at the current time going over his very large supply of Communist Party literature and preparing it so that he could bring it to Seattle from his home and furnish it to agents. [redacted] was requested to identify each piece of Communist Party literature with his initials in pencil.

[redacted] was informed by agents that he must be very careful not to make mention of the fact to anyone that he was cooperating with the FBI. He said, "You men undoubtedly know that I would not make such a mistake the second time, inasmuch as I undoubtedly caused you embarrassment some months ago when I unthinkingly informed the Coast Guard Appeal board that I had cooperated with the FBI". [redacted] also remarked that he was well aware of the importance of the function that he was endeavoring to perform and would be most certain that he carried out his end of the bargain. He was also again reminded that he at no time was to assume or indicate to anyone that he was employed by the FBI. He said that he well understood this fact. Agents also told [redacted] that they were not in any way interested in employee or employer relationships regarding union matters. In this connection he was told that the FBI was interested, however, in Communist Party infiltration into labor unions or any other group.

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[redacted] was told by agents that he would be compensated for his time and effort expended and that at the current time he would be paid \$50 a month if he in return furnished information of value concerning current activities. [redacted] was given \$50 on 3/24/54 by agents with the understanding that he would not receive any more money at this time unless he produced information of value. It was understood in this connection, however, that it would be rather difficult for him to reactivate himself on a "moments notice" and that such reactivation on his part would take careful planning and undoubtedly would consume considerable time and effort. He was told in this connection that he would be well compensated for any time expended in an endeavor to properly reactivate himself.

SE 66-2135

Agents connected with the Toplev program introduced [redacted] on 3/24/54 to SA ROBERT W. MAC NAMARA, who will handle him in the future.

[redacted] at this time is not being assigned a symbol number and is still being maintained as a Potential Security Informant. However, as soon as he is in a position to furnish information of current value a symbol number will be assigned to him.

Concerning the above-mentioned reports that [redacted] is to prepare for the Seattle Office of the FBI, he was instructed by agents to sign them [redacted]. The Bureau will be kept advised of the development of [redacted] as a security informant.

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TIME OF INTERVIEW

The above described interview with [redacted] was had in a Bureau automobile parked in the vicinity of [redacted] Seattle, Washington, on 3/24/54, between the times of 12:01 P.M. and 12:25 P.M.

EVALUATION

It is believed by agents that this individual is conscientiously endeavoring to reactivate himself within the ranks of the Communist Party in order that he might be in a position to secure information relative to Communist activities and furnish same to the FBI. It is believed that this individual will be successful in reactivating himself and will furnish information of value and prove to be an informant of value in the not too far distant future.

SAC, ALBANY

April 13, 1954

DIRECTOR, FBI

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOP LEV (100-3-99)
SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

(Top) There are transmitted herewith copies of an article entitled "Marx on The Truman Doctrine," for possible use in connection with the captioned programs. It contains a series of quotations from the writings of Karl Marx regarding the Russian menace to Europe which, although originally written about 100 years ago, are particularly pertinent at the present time.

A small additional supply of these pamphlets is being maintained in the Central Research Unit at the Bureau in the event additional copies are required by your Office.

Enclosures (10)

- 1 - Baltimore (With Enclosures 10)
Boston (With Enclosures 10)
Buffalo (With Enclosures 10)
Chicago (With Enclosures 25)
Cincinnati (With Enclosures 10)
Cleveland (With Enclosures 10)
Denver (With Enclosures 10)
Detroit (With Enclosures 20)
Indianapolis (With Enclosures 10)
Los Angeles (With Enclosures 50)
Milwaukee (With Enclosures 10)
Minneapolis (With Enclosures 10)
Newark (With Enclosures 20)
New Haven (With Enclosures 10)
New York (With Enclosures 75)
Pittsburgh (With Enclosures 10)
Philadelphia (With Enclosures 25)
Portland (With Enclosures 10)
St. Louis (With Enclosures 10)
San Francisco (With Enclosures 10)
Seattle (With Enclosures 25)
Springfield (With Enclosures 10)
Washington Field (With Enclosures 10)

ENCL

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
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EX-127

20 APR 15 1954

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Gearty _____
Mohr _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

JFC:djs



35 APR 23 1954

Marx on The Truman Doctrine

By Bertram D. Wolfe


*Senior Fellow Slavic Studies, Hoover
Library, Stanford University, 1949-50;
Author of 'Three Who Made A Revolution'.*

**the new
Leader**

March 19, 1951

180

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March 19, 1951

Marx

on the

Truman Doctrine

By Bertram D. Wolfe

"In a dictatorship one does not think, one quotes."

—Ignazio Silone

IN THE SOVIET UNION there are four Synoptic Gospels: the words of the Master, Marx, and the commentaries of the Three Apostles, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. By virtue of a Quaternian Mystery, the four are one and besides them there is none. All cumulative experience, all recorded history, all the scientific investigations of a half-century, or a cycle of centuries, in genetics or philology or music, can be whisked away in the thunderclap of a single quotation from any one of the four, or buried under a hail of quotations from all four at once.

Where all utterances, large and small, profound or casual, serious or jesting, ill-tempered, sanguine or dyspeptic, are alike erected into a sacred canon, quotations can be found to fit any need, annihilate any questioner, and, day after tomorrow, prove the reverse of what was proved today. This quotational shock treatment and chain reaction, once started, can no longer be stopped. One quotation calls for another, until the Scripture is gradually reduced to a rubble of fragmentary texts bearing little or no relation to the original structure of thought. There is a curious hide-and-seek censorship in which one utterance is roared into the public's unresisting ear while another utterance is carefully concealed as if it did not exist.

In recent years, the years of the late Stalinist dispensation, there is a whole body of Marx's writings which is buried many feet below the level of the embalmed body of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. This body of the sacred text is literally never unwrapped or exhibited for public contemplation or veneration. For all practical purposes, it has been expurgated and its author posthumously purged, for it deals with Russian aggressive expansion over Europe and Asia, with Russian "Asiatic backwardness and barbarism," with the aggressive imperialist nature of Pan-Slavism, with the threat to democracy and socialism that comes from the spread of Russian absolutist state institutions and Russian imperial power. Instead of citing

them, explaining them, or explaining them away, the self-avowed "greatest of the apostles of Marx" has preferred to bury the entire text fathoms deep in the earth.

In this as in all things, the historian of the Russian Revolution increasingly finds himself forced to dig like an archaeologist among time-buried ruins in order to re-establish the true outlines of events and ideas, buried beneath a deliberately created surface rubble of misquotation, circumlocution and simple forgery.

PROOFS FROM THE MASTER

Lenin was accustomed, as Krupskaya tells us, "to consult with Marx" whenever he found himself faced with a new situation requiring new solutions or new quotational proofs from the Master. How would it be, then, if we should follow his example now, in order to find out how Marx would have reacted to present-day problems—let us say, to Russo-Turkish relations, the Dardanelles, Iran, or the Truman Doctrine. Nothing could be simpler, for Marx actually does utter his views in no uncertain terms concerning every one of the above problems.

In an article which appeared in the *New York Tribune* of April 12, 1853, Marx wrote:

"The commercial importance of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus makes them at the same time military positions of the first rank, that is, positions of decisive importance in any war. Similar points are Gibraltar and Helsingør [commanding the entrance into the Baltic.—B.D.W.]. But the Dardanelles are, from the nature of their locality, even more important. . . . The narrowness of the strait at the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus is such that a few properly erected and well armed fortifications, such as Russia, once in possession, would not tarry to erect, might defy the combined fleets of the world if they attempted a passage. In that case, the Black Sea would be more properly a Russian lake than even the Lake of Ladoga, situated in its very heart. The resistance of the Caucasians would be starved out at once; Trebizond would be a Russian port, the Danube a Russian river. Besides, when Constantinople is taken, the Turkish Empire is cut in

two. . . . Macedonia, Thessaly, Albania, outflanked and cut off from the main body, will not put the Conqueror to the trouble of subduing them; they will have nothing left but to beg for mercy and for an army to maintain internal order.

"But, having come thus far on the way to universal empire, is it probable that this gigantic and swollen power will pause in its career? . . . With Constantinople, she stands on the threshold of the Mediterranean; with Durazzo and the Albanian Coast, she is in the very center of the Adriatic. . . . Flanking the Austrian dominions on the north, east and south, Russia will count the Habsburgs [*i.e.*, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc.—B.D.W.] as her vassals. . . . The broken and undulating Western frontier of the Empire, ill-defined in respect to natural boundaries, would call for rectification; and it would appear that the natural frontier of Russia runs from Dantzig, or perhaps Stettin, to Trieste. As sure as conquest follows conquest and annexation annexation, so sure would the conquest of Turkey by Russia be only the prelude for the annexation of Hungary, Prussia, Galicia, and for the ultimate realization of the Slavonic Empire which certain fanatical Panslavistic philosophers have dreamed of. . . .

"But let Russia get possession of Turkey and her strength is increased nearly half, and she becomes superior to all the rest of Europe put together. Such an event would be an unspeakable calamity to the revolutionary cause. The maintenance of Turkish independence, or, in the case of the possible dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the arrest of the Russian scheme of annexation, is a matter of the highest moment. In this instance, the interest of the revolutionary democracy and of England go hand in hand. Neither can permit the Tsar to make Constantinople one of his capitals, and we shall find that, when driven to the wall, the one will resist him as determinedly as the other."

So, too, I found in Marx's correspondence to the New York *Tribune* warnings about the "hundreds of Russian agents perambulating Turkey and the Balkans"; about the use Russia was making of the Eastern Orthodox Church and clergy; the imperialist use she was making of Pan-Slavist ideology "to unite all branches of the great Slav race under one sceptre and to make them the ruling race of Europe"; her use of "insurrections more or less directly urged on by Russian gold and Russian influence"; Russia's ability to work out a "well-defined Eastern policy" while the Western powers "grope in the dark," because Russia herself is "semi-Asiatic in her condition, manners, traditions and institutions." And Marx has discovered, no less, the germs of that new rule for the Balkans which makes loyalty to Russia the test of loyalty, and treason to Russia the test of treason. Of Prince Menshikov, the Molotov and Vishinsky of his day, Marx writes in the *Tribune* of June 9, 1853:

"What Prince Menshikov now demands is . . . that the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, as well as the Metropolitan Archbishops [throughout the Balkans—B.D.W.] shall be immovable, unless proved guilty of high treason—

against the Russ[ians]!—and that only upon the consent of the Tsar. . . ."

We did not start this game of quotations, but since more than one can play at it, it would not be hard for Tito, either, to find a veritable atom bomb of quotations in these pages to blast Stalinism out of the tabernacle where the sacred writings are kept.

GLACIAL EXPANSION

Almost one hundred years ago, it would seem from his news letters, Marx had discovered what is in its present phase known as "the cold war," namely that glacial expansion of the Russian state over Europe and Asia by a combination of penetration, invasion, puppetry, insurrection, and the activity of its agents in every land. Marx felt that if this autocratic regime continued to spread, democracy, socialism and Western civilization were alike doomed. But he did not have too high an opinion of Western diplomacy and Western resistance. He was unsparing in his irony concerning the ease with which particularly Englishmen and English newspapers were taken in by mere professions of peace by a dictator bent upon seizing as cheaply as possible the fruits of war.

"In all essential points," he wrote in the *Tribune* of April 19, 1853, "Russia has steadily, one after another, gained her ends thanks to the ignorance, dullness, and consequent inconsistency and cowardice of the Western Governments. . . ."

No pacifist, Marx looked with disdain upon the peace-at-any-price camp in the West:

"One thing must be evident at least," he wrote, "that it is the stockjobbers and the peace-mongering bourgeoisie, represented in the British government by the oligarchy, who surrender Europe to Russia, and that in order to resist the encroachments of the Tsar we must above all overthrow the inglorious Empire of those mean, cringing and infamous adorers of the golden calf."

What scorn Marx directed towards the fatuous optimism of the London *Times* concerning the peaceful intentions of the Autocrat:

"The Tsar has declared for peace,' the *Times* is happy to state. . . . The Tsar has expressed 'pacific' sentiments *by his own lips*. . . . He will allow the other powers to occupy themselves with conferences provided they allow him meanwhile to occupy the principalities. . . ." (*New York Tribune*, Oct. 4, 1853).

"How does it happen," he had written four months earlier, "that the poor *Times* believed in the 'good faith' of Russia towards Turkey and her 'antipathy' against all aggrandizement? Peter proposed to raise himself on the ruins of Turkey. Catherine proposed dismemberment. . . . Nicholas, more moderate, only demands the *exclusive protectorate* of Turkey [now extended to the exclusive protectorate of all the 'people's democracies' in the Balkans and elsewhere—B.D.W.]. Mankind will not forget that Russia was the *protector* of Poland, the *protector* of the Crimea, the *protector* of Courland [the Baltic Provinces—B.D.W.], the *protector* of Georgia, Mingrelia, the Circassian

CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

and Caucasian tribes. And now Russia the protector of Turkey!"

As to Russia's lip-service to anti-imperialism and its declared "antipathy to aggrandizement," Marx offered:

"the following facts from a mass of the acquisitions of Russia since Peter the Great. The Russian frontier has advanced:

Toward Berlin, Dresden, Vienna	about 700 miles.
Toward Constantinople	500 miles.
Toward Stockholm	630 miles.
Toward Teheran	1000 miles."

Of course, poor Marx is out of date, and the reader will have to add the additional mileages in each of the above directions and the mileage toward Hong Kong and India that stretches across two continents.

CHANGED CONDITIONS

Yes, of course, dear reader, "conditions have changed" since Marx's day and I am not one to settle a problem by a quotation from any text made sacred. Among the conditions that have changed, one would have to note that Russia has since had a revolution which has made its effete empire into a new, dynamic and energetic state machine; that the revolution has developed into a counter-revolution, and that the state which was to wither away has become the total state. One would have to note that the third of the Four Apostles, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, seized power under the sign of anti-imperialism, renouncing Russia's claims to Poland and the Baltic nations, to the Balkans and the Dardanelles, to northern Persia, Manchuria and the lands traversed by the Chinese Eastern Railroad.

"The Provisional Government," Lenin wrote indignantly in July 1917, "has not even published the secret treaties of a frankly predatory character, concerning the partitioning of Persia, the robbing of China, of Turkey, the annexation of East Prussia, etc. . . . It has confirmed these treaties concluded by Tsarism, which for several centuries has robbed and oppressed more peoples than all other tyrants and despots together . . . disgracing and demoralizing the Great Russian people by transforming them into an executioner of other peoples."

Yes, times have changed, and are changing still even as I write. The now not-so-provisional government of the Fourth and Greatest Apostle is bent once more on "the partitioning of Persia, the robbing of China, of Turkey, the annexation of East Prussia, etc." and once more "is disgracing the Great Russian people and demoralizing them by transforming them into an executioner of other peoples." Indeed, times have changed so much since Lenin wrote his impressive *Imperialism, the Final Stage of Capitalism*, that it would not be amiss for a Fifth Disciple to arise to write a brochure no less impressive to be entitled: *Imperialism, the Final Stage of Communism*.

All I have sought to do here is to rescue from undeserved purge and oblivion some of the earnest words of the First of the Apostles and the Founder of the Faith.

A quotation from Marx, in Russia, is supposed to be enough to settle anything, to make or break a theory, a proposal or a man. Am I stretching things when I suggest that the author of this now sacred text loved freedom and hated tyranny; believed deeply in democracy, political, economic and social; feared and opposed bureaucracy and slavery and personal, arbitrary rule; cherished all that was best in Western civilization and wished to build upon and enlarge it, not undermine and destroy it; feared the glacial spread of the even then too brutal and too total Russian Empire and insisted that it could and must be contained or both democracy and socialism would be lost?

"If at the outset," Marx wrote in the *Tribune* of December 30, 1853, "they [the Western governments—B.D.W.] had used a manly style of language, adequate to the position they hold and the pretensions they set up before the world, if they had proved that bluster and swagger could not impose on them, the Autocrat would not only have refrained from attempting it, but would have entertained for them a very different feeling from the contempt which must now animate his bosom. At that time, to show that they seriously meant to preserve Turkey intact, and were ready to back up their intention with fleets and armies, was the sure means of maintaining peace."

Could it be that Harry Truman was reading the unexpurgated Marx when he penned the Truman Doctrine?

Or that Karl Marx was anticipating the Marshall Plan or the Truman Doctrine when he wrote:

"It is cheering to see the American intervention in Europe beginning just with the Eastern question. Besides the commercial and military importance resulting from the situation of Constantinople, there are other important considerations making its possession the hotly controverted and permanent subject of dispute between the East and the West—and America is the youngest and most vigorous representative of the West." (*Tribune*, August 12, 1853.)

Whatever we make of these quotations, this much at least is clear, that Marx does not belong to the "peace camp" of the aggressively expanding total state, nor to the concentration-camp system that accompanies its expansion. His voice is stifled and his writings purged and perverted in the land that professes to worship him. When such words can be freely printed in Russia again, then mankind will know that Russia is once more free. In the meantime, a closing prophecy from Marx, the chief of the prophets:

"With a worthier and more equal social status, with the abolition of caste and privilege, with free political institutions, unfettered industry, and emancipated thought, the people of the West will rise again to power and unity of purpose, while the Russian Colossus itself will be shattered by the progress of the masses and the explosive force of ideas. There is no reason to fear the conquest of Europe by the Cossacks. The very divisions and apparent weaknesses which would seem to render such an event easy, are the sure pledge of its impossibility."

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
Attn: Asst. Director A. H. BELMONT
SAC, New York (100-64755)

4/13/54

CONFIDENTIAL

CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

BEATRICE GOODLOE, was
SM - C

b6
b7C

ReBulet 1/12/54 granting authority to approach subject
under the Toplev program.

On 4/1/54 surveillance of the subject's residence, 111
Norfolk St., NYC was instituted by SAS [redacted] and
ALFRED B. NOVAK. At 9:45 a.m. the subject was observed leaving
her residence and after surveilling her to a discreet distance,
the agents approached BEATRICE GOODLOE, who acknowledged her identity.

The agents identified themselves and told GOODLOE that they
wanted to have a confidential talk with her. GOODLOE immediately
replied that she had nothing to say and would not talk to agents of
the FBI. GOODLOE then said sharply, "Don't follow me - I don't want
to be followed by white men". At this point GOODLOE turned and
walked rapidly away.

In view of the subject's obvious adherence to the CP
directives as to the policy to be followed when approached by the
FBI, no further attempt will be made to contact GOODLOE under the
Toplev program at this time.

RM

1 - Bureau (100-335957) b7D
1 - [redacted]

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ABN:TMF

53 APR 23 1954

100-3-77
NOT RECORDED/
10 APR '54

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

Director, FBI (100-3-99) (100-408429)
(Attn: Assistant Director A. H. BELMONT)
SAC, New York (100-116270)

4/8/54

CONFIDENTIAL

CP-USA

OTOLEV

IS-C

ARAM MIRJANIAN, wa.
IS-C

ReBulet 2/15/54, authorizing a contact with ARAM MIRJANIAN.

Interview with MIRJANIAN

On 4/7/54, ARAM MIRJANIAN was surveilled from his place of employment, at 40 East 12th St., NYC, and was approached in a secure location, by SA EDWARD W. BUCKLEY and SA CHESTER A. REILLY.

MIRJANIAN acknowledged his identity, and when the Agents identified themselves by displaying their credentials, he became very nervous. It was explained to MIRJANIAN that he was being contacted in order to afford him a opportunity to have a friendly confidential talk with Agents of the FBI, on matters of importance to himself, and to the US Government. He advised that he was not being placed under arrest, and he was offered the opportunity to converse with Agents in a Bureau car, which was available.

MIRJANIAN politely replied, "I am sorry gentlemen, but I cannot talk to you. I cannot talk to the FBI." He was asked why he could not talk to the FBI, but he only shook his head, and repeated his statement. The Agents explained to MIRJANIAN, the Bureau's interest in protecting the security of the nation, and it was pointed out to him, that as a naturalized citizen, he was expected to cooperate with the Government.

MIRJANIAN, after each statement or question on the part of the Agents, merely shook his head and politely repeated his statement, "I am sorry gentlemen, but I cannot talk to you." The Agents made numerous points in an effort to draw MIRJANIAN into conversation, but he repeatedly refused to answer questions or to make any comment on the Agents' remarks.

For approximately 10 minutes, the Agents talked at MIRJANIAN, without getting any response from him, other than his previous remark that

RM

b7D

1- [redacted]
1- NY 100-114173

CAR:EPW
19 APR 1954

100-3-99-
NOT RECORDED
19 APR 15 1954
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-408429-1

Letter to the Director
NY 100-116270

he could not talk to the FBI. MIRJANIAN finally recovered his composure, and stated, "If you say that I am not under arrest, then I am free to leave at any time, is that correct?" He was assured that he was free to break off the conversation at his pleasure, but it was suggested to MIRJANIAN that he give the Agent an opportunity to talk to him again in the near future. MIRJANIAN again shook his head and replied politely, "I am sorry gentlemen but I cannot talk to you at all. If I change my mind, I will get in touch with you."

MIRJANIAN was asked if he knew the whereabouts of the CP fugitives. He shook his head in a negative fashion. He was asked if he would advise the FBI if he did know of their whereabouts. At this point, MIRJANIAN said, "I am sorry gentlemen, but I cannot talk to you, and I must leave you now." The interview was then terminated.

Although MIRJANIAN was polite and deferential throughout the interview, he obviously was adhering to the CP instructions relating to approaches by FBI Agents. Although he would not engage in any conversation, it was the opinion of the Agents that they had made various points which affected MIRJANIAN, and they left him with much to think about.

In view of MIRJANIAN's refusal to talk on any subject, no further consideration is being given at this time, for a re-contact with MIRJANIAN, under the TOPLEV Program.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-03-2012

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
ATT: Assistant Director A. H. BELMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

4/7/54

[redacted] was

SM-C

b7D

CPUSA-TOPLEV
IS-C

Rebulet 2/19/54 granting authority to contact [redacted]
under the Toplev Program.

The agent handling this case was assigned to the Lefro Special on a full-time basis from March 1 to March 31. Spot checks on April 1 and 2 failed to provide an opportunity to contact the subject. However, it is believed that the subject will be approached, and the results of the interview submitted to the Bureau by May 19.

RM

1 - [redacted] (Toplev)

OPTIONAL FORM 10-6520-1
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27, 1962

ABN:SBB

100-3-99-4
NOT RECORDED

18 APR 18 1954

5 GRANADA 1954

INITIALS OR SIGNATURE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-03-2012

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
Att: Assistant Dir. A. H. BELMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

4/7/54

CONFIDENTIAL

CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS - C

b7D

[redacted] wa
SF - C

Re NY letter 2/26/54 advising that numerous surveillances had been conducted in the vicinity of subject's residence and employment with negative results to interview her.

Additional efforts to contact the subject under secure conditions were made on April 2, 5, and 7, 1954 in the vicinity of subject's residence and employment.

These efforts were made with negative results.

b7D

Investigation at subject's residence indicates that [redacted]
does not keep regular hours and many days she does not go to work at [redacted]
[redacted] NYC, and remains at home all day. Although the subject has been observed on one occasion, 2/11/54, in the vicinity of the Jefferson School, she was in company of another unidentified woman and an opportunity to interview subject did not present itself. In view of the fact that considerable effort has been made to contact the subject, it is not believed that further time should be spent in an effort to contact her because of subject's irregular working hours.

UACS, no further efforts will be made to interview [redacted] under the Toplev program.

RM

1/21/54 - / - /
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APR 7 1954

1 - [redacted]

HILDE

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONTINUATION OF PAGE FIVE

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

April 6, 1954

SAC, LOS ANGELES [redacted]

CP, USA, TOPLIV;
INTERNAL SECURITY - C;
[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

b7D

This is the monthly progress letter required by Bureau per Bulet dated September 28, 1952.

Since my last progress letter on informant, he has attended one meeting of the [redacted] of the [redacted]

Also during this period he was contacted by [redacted] UE in this area. and he was advised that he, [redacted] was going to the [redacted]

were required as a result of the hearings which had been conducted there by Senator JOSEPH McCARTHY. [redacted] advised informant that as a result of this trip east he would not be able to [redacted]

[redacted] He stated that serious consideration has been given to a number of persons to [redacted] and that all were agreed that informant was the best man to assume this responsibility. Informant stated that he would be happy to do this, and he accepted subject to obtaining the approval of his present employer. [redacted] stated he would contact the employer and obtain his approval, however, the employer declined to release informant for this purpose. Informant thus could not accept the assignment of [redacted]

Informant stated that from his standpoint this was unfortunate because the Communist Party is very much interested in the progress of the [redacted]

On a recent date informant was requested by [redacted] [redacted], to contact a [redacted] in the Los Angeles area named [redacted] with whom informant has [redacted] in the past. [redacted] desired informant to contact [redacted] because [redacted] is [redacted]

REGISTERED
VWH:bla

100-3-99-
NOT RECORDED
181 APR 13 1954

5 (1) APR 13 1954

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[redacted]
[redacted]
a close friend of [redacted]

[redacted] thinking was that if informant could persuade [redacted] to go to [redacted] in an effort to get him to [redacted] might benefit thereby. Informant stated that he was willing to do this if [redacted] could set up an interview for him with [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Informant has not yet been picked up to attend any meetings of the Communist Party although, as reported in my previous letters, he has been advised by [redacted] that he is assigned to a Communist Party club and should be picked up at any time.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: April 8, 1954

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT:

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOP LEV (100-3-99)

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM (66-2542-3)

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Trotter _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

The Central Research Unit recently reviewed all the material issued by the United States Information Agency (USIA) to determine whether or not any of this material could be used in the captioned programs of the Bureau. Included in this material was an article entitled "Marx on the Truman Doctrine" by Bertram D. Wolfe, which was reprinted by USIA from the March 19, 1951, issue of the "New Leader," a copy of which is attached.

This article consists largely of quotations from Karl Marx describing the Russian menace to Europe which, although originally written about 100 years ago, are particularly pertinent at the present time. Copies of this reprint were made available by USIA and there is attached a letter transmitting copies to the field in quantities recommended by the Internal Security Section.

RECOMMENDATION:

Recommend that the attached letter be approved and returned to the Central Research Unit where it will be dated and arrangements completed for forwarding this leaflet to the field.

Attachment

JFC:djs

1 - Mr. J. D. Donohue

✓ For SMC
4-1 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE
SPECIFIED
OR MARKED

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 7-24-87
100-3-99-100-3-99

DECLASSIFICATION

7-24-87

RECORDED - 68

SAC

100-3-99-1802

MR. L. 155

53 APR 26 1954

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED FILED IN / UNSEARCHED UNINDEXED



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

900 Standard Building
Cleveland 13, Ohio

April 2, 1954

Director, FBI

Attention: Assistant Director
A. H. BELMONT

Re: CP-USA, TOPEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
(Bufile 100-3-99)

[redacted]
(Bufile [redacted])

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Dear Sir:

Remylet dated January 20, 1954, reflecting results of the fifth interview with [redacted]

[redacted] was contacted telephonically at the [redacted] Cleveland, and arrangements made for him to appear at the Cleveland Office on the evening of March 30, 1954. On that evening, he was interviewed by SA [redacted] from 8:15 P.M., to 10:45 P.M.

Sixth Interview

Discussion with [redacted] was initiated regarding the housing situation in the United States and he indicated he was pleased with the administration's plans to reduce the required FHA down payment on homes, as a step toward what he referred to as a system of "production for use". He noted the high cost of lot development estimating that the development cost was approximately \$2,000 per lot, which he attributed to present high labor costs. He commented upon the plans of United States Steel to manufacture steel homes at a new plant at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and of United States Steel having acquired the distribution outlets formerly used by Gunnison and felt that the present wooden home being produced by a United States Steel subsidiary would be replaced by a steel or non-ferrous type home.

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RECORDED-21

INDEXED - 21

100-3-99-1803

EBB:rlk

EX-123

REGISTERED MAIL

APR 3 1954

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BEL

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He discussed the "present economic recession" and attributed it to a withdrawal of funds available for retail purchases, by profit taking and hoarding of available funds through fear of future economic instability, which caused surpluses to build up, and a consequent economic recession.

He commented upon the recent arrest of WENDALL RINGHOLTZ, former "left wing" labor leader in Cleveland by the FBI in California for extortion, and stated [REDACTED] RINGHOLTZ' defense to [REDACTED] (Cleveland security subject) and stated that [REDACTED] who is a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in Cleveland. He stated that RINGHOLTZ had been in a "very bad rut mentally" since he had been ousted from the labor movement in Cleveland and that his condition had been aggravated by the health of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and that RINGHOLTZ had gone heavily in debt in trying to help [REDACTED] health. He stated he had [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for a short time, and then later had [REDACTED]. He stated that RINGHOLTZ later had gone to California, and that when the extortion occurred, RINGHOLTZ was about to lose the home he was living in and that [REDACTED] was still ill.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] (Cleveland Security Index subject) continues to [REDACTED] which is operated by [REDACTED] (Cleveland security subject) from his residence, and that the [REDACTED] has [REDACTED]

In addition, [REDACTED] furnished background information, current employment, residence, etc., of approximately thirty other individuals with whom he is or was acquainted, and characterized them as either "left wing" or "open Communists". This information will be appropriately disseminated.

During the interview, [REDACTED] appeared to speak more freely and to exhibit a more cooperative attitude than he has in the past. He appeared to be quite willing to continue the discussions at a future time, and invited the agent to contact him to arrange a mutually agreeable time for further discussions.

It is planned to arrange for a continuation of the interviews in about thirty days, and the Bureau will be promptly informed of the results thereof.

Very truly yours,


N. H. McCabe
Special Agent in Charge

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APR 16 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
Att: Assistant Director A. H. BELMONT
SAC, New York (100-64424)

CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS-C

CHARLES KELNER, was
IS-C

Rebulet, 2/4/54, authorizing this office to reinterview CHARLES KELNER whenever feasible away from his residence and place of employment.

M
On 4/15/54, a physical surveillance was commenced in the vicinity of the residence of CHARLES KELNER, 1534 Selwyn Ave., Bx., NY, for the purpose of interviewing the subject on the street when he departed from home. This surveillance was conducted by SAs CHESTER A. REILLY and EDWARD W. BUCKLEY.

At approximately 9:15 a.m., on this date, the subject was observed to depart from his residence and walk in the direction of the independent subway station, some four blocks away. After subject had walked approximately two blocks away from his home, he was directly approached on the street by Agents REILLY and BUCKLEY who greeted the subject with the comment, "Good morning Mr. KELNER, how are you?" KELNER immediately recognized the agents and replied, "Hello, are you men back again?" KELNER was advised that the agents wanted to have a confidential conversation with him for the benefit of determining whether KELNER would consider cooperating with his Government at this time. The agents mentioned to KELNER that since the last interview with him, he has now had sufficient time to consider the desirability of cooperating with his Government. KELNER immediately replied, "Gentlemen, I made a mistake when I stopped to speak to you the first time, I don't want to be humiliated again." The agents at

1 - [redacted] (P & C)

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100-3-99

NOT RECORDED
15 APR 22 1954

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Letter to Director
NY 100-64424

this point advised KELNER that they were talking to him confidentially, away from his residence and place of employment, and for this reason took the trouble to avoid embarrassing KELNER by speaking to him in a friendly way on the street. KELNER stated, "I have nothing further to say to you and I will not engage in any conversation with you, now or later." KELNER remarked that he considered himself a worker since he was presently employed as a superintendent and plumber at 35 E. 12th St., NYC, and as far as he was concerned was not engaged in any political activity. When KELNER was again asked to consider cooperating with the Bureau, he stated, "I'm not going to talk to you since I have nothing to say." KELNER stated that he had no information to furnish the Government and had nothing to discuss, remarking that he was not political minded. The agents advised KELNER that they were familiar with his background and his association with the people at 35 E. 12th St., NYC. KELNER waved his arms, became noticeably upset and spoke in a loud voice that he had nothing to say and if the agents wanted to speak to him again, they should get the necessary papers to arrest him, since he had a lawyer to defend himself. The agents advised KELNER that the purpose of their visit was to have a conversation with him, and in an endeavor to ascertain if he desired to cooperate with his Government through the FBI.

When it was obvious to the interviewing agents that KELNER was somewhat belligerent and was not going to cooperate, the agents asked him if he had any information concerning the whereabouts of CP fugitives, HENRY WINSTON, GIL GREEN, JIM JACKSON, WILLIAM NORMAN and FRED FINE, KELNER stated, "I have nothing to say and pointedly remarked in relation to WINSTON and GREEN, "I don't know

Letter to Director
NY 100-64424

those men." KELNER endeavored to deny knowing WILLIAM WEINER, former CP functionary, now deceased. KELNER would only state in regard to WEINER, "I may have met him."

After a five minute period, KELNER stated, "Gentlemen, I'm not going to speak to you any more, I don't want to be bothered by you again." KELNER was advised that in the event he should change his mind, after reflecting on the opportunities being presented to him by this Government, he could feel free to communicate with the NYO of this Bureau any time he so desired. KELNER stated, "I don't want to speak to you again."

EVALUATION

Interviewing agents observed that KELNER was upset at the reinterview but became somewhat belligerent and refused to engage in a conversation with the agents. It was obvious to the agents that KELNER lied when he denied knowing WINSTON and GREEN, and only admitted slight acquaintanceship of WEINER.

In view of the uncooperative attitude of KELNER, no further contacts will be had with him by this office. It is apparent that KELNER has notified a lawyer that he was approached by agents of this Bureau in the past.

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99)
(100-328572)

April 14, 1954

SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-21961)

b7D

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

JOSEPH KENEGSBERG, wa.
SECURITY MATTER - C

ReBulet dated 1/4/54.

SURVEILLANCES

Surveillances of this subject indicate that he is presently employed by the Allison-Moseley Coffee Company, 1220 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California, as a Sheet Metal Worker. Subject would leave his residence at approximately 7:35 a.m. and was discharged from his place of employment between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. It was deemed advisable to contact the subject immediately upon his leaving his place of employment.

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CONTACTS

4/13

On 2/13/54, SAs [] and VINCENT W. HUGHES placed subject's place of business under surveillance. Subject was observed in the immediate vicinity of his place of employment and he was approached by the agents, who promptly identified themselves. The agents briefly pointed out the purpose of their contact and other related matters within a two- or three-minute period. The subject then commented that he had nothing to say and started to walk off.

The agents reminded him that he was an immigrant of the United States and that this country had afforded him a livelihood and protection from such people as ADOLPH HITLER over the last thirty years, and then asked him if he did not feel some obligation to carry on a discussion with duly-authorized law-enforcement officers. He replied that he was a busy man, had nothing to say to the agents, and walked away.

REG.
VWH:ndr

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15 APR 22 1954
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EVALUATION

This subject afforded agents no opportunity to carry on a lengthy discussion with him. At most, agents spoke to him a total of five minutes and this with frequent interruptions from the subject that he had nothing to say and that he must leave.

Because of subject's attitude, efforts to develop him under the Toplev program are being considered closed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-03-2012

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
ATT: Assistant Director A. N. BELMONT
SAC, New York (100-49149)

4/14/54

CP, USA - TOPLIV
IS - C

MORRIS GAINER, was
SM-C

Rebulet 12/16/53 authorizing an approach to MORRIS GAINER under the
Toplev program.

Interview with MORRIS GAINER

On 4/13/54 MORRIS GAINER as observed to leave his residence at 1169 Longfellow Ave., Bronx, NY at 6:45 AM and he was surveilled to his automobile which was parked a block and a half away.

GAINER was approached by SAs EDWARD W. BUCKLEY and CHESTER A. KELLY. He readily admitted his identity. The agents exhibited their credentials and advised GAINER that they desired to have a confidential talk with him on a friendly basis on matters of importance to himself and to the US Government. GAINER replied "I've got nothing to say to you guys."

It was impressed on GAINER that no one knew that the agents were talking with him and that this was an opportunity for him to talk to the agents on a confidential basis, if he so desired. GAINER replied "I know what you guys want, but I've got nothing to say to you. You have been responsible for me losing a lot of jobs, why should I talk to you." It was believed that GAINER was referring to his loss of union membership when he was ousted from his painters' union. GAINER was asked what he meant by that statement and how the FBI had been responsible for his loss of jobs. GAINER replied "Oh, I don't mean you personally, but the whole situation has resulted in the loss of several jobs for me." GAINER was asked if he was blaming the FBI for this situation. He replied "Oh no, not the FBI but everything in general. Well, I'm not going to talk to you fellows about anything anyway so don't bother me."

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At this point GAINER walked to his automobile and started to unlock it. The agents talked to GAINER, making numerous points in an effort to engage him in conversation, but GAINER merely shook his head and started to get into the car. GAINER was asked if he knew the whereabouts of the CP fugitives. He replied "I told you I'm not going to talk to you about anything." He thereupon entered his automobile and the agents discontinued the interview at this point.

1 Bureau (100-333363)

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163 APR 21 1954

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to the Director
NY 100-49149

During the interview GAINER was firm in his refusal to engage in conversation and he obviously was adhering to CP instructions relating to contacts with FBI agents.

In view of GAINER'S uncooperative attitude, no consideration is being given at this time for a recontact with him under the Toplev program.

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
Att: Asst. Director A.H. BELMONT
SAC, New York
CP, USA **TOPLEV**
IE - 5

4/14/54

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[redacted] was
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Rebulet 1/7/54 and mylet 3/8/54.

This will advise that [redacted] has not as yet been contacted under the TOPLEV Program. During the month of March, work on the LEFRO investigation deferred efforts to contact [redacted] however, attempts will be renewed to arrange an interview with [redacted] and it is believed that he will be contacted in the near future. The results of such interview will be forwarded to the Bureau by May 14, 1954.

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100-3-99
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SAC, Seattle (66-2135)

April 14, 1954

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Director, FBI (100-3-99) - 1804

EX. 104

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
DEVELOPMENT OF TOP-LEVEL
SECURITY INFORMANTS (TOPLEV)
INTERNAL SECURITY - C


Reurlet dated April 2, 1954, in which you advised that authorization is outstanding to interview one subject and several other individuals will be recontacted in the near future.

You should conduct these remaining interviews as soon as possible in order that this program may be completed on a full-time basis.

It is expected that all these approaches will be completed by the first of next month.

JDD:DE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Trotter _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____



Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99)

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (66-2135)

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
DEVELOPMENT OF TOP-LEVEL
SECURITY INFORMANTS (TOPLEV)
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

DATE: April 2, 1954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ATTENTION: Assistant
Director A. H. BELMONT

AIR MAIL - REGISTERED

Mr. [redacted]
Mr. [redacted]
Miss Gandy
[redacted]

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated April 17, 1953, in which it was requested that a letter be submitted the first of each month listing the names of the TOPLEV subjects being investigated preparatory to requesting authority to interview, names of the subjects on whom authority had been granted to interview, and the names of various individuals who were being considered for interview some time in the future.

The following data is being set forth by the Seattle Office relative to the status of the TOPLEV program in Seattle as of this date.

AUTHORITY RECEIVED BUT
NOT YET APPROACHED

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Name	Date Authorized	Seattle file	Bureau file
[redacted]	February 15, 1954	[redacted]	[redacted]

Concerning this individual, agents connected with the TOPLEV program have made numerous attempts to contact him during which time he would be leaving his place of residence. Attempts to date, however, have met with negative results concerning the security involved.

INDIVIDUALS PREVIOUSLY APPROACHED,
AUTHORITY RECEIVED TO RECONTACT

Name	Date Authorized	Seattle file	Bureau file
[redacted]	March 25, 1954	[redacted]	[redacted]
	October 9, 1953		
	March 1, 1954		
	February 17, 1954		

In Seattle letter dated March 3, 1954, setting forth a summary of the status of the TOPLEV program in Seattle as of that date, additional names were set forth under the headings, "Subjects Being Investigated Preparatory to Requesting Authority to Interview", and "Subjects Under Consideration for Inter-

JRB:nlk

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100-3-22-1804
APR 13 1954
13

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: CP, USA
TOPLEV

view". The Seattle Office at this time is deleting these names and in the event desired data is obtained concerning said individuals, they will be contacted under the Security Informant Program if proper approval is received from the Bureau.

TOTAL NUMBER OF SUBJECTS
INTERVIEWED OR TO BE INTERVIEWED

Agents connected with the TOPLEV program in Seattle have interviewed 59 individuals to date and at the present time Bureau authorization is outstanding to interview one additional individual.

As mentioned in previous communications to the Bureau, the Seattle Office is endeavoring to expedite the completion of the TOPLEV program. It is still believed, however, that from time to time individuals will move into the Seattle area who will qualify for interview under this program; also, individuals living in this area might become increasingly active and also qualify for an approach under this program. In the event individuals are noted in either of the above two categories, their names will be submitted along with the required data for Bureau approval to interview.

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-99) [REDACTED]

4/6/54

SAC, LOS ANGELES [REDACTED]

(100-17951)

(OTOLEV)
[REDACTED]

PSI

ReBulet to Los Angeles and all Toplev offices dated
3/19/54.

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[REDACTED] was recontacted at Coalinga, California, on 3/25/54 by SA [REDACTED] and SA VINCENT W. HUGHES. Agents asked him if he had had occasion to read the pamphlets which they had left him, which were of an anti-communist nature. [REDACTED] said that he had and he found it like a lot of "other stuff" which he had read which had not overly impressed him. He stated his general opposition to this type of material was that it relied heavily on quotations from Marx and Lenin which were taken out of context and he added, "When you have had the direct experience with these people and have never heard the advocacy of such stuff, that it is now rather hard to accept." [REDACTED] was referring to his participation in the communist movement and by his statement he obviously meant that he had heard no specific references to revolution and the placing of one's allegiance to communism above his national loyalty.

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After these few remarks, [REDACTED] stated that what his present position boils down to is that if there are any subversive elements in this country of which he become aware, he would notify the FBI and he stated he is willing to advise agents of any information they desire concerning his past activities.

Agents advised him that they would like him to go a step further on the Bureau's behalf in an effort to ascertain the Party's current feelings toward him and that they would like him to make an effort to recontact the Party to determine this. He was advised that as a result of some research on the part of the agents, that they had learned that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] obtained his naturalization papers in Los Angeles a number of years ago. They advised [REDACTED] was now being investigated and considered for possible denaturalization and deportation because of his communist activities. Agents advised that the Immigration and Naturalization Service was presently conducting investigation of [REDACTED] and that it is routine in such investigation to [REDACTED] of the subject.

REGISTERED

100-3-99-1

VWH:cla

NOT RECORDED

193 APR 27 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

60 APR 29 1954

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[redacted]
Agents suggested to [redacted] that on his next visit to Los Angeles, he contact some Party official to advise them that INS agents had [redacted]

[redacted] had nothing to say without the presence of an attorney and that he, [redacted] should ask the Party member, whom he contacts, if this was the approved procedure at this time.

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[redacted] thought this would be an excellent pretext and readily accepted it, leaving only in doubt who he should contact in Los Angeles. He originally suggested [redacted] with whom he was closely associated in the [redacted]
[redacted] and who is an old-time communist. However, upon reconsideration, he felt that [redacted] might not take any action upon the receipt of this information and [redacted] suggested that he contact [redacted] himself, with the thought in mind that [redacted] would probably refer him to some Party person of a higher echelon. [redacted] stated he expected to be in Los Angeles sometime in early April 1954.

In additional discussion with [redacted] he stated that since the agents' first visit to him, he had given some thought as to whether any of his old communist contacts may ever look him up. Then, without any provocation, he stated, "The only people who may look me up are [redacted]
[redacted] is all over." (Referring

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He was asked why he thought [redacted] might contact him and the only answer he gave was that he thought that when he was active in the Los Angeles area that he was "probably" [redacted] could not elaborate on this any further.

The Bureau will be promptly advised of any additional developments in connection with efforts to set up [redacted] as an informant.

SAC, Chicago

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April 21, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

1865

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Ex. 10

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet dated April 15, 1954.


Authority is granted to utilize Special Agent Myron H. Treter on the Toplev Program.

You should be certain that he is fully acquainted with the Bureau's instructions relative to this project.

JDD:DE

NOTE ON YELLOW: SA Treter has been assigned to the Security Informant Program and, according to Chicago, is aware of the Bureau's instructions and available literature regarding the Security Informant and Toplev Programs. The personnel file of SA Treter indicates his latest efficiency report rates him as satisfactory; he is not on probation; and it is noted that on September 8, 1952, he received a meritorious raise for his work in developing security informants and on January 8, 1953, he received a letter of commendation for another security informant whom he developed. SA Treter is a good selection to continue the Toplev Program.

Tolson _____
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Harbo _____
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Trotter _____
Winterswold _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____



35+ APR 28 1954

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (100-3-99)

DATE: April 15, 1954

FROM : SAC, Chicago [redacted]

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SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEV

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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At the present time there have been two agents working on the Toplev Program in the Chicago Division, SA's CHARLES W. COLGLAZIER and [redacted] Agent [redacted] is being removed from the Toplev Program at his own request and it is desired to replace him with SA MYRON H. TRETER, GS-12, who entered on duty with the Bureau on October 6, 1947. For the past five years Agent TRETER has been working on security work in the Chicago Division, has had considerable experience in various phases of security work, and is capable of handling complicated investigations. For the past eight months he has been assigned to the Security Informant Program and is acquainted with the Bureau's instructions and the available literature regarding both these programs.

JPM/gls

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100-3-99-1805

APR 15 1954

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EX-104

FBI - CHICAGO
INTERNAL SECURITY

SAC, Los Angeles [redacted]

April 22, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, UGA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
[redacted]

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Reurlet dated April 6, 1954, setting forth the progress of this informant.

According to previous instructions, you are submitting progress letters on this informant each month in addition to a summary every six months when additional authorization to make payments to the informant is requested by your office.

The informant appears to be progressing satisfactorily and monthly progress letters are not necessary at this time.

Authority is granted to discontinue the monthly progress letters and when requesting continuation of payments for the informant, you should be certain to include in summary fashion all pertinent information obtained by the informant and, particularly, plans for his future development.

Any matters of immediate interest should, of course, be furnished to the Bureau by airtel or teletype as they arise, dependent upon the individual circumstances in each case. You should, of course, continue to personally supervise the development of this individual to obtain the maximum benefit from his services.

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Tele. Room _____
Lolloman _____
Miss Gandy _____



100-3-99
NOT RECORDED
181 APR 23 1954
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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-03-2012

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
Att: Asst. Dir. A.H. BELMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

4/16/54

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

(COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
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[redacted]
IS-C

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Rebulet dated 2/19/54 granting authority to interview subject under
the TOPLEV program.

Please be advised that this office was unable to conduct this interview with the subject since the Agent to whom the interview has been assigned was engaged in assisting in the LEFRO investigation. It is expected that the TOPLEV interview with this subject will be conducted by May 19, 1954.

① Bureau [redacted]

RH

FJM:ACK

100-3-99-V
NOT RECORDED
158 APR 22 1954

INITIALS [redacted]

55 APR 26 1954

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ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN [redacted]

SAC, Detroit (66-3360) [redacted]

April 14, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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[redacted]
SECURITY MATTER - C

Reurlet dated April 8, 1954, advising that it has not been possible to recontact the subject under this program.

According to referenced letter, since the subject rides to and from work with her husband and her husband is usually at their residence, it has been difficult to make an approach to her. It was requested that a recontact be held in abeyance until after HCUA hearings were held in Detroit.

Since it cannot be determined when you will be able to make a recontact with the subject, you should remove [redacted] from consideration at this time under the Toplev Program.


If in the future circumstances are such that a recontact with her is believed practicable and feasible, you should advise the Bureau, setting forth the circumstances and await Bureau authorization to proceed.

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JDD:DE

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Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Trotter _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

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APR 28 1954



ORIGINAL FILED IN

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

April 8, 1954

SAC, Detroit (66-3360)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CP, USA, TOPLIV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

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SECURITY MATTER - C

Attention: Mr. A. H. BELMONT, Assistant Director

Reference Bureau letter dated February 11, 1954.

It has not been possible to attempt a recontact with captioned subject for the following reasons:

The Party, according to [redacted] has directed that [redacted] a short while ago, re-establish himself as again living with [redacted] at least until after the [redacted] this Committee and he was told to give all the resemblance of marital status to quiet any rumors that might spread throughout the Party. The Party has informed the [redacted] according to the Informant, was informed that her future Party assignments will be discussed with her after the [redacted] are here.

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It has been most difficult to make a recontact with [redacted] due to the fact that she rides to and from work with her husband and any calls received at her residence are first taken by [redacted] who stays very close to home. It is requested that the Bureau authorize a hold in abeyance with respect to recontacting [redacted]. The Bureau will be promptly advised concerning developments in this matter.

JH:HAL
REGISTERED

100-3-99-
NOT RECORDED
29 APR 19 1954

FBI - DETROIT
APR 19 1954

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-03-2012

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
Att: Asst. Dir. A.H. BELMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

4/16/54

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

(COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
IS-C

[redacted]
SM-C

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Rebulet dated 4/19/54 granting authority to interview subject under the TOPLEV program.

M Please be advised that this office was unable to conduct this interview with subject as the Agent to whom this interview has been assigned was engaged in assisting in the LEFRO investigation. It is expected that this TOPLEV interview will be conducted by 5/19/54.

Q
1 Bureau [redacted]
1 [redacted]

Cy

RM

FJN:ACK

100-3-99-V
NOT RECORDED
158 APR 22 1954
INITIALS [redacted]

[Signature]

33 APR 27 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Director (100-3-99)
Attention: Assistant Director A. H. BERNARD
FAC, New York (100-82433)
Communist Party
CP, USA (TOPLEV)
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

4/16/54

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

llp
BERNARD L. KOTEN, was.
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Rebulet 2/17/54 granting authority to contact KOTEN under the Toplev Program.

KOTEN was observed leaving his residence, 548 West 164th Street, NYC, at 9:25 a.m. on 4/16/54. He was followed discreetly by SA JOSEPH A. CULLEN and [redacted] to St. Nicholas Avenue. At the corner of St. Nicholas Avenue and 163d Street KOTEN was approached under secure conditions by the agents. He acknowledged his identity and the agents produced and displayed their credentials to him. The agents explained that they would like to talk to KOTEN confidentially. He asked what the nature of the talk was to be. Photographs of the Communist fugitives were displayed to him and he was informed that those were photographs of Communist fugitives from justice. He immediately said, with a wave of his arm, that he had "nothing to do with them and I don't know them." KOTEN started to walk away at this point. It was noticed that he was very nervous and tried to create the impression that he was in a hurry.

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The agents asked KOTEN if the circumstances were such that he did happen to know of any information concerning these Communist fugitives, would he then tell the agents about them. He answered, "I don't know. I don't want to get involved." The agents reminded him that he was an American citizen. He responded quickly by stating, "You bet I am." He was then told that as an American citizen he had a duty among others to cooperate with law enforcement agencies in the investigations conducted by them. KOTEN replied that he did not know anything that would help "you."

RM

1 - Bufile 100-245228 (RM)
1 - [redacted]

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181 APR 22 1954

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INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

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70 APR 28 1954

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Letter to Director, FBI
NY 100-82433

The agents explained to KOTEN that they believed he was in a position to assist the government and they would like to discuss with him certain matters. KOTEN started walking away and said, "I'm late now and I don't know anything that could help you." He was asked that if the circumstances were such that the agents believed he was in a position to help the government in investigative matters pertaining to citizens of other countries who were in the US at the present time and whose visits to this country were designed for purposes detrimental to the US, would he assist the government in investigations of those persons. He answered, "No, I would not." He then added that he would not talk about such matters "here." He was then advised that the agents had approached him in this manner in order that he might not be embarrassed by a call at his home or at his office. They asked him if he did not appreciate such consideration. He did not reply.

He was then asked if he would assist the government in any way whatsoever in its investigations. He answered, "I don't know." He was again reminded that as a citizen he had a duty to assist the government. He replied that he was not going to talk about such things on the street. He was politely informed that the agents would be very glad to make an appointment to talk with him at any place he might suggest and he again waved his arm and said, "No, I will not get involved. If you have a warrant it might be different." He walked away from the agents and the interview was terminated.

It appeared that KOTEN was surprised when he was approached by the agents, and it also appeared that he became immediately noticeably nervous and extremely reluctant to talk to the agents. The excuse that he was in a hurry was a thinly veiled attempt to get away from the agents. Until he was approached the agents had noticed that he had not been in a hurry and was rather sauntering along the street casually looking in store windows and generally walking fairly slow. It is obvious that KOTEN was following a line of least resistance by adhering to a routine similar to that suggested by the CP in its instructions to individuals who are approached by FBI agents.

In view of the above no further action will be taken under the Toplev Program concerning KOTEN at this time.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-03-2012

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
Att: Asst. Dir. A.H. BELMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

4/16/54

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
IS-C

[redacted] was
IS-C

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Rebulet 2/25/54 granting authority to interview subject under
the TOPLEV program.

Please be advised that this office was unable to conduct this
interview with subject inasmuch as the Agent to whom this interview has
been assigned was engaged in assisting in the LEFRO investigation. It
is expected that the TOPLEV interview with this subject will be conducted
by 5/25/54.

1-Bureau [redacted]

RM

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C/S

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156 APR 23 1954

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subjects. Additionally, informant has been in contact with

Informant was recently laid off by his employer, the [redacted] [redacted] due to a cutback in the labor force, and is therefore currently unemployed. Inasmuch as informant was employed by this firm over eight years and has earned seniority, he is hopeful of being recalled. He has indicated his intention to intensify his efforts for advancement in the Communist movement.

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Informant has been specifically advised that he is not an employee of the Bureau, that his assistance is voluntary, that his membership in any organization is not sponsored nor sanctioned by the Bureau, that his cooperation must be strictly confidential, that any compensation received by him in excess of expenses must be reported as income for income tax purposes, that the Bureau is not interested in employer-employee relationships, and that he must not retain copies of reports.

Informant has not been paid the maximum amount heretofore authorized. However, in view of his current activity and promise, it is recommended that authority be continued for a period of six months effective 5/1/54 to pay informant a maximum of \$150 per month on a strictly C.O.D. basis. Information furnished will be carefully evaluated to assure that full value is received for payments made.

SAC, New York [redacted]

April 14, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

100-3-99-4
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] b7D

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurlet dated April 7, 1954.

Authority is granted to contact [redacted]
whenever feasible away from residence and any place
of employment.

In conducting this interview you should be
guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to
interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it
is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days,
the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the
contact has not been made and when you anticipate
conducting the interview.

JDD:DE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Trotter _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____

13 APR 29 1954



RECEIVED
FBI - NEW YORK
APR 29 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

4/15/54

SAC, Los Angeles [redacted]

CP, USA

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TOPLEV
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CONFIDENTIAL

Opd
[redacted]
Remylet dated 10/7/53 and Buauth dated 10/20/53 to continue payments to informant to an amount not to exceed \$150 per month.

Informant continues to be in regular contact with the L.A. Office and has attended and promptly furnished information concerning the following events since relet.

[redacted]
CP meeting
CP meeting
CP meeting
CP meeting
CEDC meeting
CP meeting
CP meeting
CP meeting

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[redacted]
DFW rally

[redacted]
CP meeting
CP meeting
CP meeting
CP meeting
CRC rally
CP meeting

Informant continues to be the main source of information concerning the activities of members of [redacted] husband of [redacted] from L.A. There are presently [redacted]

Among those upon whom informant has reported since relet are [redacted]
[redacted]

HEH:DRU
Reg.

68 MAY 4 1954

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100-3-99-1
NOT RECORDED
155 APR 20 1954
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
Attention: Assistant Director A.H. BELMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

4/7/54

CONFIDENTIAL

CP, USA - TOPLIV
IS - C

[redacted]

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IS - C

Rebulet 3/22/54.

The name of [redacted] is being submitted
for the Bureau's consideration as a person to be contacted under
the Top Lov Program.

BACKGROUND

Birth Data

[redacted] at
NYC. His father was born in [redacted] and his mother was
born in [redacted]

Marital Status

[redacted] married [redacted] They
have a [redacted]

Race and Citizenship

[redacted] is white, and is a citizen of the
United States.

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Education

[redacted]
[redacted]
interference with college exercises. He later entered [redacted]
[redacted].

1 - Bufile [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

12 APR 1954

EWB:CAR:ITEM

Letter to Director, FBI

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Employment

[redacted]
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Residence

[redacted] resides with his family at [redacted]
[redacted] and was reported to spend time at a [redacted]
[redacted] New York.

COMMUNIST PARTY AFFILIATIONS

At an [redacted]
on [redacted] and said that
he had been a CP member since 1934 and had been associated
with Communist activities since 1930. He said that he was
a member of the [redacted] of the CP at that time.
and described his employment as [redacted]

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It was reported in September and October 1950 that [redacted]

[redacted] the CP, USA.

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Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted]
In November 1950 [redacted]

[redacted]
b7D

From [redacted]

[redacted]
b7D

After returning to the United States in [redacted] travelled to the West Coast and [redacted] both there and in other parts of the country [redacted]. His [redacted] since his return to the United States appeared to follow the current CP line, and his [redacted] has received publicity in the [redacted] and the [redacted] on the West Coast.

Letter to Director, FBI
[redacted]

Reports On [redacted] Current Standing With The Communist Party.

Rebulet reports information indicating that [redacted] may be disillusioned with conditions in the Soviet Union, that he may be more Socialistic than Communistic, and that his fear of inability to get a job prevents his defection from the CP.

The following information may have a bearing on [redacted] present status:

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It was reported in December 1952 that [redacted] in correspondence to his mother, had indicated that if his wife [redacted]

[redacted] mother advised an informant that [redacted] in China, and that he had been very well treated in Moscow. It was also reported in November 1952 by [redacted] China since September 1952 had not been used in the [redacted] although it had [redacted] on the West Coast. It was the informant's opinion that [redacted] was in some difficulty with the [redacted] and he said [redacted] had been referred to as "no good".

In [redacted] return to the United States CG-5824-S reported that [redacted] had commented that [redacted] was being "pushed around" by the [redacted] people, and that apparently [redacted] was not going to put [redacted] back to work as [redacted]. According to [redacted] was going to use [redacted]

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In September 1953 CG-5824-S reported that when [redacted] left the United States in [redacted] he left unofficially without a [redacted] CP to go to Europe. Informant said [redacted] left in this manner because at that time he was not in the good graces of the national leadership of the CP because he was in conflict with the [redacted] the Foster leadership. He said that [redacted] was not given the official credentials of [redacted] until after he had arrived in Europe and his difficulties with the Party had been clarified.

Letter to Director, FBI

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[redacted]
[redacted] had originally planned to go to Europe to [redacted]

[redacted] When he took this European trip on his own in [redacted] the Party at first disliked his making the trip because it feared that [redacted] would talk against the sectarian policy of the CP, USA. The informant reported that he had been advised that [redacted] was not permitted to enter Russia except in transit to China. The informant commented that the fact that the Russians did not permit [redacted] to travel free means that he did not get much of a recommendation from the leadership of the CP, USA. The informant remarked that prior to making his visit to China, [redacted] had indicated that he was returning to the United States and it appeared that [redacted] was then offered the opportunity to go to China either by the Russians or the CP, USA and he accepted this opportunity. In November 1953 it was reported that [redacted]

[redacted] on the question as to whether or not there would be war with the Soviet Union and what the correct Party line for [redacted] should be on this matter. Among other things, [redacted] contended that the EISENHOWER Administration professed to want peace, but its actions reflect that the only thing that holds the United States back from war is the strength of the Soviet Union. Therefore, peace should not be taken for granted because the Soviet Union wants peace and EISENHOWER says he wants peace. It was reported that at first [redacted] took different positions, but finally [redacted] agreed with [redacted] on the above approach on foreign policy. [redacted] however, took the position that there was not going to be a war between the United States and the Soviet Union because both did not want it and both were sincere in their statements. [redacted] added that the Soviet Union's recent announcement that it is increasing its production of consumer goods indicates to him that there is a weakness in the Soviet Home Front rather than strength, in that the Soviet Union can re-arm and at the same time increase consumer goods production. [redacted] position was that this is a sign of strength in the Soviet Union. It was said that when [redacted] remarks he stated that [redacted] displayed "Anti Soviet tendencies". [redacted] also commented that reports she has

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Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted]
[redacted] received concerning [redacted] recent West Coast [redacted]
[redacted] appears to substantiate [redacted] beliefs. She said
that [redacted] had indicated this tendency when [redacted]

For example, [redacted] remarked that he had found the morals b7D
in China to be higher than those in the Soviet Union. She
also quoted [redacted] as making the statement that toilet
facilities in China and Manchuria were superior to those in
the Soviet Union.

The name [redacted] is included on the Security Index.

PLAN OF APPROACH

In view of the above information, coupled with the information in rebullet to the effect that [redacted] had propositioned the [redacted]

[redacted] it appears that there is a strong possibility that [redacted] may be ready to defect from the CP. Although nothing appears in his latest [redacted] to substantiate this belief, it is apparent from the reports of dissatisfaction with [redacted] on the part of highly placed CP functionaries that [redacted] may at least be "under a cloud". There is a possibility that since [redacted] had difficulty with the CP when leaving for his European trip, this difficulty, together with incidents which may have occurred during his travels throughout the Iron Curtain countries may have "soured him" on the CP movement.

In view of the reports that [redacted] was not placed in his former position in the [redacted] on his return from Europe and the indication that the CP people were "pushing him around", it is believed that this may have further bearing on his attitude towards the Party at this time.

Because of this man's [redacted]

[redacted] consideration will be given to this interview with the purpose of engaging this man in conversation and eventual development as an informant for this office.

It is felt that if contacted under secure conditions that an interview with [redacted] might prove successful.

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Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted]
[redacted] The Bureau is requested for authority to contact [redacted] in accordance with existing Bureau instructions relating to the Top Lev program. If such authority is granted [redacted] will be approached on the street by two agents after he has been surveilled to a secure location. Adequate security will be provided by other agents on the Top Lev squad, all agents operating for the express purpose of trying to make a successful interview. It is contemplated that this approach will be made during the week of May 3, 1954, circumstances permitting.

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SAC, New York [redacted]

April 14, 1954

Director, FBI (100-3-99) [redacted]

100-3-77

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
TOPLEV
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

[redacted] was
SECURITY MATTER - C

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Reurlet dated April 8, 1954.


Authority is granted to contact [redacted]
whenever feasible away from residence and place of
employment.

In conducting this interview you should be
guided by existing Bureau instructions relating to
interviews with Toplev subjects.

Advise Bureau results of contact and if it
is not possible to approach the subject within 60 days,
the Bureau should be furnished the reason why the
contact has not been made and when you anticipate
conducting the interview.

JDD:DE

Tolson _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Harbo _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Mohr _____
Trotter _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Miss Gandy _____



ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Director, FBI (100-3-99)
ATTENTION: Asst. Director A. H. BELMONT
SAC, New York [redacted]

4/8/54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CP, USA - TOPLEV
IS-C

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[redacted] was
SM-C

[redacted] a long-time member of the CP and current
and present CP [redacted] CP meetings, has been selected
as a subject to be interviewed under the TOPLEV Program.

NYC,

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PERSONAL BACKGROUND

The subject, as [redacted] at
[redacted] the son of [redacted] who was born in
[redacted] and [redacted]. It is noted that the subject's true
name is [redacted] although he is commonly known in the CP as
[redacted]

[redacted] claims American citizenship through his father,
who was naturalized in [redacted] claims
a high school education and two years of [redacted]

[redacted] is also reported to have attended [redacted]
that he can [redacted] He has claimed
[redacted].

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The subject has a [redacted] which makes him
[redacted] married [redacted] NY.
[redacted] It is noted his wife is a [redacted]
and in 1951 went on a [redacted]

[redacted] and his wife presently reside in [redacted]
NYC. They have no children, but the
superintendent has advised that [redacted]
is staying with them.

RM

FBI Bureau [redacted]

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HPL:RMcn

100-3-99- ✓

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152 APR 20 1954

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Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted]
It is noted that [redacted] who is an inmate of the US Penitentiary, [redacted] for violation of the Smith Act, has advised the warden of that penitentiary that [redacted]

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In addition to [redacted] activities as a [redacted] self employed as a [redacted] he is reported to be working out of his apartment.

CP ACTIVITIES

CP [redacted] file indicates that in 1935 [redacted]
NYC. [redacted] From 1937 to 1940. [redacted]

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From 1942 to 1946. [redacted] was employed as [redacted]

[redacted] It is noted that this is a CP [redacted]

In 1942. [redacted] was reported as active as a [redacted]

In 1943, info was supplied to the NYO that [redacted]

the CP to the [redacted] the CP,
NY. In that same year, [redacted] was reported as [redacted]

b7D

In 1944. [redacted] was listed on [redacted]
[redacted] CP Club as well as [redacted]
[redacted] this Club. In 1944, he [redacted]
[redacted] the National Convention of the CP, which was held from May 20th to May 23, 1944 in NYC.

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Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted]

During the period 1943 to 1944 [redacted]
[redacted] numerous CP forums and meetings.

In 1945, [redacted] along with
[redacted] Marxist philosophy. It is noted this [redacted]
[redacted] and Mr. [redacted]
was [redacted]

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Also in 1945, the subject attended the NYS CPA convention [redacted]. During the period 1947-1948,
[redacted] was a member of the [redacted]
[redacted] the NYS CP. During the period 1944 to the present time, the subject has [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] and
[redacted] CP functions and meetings of CP fronts.
It is noted that in 1948 [redacted] was reported as on the
CP. USA [redacted]. In 1951, he [redacted]
[redacted] NYC.

At the present time, [redacted] is reported
to be [redacted]

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[redacted] advised early in Dec., 1953 that [redacted]
[redacted] NY. These [redacted] of members
of the CP, and were to be attended by approximately twenty
CP members in that area. It is noted that the party planned
to [redacted].

PLAN OF APPROACH

Bureau authority is requested for this office
to interview [redacted] during the week of April 26, 1954
if circumstances permit. This contact would be made when

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Letter to Director, FBI

[redacted]
[redacted] is a secure distance away from his home or the

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The interview would be conducted in accordance
with existing Bureau instructions re interviews of security
subjects.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
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Page 158 ~ b1, b3